FOMC声明文。 [外部リンク] received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in March suggests that economic activity has continued to strengthen and that the labor market is beginning to improve.』(今回)
『Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in January suggests that economic activity has continued to strengthen and that the labor market is stabilizing. 』(前回)
『Growth in household spending has picked up recently but remains constrained by high unemployment, modest income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit.』(今回)
『Household spending is expanding at a moderate rate but remains constrained by high unemployment, modest income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. 』(前回)
『Business spending on equipment and software has risen significantly; however, investment in nonresidential structures is declining and employers remain reluctant to add to payrolls. Housing starts have edged up but remain at a depressed level. While bank lending continues to contract, financial market conditions remain supportive of economic growth.』(今回)
『Business spending on equipment and software has risen significantly. However, investment in nonresidential structures is declining, housing starts have been flat at a depressed level, and employers remain reluctant to add to payrolls. While bank lending continues to contract, financial market conditions remain supportive of economic growth. 』(前回)
新築住宅の判断が若干引き上げられていますが、その他に関しては変わらずと。
・現状判断のまとめ
『Although the pace of economic recovery is likely to be moderate for a time, the Committee anticipates a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability.』(今回)
ここの文言は前回と全く同じです(^^)。
・インフレに関する文言も同じとな
『With substantial resource slack continuing to restrain cost pressures and longer-term inflation expectations stable, inflation is likely to be subdued for some time. 』(今回)
『The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. 』(今回)
『Voting against the policy action was Thomas M. Hoenig, who believed that continuing to express the expectation of exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period was no longer warranted because it could lead to a build-up of future imbalances and increase risks to longer run macroeconomic and financial stability, while limiting the Committee’s flexibility to begin raising rates modestly. 』(今回)
『Voting against the policy action was Thomas M. Hoenig, who believed that continuing to express the expectation of exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period was no longer warranted because it could lead to the buildup of financial imbalances and increase risks to longer-run macroeconomic and financial stability. 』(前回)
『For many members, the developments at home and abroad over the two months since the publication of the February Inflation Report had helped ease concerns about some of the downside risks to the near-term economic outlook for the United Kingdom. Output looked more clearly to have begun to recover at the end of 2009 and, abstracting from the effect of erratic factors, with a momentum that appeared to have been carried forward into the beginning of 2010. That was broadly as had been anticipated as the most likely outcome in the Committee’s February projections. Moreover, short-term interest rate expectations had fallen. And, notwithstanding this month’s appreciation, the sterling effective exchange rate index was lower than two months ago. Those factors should also support growth.』
『Looking ahead, there remained a number of factors restraining activity and inflation. These included the impairment of the banking sector, the need for fiscal consolidation in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, and despite some recovery in activity, the continuing degree of spare capacity in the economy. Offsetting these downside factors were the past depreciation of sterling and the exceptional degree of monetary stimulus. There was a range of views among Committee members about how the balance of risks to inflation and activity had altered over the past few months. But, overall, the Committee agreed that it was appropriate to maintain the current stimulatory stance of monetary policy at this meeting.』
[外部リンク] approach to this problem is for central banks to target a gradually rising price level rather than a constant inflation rate. Imagine a plot of the consumer price index (CPI) from today onward increasing 2 percent each year. Central banks would commit to adjusting policy to keep the CPI near that line.』
『The advantage of this approach, in theory at least, is that when a negative shock drives prices below the target level, people will automatically expect the central bank to increase inflation for a while to get back to trend. In principle, that expectation would lower real interest rates without the central bank changing its inflation commitment, even if nominal interest rates were pinned at zero. It could also make it easier for people to make long-term economic decisions because they could anticipate that inflation misses would be reversed over time, reducing uncertainty about the future price level.』
『Central to the idea is that the Federal Reserve would be committing to hit a price level that was growing at a constant rate from a fixed point in the past. The specific inflation rate that could be expected in the future would change over time, depending on the inflation that had been realized up to that point. You could know what inflation rate to expect only if you knew both the current consumer price index and the Fed’s target for the index in the future. In addition, the inflation rate that you could expect would be different for different horizons.』
