[外部リンク] interest rate expectations had fallen in most major economies during the month. Compared with a month earlier, official policy rates were expected to remain low for longer. These moves appeared to have been prompted by announcements and comments from the monetary authorities. In the United Kingdom, the decision to extend the asset purchase programme, the publication of the Inflation Report and the MPC Minutes had all led to a lower and flatter short-term yield curve.』
『The announcement to increase the asset purchase programme by £50 billion to £175 billion at the beginning of August had not been widely expected. That had led to a fall in the yields on gilts eligible for the asset purchase programme by some 10-20 basis points on the day. Yields had continued to fall during the month. Government bond yields had also fallen in the United States during the month, and it was a more mixed picture across maturities in the euro zone.』
『M4 growth, excluding the money holdings of institutions that intermediate between banks, had been estimated to have picked up slightly to 5.3% on a three-month annualised basis in July compared with 4% in June. The annual growth rate of non-financial corporate money holdings had become positive for the first time in over a year. That was encouraging, as one way the asset purchase programme had been expected to stimulate nominal spending was through boosting the moneyholdings of the non-financial private sector.』
『There had been a number of developments during the month with positive implications for the short term. The world economic data had generally been stronger than the Committee had expected at the time of the August Report. In the United Kingdom, the GDP data for 2009 Q2 had been revised upwards. The more recent data on construction and industrial production had suggested further upward revisions to the Q2 GDP data were likely, and manufacturing output had grown strongly in July. Business surveys had continued to improve. Broad money growth had picked up.』
『Asset prices had continued to rise. The recovery in equity and house prices meant that collateral values had risen, which should, other things equal, increase the availability of credit and reduce the cost of borrowing. Market expectations of future Bank Rate had fallen; the exchange rate had depreciated; and gilt yields were down. Three-month Libor had fallen to its lowest rate since the mid 1980s, and that rate was an important benchmark for the cost of companies’ borrowing. All of these financial market developments were likely to boost nominal spending in due course.』
『There had been some promising indications from asset markets. But the lesson from previous financial crises was that they were not resolved quickly, and that there could be false dawns.』
ほほう偽りの夜明けとな。で、このパラグラフはまだ続きます。
『The banking system still had to complete a process of balance sheet adjustment, including raising new capital, and bank lending remained weak. The drag on aggregate demand growth from the financial sector was likely to be long-lasting. High levels of public debt internationally and the persistence of global imbalances remained downside risks to the sustainability of the recovery. The implications of the financial crisis for potential growth and the degree of economic slack ? and thus medium-terminflation ? also remained uncertain.』
『In August, the Committee had decided on and announced a programme of asset purchases for the three months up to the November MPC meeting. The medium-term outlook had not changed markedly since then. For those members who had preferred a larger stimulus at the August meeting, a larger asset purchase programme could still be justified. But in the absence of significant news about the medium term the case for adjusting the programme now was outweighed by the benefits offollowing through with the programme of asset purchases announced in August. All members therefore agreed to continue with the announced programme of asset purchases this month.』
『企業の資金調達コストについて、何人かの委員は、資金余剰感が強いもとで、社債・C P 発行金利の一段の低下や、中間期末越えプレミアムの低さなどに示されるように、改善が続いていると述べた。また、複数の委員は、高格付けC P の発行レートが短国レートを下回る官民逆転現象が再び定着してきていると指摘した。』
今回の声明文 [外部リンク] received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August suggests that economic activity has picked up following its severe downturn. 』(今回)
『Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June suggests that economic activity is leveling out. 』(前回)
『Conditions in financial markets have improved further, and activity in the housing sector has increased.Household spending seems to be stabilizing, but remains constrained by ongoing job losses, sluggish income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit.』(今回)