『 Moreover, central banks are able to control inflation only with a considerable lag and even then only imprecisely, so the process of hitting a target would likely involve frequent overshooting and correction and consequently frequently shifting inflation objectives.』
『Contrast this approach with the communications required of central banks when targeting a specific inflation rate. For example, central banks targeting a 2 percent inflation rate typically put that target prominently on their webpage. If those banks were instead targeting a price level growing at 2 percent, their webpages would have to provide a table of inflation rate targets for a variety of horizons, and the targets would change each month. I fear that rather than anchoring people’s expectations about prices, it could leave them perplexed.』
『As you can tell, I see compelling reasons why central banks should stick to their current inflation objectives. Those reasons relate most importantly to the effect of a central bank’s communications and behavior on its credibility and on the public’s expectations.』
『More study leading to a better understanding of the linkage between central bank actions and expectation formation should improve the ability of central banks to achieve society’s inflation and output objectives more effectively under a variety of circumstances, including in a severe negative shock of the type we recently experienced.』
ということで、最後のまとめはもう引用だけ。
『Conclusion
Many central bankers and economists, myself included, were a little complacent coming into the crisis. We thought we knew enough about the basic structure of the markets and the economy to achieve economic and price stability with relatively minor perturbations. And we thought we had the tools necessary to deal with liquidity shortages and maldistributions.』
『The reality is that we didn’t understand the economy as well as we thought we did. Central bankers, along with other policymakers, professional economists and the private sector failed to foresee or prevent a financial crisis that resulted in very serious unemployment and loss of wealth around the world. We must learn from our experience.』
『The questions I’ve posed are tough, but addressing these issues successfully should enable central banks to reduce the odds of future crises and respond more effectively to any bouts of instability that still might arise.』
『そうした当時の雰囲気は、2003年4月に公表されたIMFのWorld Economic Outlook や、同じく2003 年にカンザスシティー連銀によって主催されたジャクソンホール・コンファレンスの議事録をみると、容易に確認できます。2003 年6月のFRBの金利引き下げでは、その理由として「好ましからぬ大幅なインフレの低下(unwelcome substantial fall in inflation)」を避けることが挙げられました。振り返ってみると、デフレの危険が大きくクローズアップされた裏側で、金利の果たす動学的資源配分機能は軽視されがちでした。そして、正にその時期に、信用やレバレッジの増加、期間ミスマッチの拡大という、その後の危機の種が蒔かれました。』
『金融危機、そして、それに先立つバブルは何故、繰り返し起きるのでしょうか。その原因については、リスク管理の甘さ、過大なレバレッジ、大きすぎて潰せない(too big to fail)とみられる金融機関の存在、金融監督の失敗、過度に緩和的な金融政策など、様々なことが挙げられています。』『そうした分析に私も同意しますが、それら個々の原因だけでは捉えきれない全体論的な視点も必要だと感じています。』
『Why do financial crises, and for that matter bubbles which precede them, occur repeatedly? Many reasons are given -- lax risk management, excessive leverage, existence of financial institutions which are perceived to be too-big-to-fail, failure of supervision, excessively accommodative monetary policy and the list goes on.』
『I generally agree with such assessments, but we also need a holistic perspective which cannot be captured just by focusing on individual causes.』
『From this perspective, I would like to emphasize that, what one could term as a “cycle of confidence” which evolves over a very long time horizon, plays a decisive role. Success breeds confidence which unfortunately turns into over-confidence or even arrogance. Complacency also sets in. The collapse of the bubble based upon this over-confidence leads now to under-confidence, which is followed by rebuilding efforts. Then the cycle begins once again.』
『The final homework assignment concerns the inflation objectives of central banks. Central banks have widely chosen to target inflation rates near 2 percent. The Federal Reserve is required by law to conduct monetary policy to achieve maximum employment and stable prices.』
『We haven’t announced an explicit inflation rate target consistent with that dual mandate, but the Federal Reserve governors and Reserve Bank presidents publish our individual forecasts for inflation over the longer run, conditional on our individual views of appropriate monetary policy. Those forecasts indicate that most of the FOMC participants believe that inflation should converge to 1-3/4 to 2 percent over time.』
『Recently, some prominent economists have called for central banks to raise their inflation targets to about 4 percent. Shifting inflation targets up would tend to raise the average level of nominal interest rates and thus give central banks more room to lower interest rates in response to a bad shock to the economy before running against the zero bound.』
『Although I agree that hitting the zero bound presents challenges to monetary policy, I do not believe central banks should raise their inflation targets. Central banks around the world have been working for 30 years to get inflation down to levels where it can largely be ignored by businesses and households when making decisions about the future. Moreover, inflation expectations are well anchored at those low levels.』
『Increasing our inflation targets could result in more-variable inflation and worse economic outcomes over time.』
『First of all, inflation expectations would necessarily have to become unanchored as inflation moved up. I doubt households and businesses would immediately adjust their expectations up to the new targets and that expectations would then be well anchored at the new higher levels. Instead, I fear there could be a long learning process, just as there was as inflation trended down over recent decades. 』
『Second, 4 percent inflation may be higher than can be ignored, and businesses and households may take inflation more into account when writing contracts and making investments, increasing the odds that otherwise transitory inflation would become more persistent.』
『For both these reasons, raising the longer-term objective for inflation could make expectations more sensitive to recent realized inflation, to central bank actions, and to other economic conditions. That greater sensitivity would reduce the ability of central banks to buffer the economy from bad shocks. It could also lead to more-volatile inflation over the longer run and therefore higher inflation risk premiums in nominal interest rates. It is notable that while the economic arguments for raising inflation targets are well understood, no major central bank has raised its target in response to the recent financial crisis.』
『Another approach to this problem is for central banks to target a gradually rising price level rather than a constant inflation rate. Imagine a plot of the consumer price index (CPI) from today onward increasing 2 percent each year. Central banks would commit to adjusting policy to keep the CPI near that line』
『The advantage of this approach, in theory at least, is that when a negative shock drives prices below the target level, people will automatically expect the central bank to increase inflation for a while to get back to trend. In principle, that expectation would lower real interest rates without the central bank changing its inflation commitment, even if nominal interest rates were pinned at zero. It could also make it easier for people to make long-term economic decisions because they could anticipate that inflation misses would be reversed over time, reducing uncertainty about the future price level.』
[外部リンク] past few years have illustrated two lessons about the relationship between macroeconomic stability and financial stability. First, macroeconomic stability doesn’t guarantee financial stability; indeed, in some circumstances, macroeconomic stability may foster financial instability by lulling people into complacency about risks. And second, some shocks to the financial system are so substantial, especially when they weaken a large number of intermediaries, that decreases in aggregate demand can be large, long lasting, and not quickly or easily remedied by conventional monetary policy.』
『Given the heavy costs of the financial crisis, the question naturally arises as to how it could have been avoided. My third assignment is to reexamine whether conventional monetary policy should be used to lean against financial imbalances as well as aim for the traditional medium-term macroeconomic goals of maximum employment and price stability.』
『One key question is whether we are likely to know enough about asset price misalignments and the effects of policy adjustments on those misalignments to give us the confidence to deliberately tack away for a time from exclusive pursuit of our macroeconomic objectives. Obviously, reducing the odds of financial crises would be very beneficial, but we need to balance that important objective against the potential costs and uncertainties associated with using monetary policy for that purpose.』
『One type of cost arises because monetary policy is a blunt instrument. Increases in interest rates damp activity across a wide variety of sectors, many of which may not be experiencing speculative activity.』
『Moreover, small policy adjustments may not be very effective in reining in speculative excesses. Our experience in 1999 and 2005 was that even substantial increases in interest rates did not seem to have an effect on dot-com stock speculation in the first episode or on house price increases in the second. And larger adjustments would incur greater incremental costs.』
『As a consequence, using monetary policy to damp asset price movements could lead to more variability in output and inflation around their objectives, at least in the medium term. Among other things, greater variability in inflation could lead inflation expectations to become less well anchored, diminishing the ability of the central bank to counter economic fluctuations.』
まずは虫干しでFOMC議事要旨。 [外部リンク] to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. 』って事で、資源の利用状況の低さ、インフレのトレンドの抑制、インフレ期待の安定という3本柱に関しても特に懸念なしという感じですな。
で、その辺に関しては『Participants' Views on Current Conditions and the Economic Outlook』の最初のパラグラフにインフレの見通しを示している文言があるのですが、そこに見事に見通しが書いてあります。
『Participants saw recent inflation readings as suggesting a slightly greater deceleration in consumer prices than had been expected. In light of stable longer-term inflation expectations and the likely continuation of substantial resource slack, they generally anticipated that inflation would be subdued for some time.』
『While participants saw incoming information as broadly consistent with continued strengthening of economic activity, they also highlighted a variety of factors that would be likely to restrain the overall pace of recovery, especially in light of the waning effects of fiscal stimulus and inventory rebalancing over coming quarters. 』
では何ですかというと、
『While recent data pointed to a noticeable pickup in the pace of consumer spending during the first quarter, participants agreed that household spending going forward was likely to remain constrained by weak labor market conditions, lower housing wealth, tight credit, and modest income growth.』