『Conditions in financial markets have improved further in recent weeks. Household spending has continued to show signs of stabilizing but remains constrained by ongoing job losses, sluggish income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. 』(前回)
金融環境は更に改善という話に、activity in the housing sector has increasedと書きながらも、家計部門の消費に関しての認識は変化が無いという事のようで。
『Businesses are still cutting back on fixed investment and staffing, though at a slower pace; they continue to make progress in bringing inventory stocks into better alignment with sales.』(今回)
『Businesses are still cutting back on fixed investment and staffing but are making progress in bringing inventory stocks into better alignment with sales.』(前回)
今回は企業活動の認識の中で設備投資と人員削減に関してthough at a slower paceというのが入ってまして微妙に上方修正。
『Although economic activity is likely to remain weak for a time, the Committee anticipates that policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institutions, fiscal and monetary stimulus, and market forces will support a strengthening of economic growth and a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability.』(今回)
『Although economic activity is likely to remain weak for a time, the Committee continues to anticipate that policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institutions, fiscal and monetary stimulus, and market forces will contribute to a gradual resumption of sustainable economic growth in a context of price stability.』(前回)
前半の表現は同じっぽいですけれども、FOMCは経済の回復の為に云々という部分の表現がgradual resumption of sustainable economic growthから今回はgradual return to higher levels of resource utilizationとなっててこれも表現的には前進してるんでしょう。ここまでが経済認識で以下物価に関して。
『With substantial resource slack likely to continue to dampen cost pressures and with longer-term inflation expectations stable, the Committee expects that inflation will remain subdued for some time.』(今回)
『The prices of energy and other commodities have risen of late. However, substantial resource slack is likely to dampen cost pressures, and the Committee expects that inflation will remain subdued for some time.』(前回)
物価見通しには変化がなさそうですな。で、金融政策ですけど、金利に変化が無い話は飛ばしてその先から。
『To provide support to mortgage lending and housing markets and to improve overall conditions in private credit markets, the Federal Reserve will purchase a total of $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securities and up to $200 billion of agency debt.』(今回)
さいですが、今回はMBS買入ちゃんを期限延長するそうで・・・・・
『The Committee will gradually slow the pace of these purchases in order to promote a smooth transition in markets and anticipates that they will be executed by the end of the first quarter of 2010.』(今回)
『As previously announced, the Federal Reserve’s purchases of $300 billion of Treasury securities will be completed by the end of October 2009.』(今回)
これは念押し。
『The Committee will continue to evaluate the timing and overall amounts of its purchases of securities in light of the evolving economic outlook and conditions in financial markets. The Federal Reserve is monitoring the size and composition of its balance sheet and will make adjustments to its credit and liquidity programs as warranted.』
[外部リンク] Practical Principles to Cope with Market Dysfunctions』の続きから。
昨日書いたのを再掲しますけど、 『Principle 1. Select and Concentrate』 『Principle 2. Avoid Further Dysfunction』 『Principle 3. Provide Safety Nets』 『Principle 4. Design Measures to be Self-Fading as Conditions Improve』 の2番目からです。
『The current financial crisis has shown how devastating the erosion of market confidence can be. When confidence is eroded, investors are “excessively” averse to uncertainty (or the so-called unknown unknowns), and become sensitive to any news having some bearing on the worst possible case scenario. Actions that may be rational at the level of individual market participants can lead to a "fallacy of composition," which prevents the markets from restoring their functions. Even worse, functional breakdown and confidence erosion aggravate each other. In this respect, a safety-net facility, which works like a put option to mitigate damages that would be incurred in the worst possible case, is likely to reduce the degree of this “excessive uncertainty aversion.”』
『Some of the unconventional measures I have outlined have this characteristic.』『For example, the term of outright purchases of CP and corporate bonds is substantially higher than the “normal” one, though lower than that in distressed conditions. Therefore, as conditions improve, market participants find it unprofitable to use these facilities, as exemplified in the recent decline in the usage of these facilities.』
というのがこれまた微妙にオシャレな話でして・・・・・・『3. Five Don’ts in Assessing Unconventional Policies』以下からです。まず項目を引用するとこうなります。