労働市場に関しては一応改善という話にはなっているのですけれどもね。
『For example, real disposable personal income in January was virtually unchanged from a year earlier and would have been even lower in the absence of a substantial rise in federal transfer payments to households. Business spending on equipment and software picked up substantially over recent months, but anecdotal information suggested that this pickup was driven mainly by increased spending on maintaining existing capital and updating technology rather than expanding capacity.』
『The continued gains in manufacturing production were bolstered by growing demand from foreign trading partners, especially emerging market economies. However, a few participants noted the possibility that fiscal retrenchment in some foreign countries could trigger a slowdown of those economies and hence weigh on the demand for U.S. exports.』
『A number of participants pointed out that the economic recovery could not be sustained over time without a substantial pickup in job creation, which they still anticipated but had not yet become evident in the data.』
『In discussing the inflation outlook, participants took note of signs that inflation expectations were reasonably well anchored, and most agreed that substantial resource slack was continuing to restrain cost pressures.』
『Measures of gains in nominal compensation had slowed, and sharp increases in productivity had pushed down producers' unit labor costs. Anecdotal information indicated that planned wage increases were small or nonexistent and suggested that large margins of underutilized capital and labor and a highly competitive pricing environment were exerting considerable downward pressure on price adjustments. Survey readings and financial market data pointed to a modest decline in longer-term inflation expectations over recent months.』
ただまあ一部の委員からはこのような指摘も。
『While all participants anticipated that inflation would be subdued over the near term, a few noted that the risks to inflation expectations and the medium-term inflation outlook might be tilted to the upside in light of the large fiscal deficits and the extraordinarily accommodative stance of monetary policy.』
前半の『Developments in Financial Markets and the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet』というまあ要するに事務方報告みたいな部分の最後の方に「ふーん」という話が。
『The staff also briefed the Committee on potential approaches for managing the Treasury securities held by the Federal Reserve.』
ほいな。
『To date, the Desk had been reinvesting all maturing Treasury securities by exchanging those holdings for newly issued Treasury securities, but an alternative strategy would be to allow some or all of those Treasury securities to mature without reinvestment.』
『Redeeming all of its maturing Treasury holdings would significantly reduce the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet over coming years and hence could be helpful in limiting the need to use other reserve draining tools such as reverse repurchase agreements and term deposits.』
そらそうなのだがその場合には財務省証券の市中消化が増えるのですけどね。
『Redemptions would also lower the interest rate sensitivity of the Federal Reserve's portfolio over time.』
『Nevertheless, the initiation of a redemption strategy might generate upward pressure on market rates, especially if that measure led investors to move up their expected timing of policy firming.』
『Participants agreed that the Committee would give further consideration to these matters and that in the interim the Desk should continue its current practice of reinvesting all maturing Treasury securities.』
[外部リンク] the severity of the downturn, it became clear that lowering short-term policy rates alone would not be sufficient. We needed to go further to ease financial conditions and encourage spending. Thus, to reduce longer-term interest rates, like those on mortgages, we purchased large quantities of longer-term securities, specifically Treasury securities, agency mortgage-backed securities, and agency debt.』(3月24日講演)
『One question involves the direct effects of the large-scale asset purchases themselves. The theory behind the Federal Reserve’s actions was fairly clear: Arbitrage between short- and long-term markets is not perfect even when markets are functioning smoothly; and arbitrage is especially impaired during panics when investors are putting an unusually large premium on the liquidity and safety of short-term instruments. In these circumstances, reducing the supply of long-term debt pushes up the prices of the securities, lowering their yields.』(3月24日講演)
『In the discussion of monetary policy for the intermeeting period, Committee members agreed that substantial additional purchases of longer-term assets eligible for open market operations would be appropriate. Such purchases would provide further monetary stimulus to help address the very weak economic outlook and reduce the risk that inflation could persist for a time below rates that best foster longer-term economic growth and price stability. 』(2009年3月18日のFOMC議事要旨より、以下同様)
から始まる議論の部分なのですが。
『One member preferred to focus additional purchases on longer-term Treasury securities, whereas another member preferred to focus on agency MBS. However, both could support expanded purchases across a range of assets, and several members noted that working across a range of assets and instruments was appropriate when the effects of any one tactic were uncertain.』
まあそもそもかなりヤケクソ気味に突っ込んだというのは把握した。