『(1) Don’t Take the Central Bank’s Balance Sheets as a Measure of Monetary Easing』 『(2) Don’t Look only at the Segments of Financial Markets subject to Intervention』 『(3) Don’t Underestimate Safety Nets』 『(4) Don’t Ignore Heterogeneity among Countries and Regions』 『(5) Don’t Assume a Return to the Way It Was』
『Many unconventional policy measures are designed to be selective and are tailored to a specific market dysfunction. Thus, there is no common yardstick evaluating all market intervention. Moreover, the usage of unconventional policy facilities declines as market functions improve. Shrinkage of a central bank’s balance sheet reflecting this mechanism should not be interpreted as a monetary tightening but rather as a sign of improving market conditions.』
『Second, do not look at the conditions of only those segments of financial markets where intervention has taken place.』
ほほう。
『In fact, there might be spill-over effects to other segments. Given resource and capital constraints, the central banks target their market interventions quite specifically. However, in so doing, central banks expect positive spill-over effects to other segments not so targeted.』
『A good illustration of this lies in Japanese CP markets. We see improvements, as expected and hoped for, in the A2-rated CP market even though they are not eligible for the BOJ’s purchase program. The A2-rated CP market is apparently affected by our purchase of A1-rated CP.』
『Third, do not underestimate the beneficial effects of safety-net measures especially when investors’ confidence is fragile. When market confidence is eroded, investors are “excessively” averse to uncertainty and tend to “wait and see” until they feel more confident about making market transactions.』
『A “safety net” facility has some of the characteristics of insurance or put options and thus substantially reduces this sort of uncertainty. Just as insurance is an umbrella for unexpected rain, a safety net builds confidence whether or not dire events come to pass. An underutilized facility does not necessarily mean it is ineffective or useless.』
(4)国による状況の違いを無視しないように
まあ1番目の話に通じるのですけど、最初の所で中々心温まる話をしています。
『Fourth, do not ignore heterogeneity among countries and regions. It is not the case that every country should follow a common sequence of policies to exit from unconventional policies.』
ここまでの話に通じる話ですが、この次がチャーミング。
『Economists, including me, have a tendency to ignore statutory differences and institutional subtleties among countries and regions, to get clear-cut empirical results and policy recommendations. There are always pitfalls in this tendency, which we should be very careful to avoid.』
『Now I come to the last of the five Don’ts: Do not assume we will return to “the way it was.” Although the collapse of the global financial markets took place in a surprisingly short period of time, their rebuilding and restructuring is likely to be a long and slow process.』
ちゅうことですな。
『The “normalcy” to which we are returning is the one in which rebuilding and restructuring are still under way. Moreover, “the way it was,” that is, as financial markets were before the crisis, with high leverage and dubious securitized products, has been shown to be unsustainable.』
『We live in a world of irreversibility, a world in which we cannot undo what we have done. Both financial markets and real economies have changed in an irreversible way. Now we have to be flexible enough to adjust ourselves to this changing reality.』
[外部リンク] Phases of Financial Markets’ Functional Breakdown in the Current Crisis』ということで、今般金融危機における市場機能の低下(というか崩壊)の過程について説明しています。順序としては(1)カウンターパーティーリスクなどの意識が高まり市場の信頼が失われ、(2)ポジションのアンワインドの動きから個別市場の価格形成機能が崩壊し、(3)金融仲介機能が壊れて実体経済への負のフィードバックが発生する、という説明をしています。
って『2. Unconventional Policies: Coping with Market Dysfunction and Confidence Erosion』という小見出しを勝手に訳してみただけなのですけどね(^^)。
『Given the severe adverse effects of market dysfunctions, the utmost policy priority of central banks was to find a way to alleviate market dysfunctions and thus to enhance financial intermediation, thereby restoring the monetary transmission mechanism.』
『This is what unconventional policies are all about.』
『This means unconventional policies are not exotic but extensions of conventional policies. However, central banks had to go beyondtheir traditional role as a liquidity provider, and to engage themselves in complementing and enhancing market functions.』
でまあ各国の実施した政策を簡単に紹介した後、市場機能崩壊に対処する4つの原則を『Four Practical Principles to Cope with Market Dysfunctions』という小見出しからの部分で説明していますが、その前に原則論を説明してます。
『Unconventional policies entail microeconomic intervention and explicit risk-taking by central banks. Thus, these policies should satisfy two basic criteria.』