『Members agreed that the monetary base was likely to grow significantly as a consequence of additional asset purchases; one, in particular, stressed that sustained increases in the monetary base were important to ensure that policy was consistently expansionary. 』
『Members expressed a range of views as to the preferred size of the increase in purchases. Several members felt that the significant deterioration in the economic outlook merited a very substantial increase in purchases of longer-term assets. In contrast, the potential for a large increase over time in the size of the balance sheet from the TALF program was seen as supporting a more modest, though still substantial, increase in asset purchases.』
『The Federal Reserve has funded its purchases by crediting the accounts that banks hold with us. Those deposits are called "reserve balances" and are part of bank reserves.』
さいですな。
○リザーブの拡大は副次的な話でメインの経路やはり金利引き下げ
で、その次の説明ではコーンさんこんな事を。
『In our explanations of our actions, we have concentrated, as I have just done, on the effects on the prices of the assets we have been purchasing and the spillover to the prices of related assets.』
『The huge quantity of bank reserves that were created has been seen largely as a byproduct of the purchases that would be unlikely to have a significant independent effect on financial markets and the economy.』
『This view is not consistent with the simple models in many textbooks or the monetarist tradition in monetary policy, which emphasizes a line of causation from reserves to the money supply to economic activity and inflation.』
『Other central banks and some of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have emphasized this channel in their discussions of the effect of policy at the zero lower bound. According to these types of theories, extra reserves should induce banks to diversify into additional lending and purchases of securities, reducing the cost of borrowing for households and businesses, and so should spark an increase in the money supply and spending.』
『To date, that channel does not seem to have been effective; interest rates on bank loans relative to the usual benchmarks have continued to rise, the quantity of bank loans is still falling rapidly, and money supply growth has been subdued. Banks' behavior appears more consistent with the standard Keynesian model of the liquidity trap, in which demand for reserves becomes perfectly elastic when short-term interest rates approach zero. But portfolio behavior of banks will shift as the economy and confidence recover, and we will need to watch and study this channel carefully.』
『Another uncertainty deserving of additional examination involves the effect of large-scale purchases of longer-term assets on expectations about monetary policy.』
長期資産を大規模に購入した場合の金融政策への期待形成に関する論点とな。
『The more we buy, the more reserves we will ultimately need to absorb and the more assets we will ultimately need to dispose of before the conduct of monetary policy, the behavior of interbank markets, and the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet can return completely to normal.』
より多くの長期債を買うと平常に戻す時により多くの吸収や資産の売却などが必要になると。
『As a consequence, these types of purchases can increase inflation expectations among some observers who may see a risk that we will not reduce reserves and raise interest rates in a timely fashion.』
『In fact, longer-term inflation expectations generally have been quite well anchored over the past few years of unusual Federal Reserve actions. And we are developing and testing the tools we need to remove accommodative monetary policy when appropriate. I am confident the Federal Reserve can and will tighten policy well in advance of any threat to price stability, andsuccessful execution of this exit will demonstrate that these emergency steps need not lead to higher inflation.』
『The Federal Reserve and other central banks reacted to the deepening crisis in the fall of 2008 not only by opening new liquidity facilities, but also by reducing policy interest rates to close to zero. Such rapid and aggressive responses were expected to cushion the effects of the shock on the economy by reducing the cost of borrowing for households and businesses, thereby encouraging them to keep spending.』
ここまでが金利を下げた話。
『In addition, the Federal Reserve and a number of other central banks have provided more guidance than usual about the likely future path of interest rates to help financial markets form more accurate expectations about policy in a highly uncertain economic and financial environment.』
時間軸ですなあ。で、その次も同じくその説明の続きです。
『In particular, we were concerned that market participants would not fully appreciate for how long we anticipated keeping interest rates low. If they hadn’t, intermediate- and longer-term rates would have declined by less, reducing the stimulative effect of the very low policy rates.』
『Given the severity of the downturn, it became clear that lowering short-term policy rates alone would not be sufficient. We needed to go further to ease financial conditions and encourage spending. Thus, to reduce longer-term interest rates, like those on mortgages, we purchased large quantities of longer-term securities, specifically Treasury securities, agency mortgage-backed securities, and agency debt.』
『Central banks have lots of experience guiding the economy by adjusting short-term policy rates and influencing expectations about future policy rates, and the underlying theory and practice behind those actions are well understood. However, the economic effects of purchasing large volumes of longer-term assets, and the accompanying expansion of the reserve base in the banking system, are much less well understood.』