その前に2つの基本的判断基準がありますとな。
『First, the benefits of market intervention should outweigh the costs of distorting resource allocation. Second, central banks should have a sufficient capital buffer of their own and appropriate burden-sharing agreements or understandings with the government to guard against possible credit losses. The latter is of the utmost importance to maintain central banks’ credibility in pursuing price stability.』
『Principle 1. Select and Concentrate』 『Principle 2. Avoid Further Dysfunction』 『Principle 3. Provide Safety Nets』 『Principle 4. Design Measures to be Self-Fading as Conditions Improve』
んでまたこの一つ一つの個別説明の中に色々と興味深い説明があって中々宜しいのですが、1から順に。
○各国中銀のバランスシート拡大規模はdysfunctionな市場の規模に対応
『Principle 1. Select and Concentrate』の所ですが、まず最初に説明しているのは「選択と集中」ってなだけに『中央銀行の持つリソースは無限では無いのですから、最も重要かつコスト対比効果の高い市場の機能回復に向けた選択と集中を行うべき』という話をしておりまして、その選択と集中においてはボトムアップとトップダウンのアプローチが必要という話をしています。
『In practice, this required cross-checking of bottom-up and top-down considerations. Bottom up, we started by examining the degree of dysfunction of particular financial markets, and then determined specific target segments of the markets for intervention. We worked out our specific intervention conditions and possible exit mechanisms.』
『At the same time, top down, we carefully examined the pros and cons of allocative distortion, resource constraints and operational capabilities of the central bank, and capital constraint of the central bank if the intended measures exposed it to market and credit risks. The cross-checking of these two was particularly effective.』
何となく言いたいことは判りますが、ちょっと観念的な感じがしたので訳しにくくて引用したのは内緒です。
で、その次の部分が微妙にチャーミングな話でもあるのですが。
『The immediate corollary of this principle is that, firstly, the nature and the magnitude of a particular central bank’s market intervention depends on the nature and the magnitude of its country’s financial market breakdown, and secondly, the resulting increase in the balance sheet of a central bank differs considerably from country to country.』
『Table 1 reports cross-country differences in corporate finance.』
んで、テーブル1というのは引用しませんが、上記URLのケツの部分にあります。具体的には・・・・・・
『In the United States, securities markets were far more important than in Japan, and even financial institutions depend heavily on CP markets for their own finance. And the collapse of securities markets was widespread. Thus, the Fed was obliged to undertake massive and wide-ranging intervention. In contrast, the strain on the Japanese securities markets was mostly contained in CP and corporate bond markets, and we saw a relatively smooth transition from security market funding to bank borrowing. Consequently, the Bank of Japan’s market intervention was limited to CP and corporate bond markets, indirectly through the banking system, which was still functioning relatively well (Item 3 of Chart 1, measures to facilitate corporate financing).』
『Consequently, the Fed’s increase in balance sheets is far greater than the Bank of Japan’s, which is depicted in Chart 2. Europe’s structure of corporate finance is closer to Japan’s, so theECB’s increase in balance sheets was similar to the BOJ’s.』
[外部リンク] Policies of Central Banks: Restoring Market Function and Confidence』ってなってまして、非伝統的政策に関する整理を行っているのですが、これがまた中々良くまとまっているのですよ。ということでこちらのご紹介を延々とやろうと思っていたのですが、諸般の事情により(謎)、今日は頭の部分だけ。本論は明日にでも(汗)。
『The topic of this panel, "Monetary Policy Boundaries: Alternative Instruments and Policy Coordination" is particularly timely, since many central banks including the Bank of Japan have already crossed conventional boundaries. They have been conducting unconventional policies since the current crisis erupted a couple of years ago.』
『Some call them credit easing, and others describe them as quantitative easing. This kind of nomenclature is eye-catching, but it is sometimes a distraction, hiding the real picture of what the central banks have done.』
『In fact, if we look at these unconventional policies from a functional viewpoint, they all have this in common: the desire to counteract market dysfunction and confidence erosion.』
『In this short presentation, I will first explain what we, the major central banks have done to prevent market meltdown. Then, from this experience, I will extract four practical principles of unconventional policies that should be borne in mind. Finally, based on these principles, I will point out possible fallacies in assessing these unconventional policies, especially at the time economic conditions improve and seem to offer a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel. Specifically, I will present five Don’ts for your consideration in contemplating a way out from the emergency measures.』