『So my second homework assignment for monetary policymakers and other interested economists is to study the effects of such balance sheet expansion; better understanding will help our successors if, unfortunately, they should find themselves in a similar position, and it will help us as we unwind the unusual actions we took.』
『One question involves the direct effects of the large-scale asset purchases themselves.』
と、買入そのものに関する直接的な効果についての検証が課題になっておりまして、その後、『A second issue involves the effect of the large volume of reserves created as we buy assets.』と、買入によって引き起こされたリザーブの拡大の効果の検証が課題になっているのです。
○買入の直接効果は市場の新規供給量対比なのか市場残高対比なのか
『One question involves the direct effects of the large-scale asset purchases themselves. The theory behind the Federal Reserve’s actions was fairly clear: Arbitrage between short- and long-term markets is not perfect even when markets are functioning smoothly; and arbitrage is especially impaired during panics when investors are putting an unusually large premium on the liquidity and safety of short-term instruments. In these circumstances, reducing the supply of long-term debt pushes up the prices of the securities, lowering their yields.』
『But by how much? Uncertainty about the likely effect complicated our calibration of the purchases, and the symmetrical uncertainty about the effects of unwinding the actions--of reducing our portfolio--will be a factor in our decisions about the timing and sequencing of steps to return the portfolio to a more normal level and composition. Good studies of these sorts of actions are sparse. Currently, we are relying in large part on studies that examine how much interest rates dropped when purchases were announced in the United States or abroad. But such event studies may not be an ideal means to predict the consequences of reducing our portfolio, in part because the economic and financial environment will be very different, and also because event studies do not measure effects that develop or reverse over time. We are also uncertain about how, exactly, the purchases put downward pressure on interest rates.』
『 My presumption has been that the effect comes mainly from the total amount we purchase relative to the total stock of debt outstanding. However, others have argued that the market effect derives importantly from the flow of our purchases relative to the amount of new issuance in the market. Some evidence for the primacy of the stock channel has accumulated recently, as the prices of mortgage-backed securities appear to have changed little as the flow of our purchases has trended down.』
[外部リンク] Assignments for Monetary Policymakers』ということで、金融政策に関する幾つかの論点についてコーン副議長の見解を示しているのですが、ひじょーに興味深いのです。で、PDFで16ページ(本文は実質14ページ程度)と結構量があるので、多分1回では無理だと思います(と最初から言い訳)ので念の為申し添えます。
○主要な4つのお題とは
『The events of the past few years have raised many questions for central bankers.』から始まるこの講演ですが、4つの課題を挙げられるということで、最初にその4点について説明しています。
『I’ve titled my presentation “Homework Assignments” because I don’t think the answers are clear, though I will venture some tentative thoughts. I have four assignments on my list; I could easily have more. And others would have yet a different list. I recognize that the complexity of these questions could keep us profitably engaged for a whole semester, but let’s see if I can outline some of the challenges and possible responses in an evening.』
ということで、その4つの宿題となる研究課題のポイントですが、
『The first two assignments concern the policy actions the Federal Reserve and other central banks took during the financial crisis.』
『One assignment is to evaluate the implications of the changing character of financial markets for the design of the liquidity tools the Federal Reserve has at its disposal when panic-driven runs on banks and other key financial intermediaries and markets threaten financial stability and the economy.』
『My second assignment involves improving our understanding of the effects of those purchases and the associated massive increase in bank reserves.』
『The third and fourth assignments relate to whether changes to the conduct of monetary policy in normal times could make financial instability and its wrenching and costly economic consequences less likely. 』
『Number three involves considering whether central banks should use their conventional monetary policy tool--adjusting the level of a short-term interest rate--to try to rein in asset prices that seem to be moving well away from sustainable values, in addition to seeking to achieve the macroeconomic objectives of full employment and price stability. 』
『The fourth and final assignment concerns whether central banks should adjust their inflation targets to reduce the odds of getting into a situation again where the policy interest rate reaches zero.』
『The homework assignment is to think about the design of liquidity facilities going forward. I’ve tentatively concluded that the recent crisis has demonstrated that in a financial system so dependent on securities markets and not just banks, we need to retain the ability to lend against good collateral to certain groups of sound, regulated, nonbank financial firms.』
『I’m not suggesting that we establish permanent contingency liquidity facilities, just that the Federal Reserve retain the authority to create the tools necessary to meet liquidity needs of groups of nonbank institutions should a panic impair the ability of securities markets, as well as banks, to function and the Board of Governors find that the absence of such functioning would threaten the economy. The collateral would have to be of good quality and the institutions sound to minimize any credit risk to the Federal Reserve.』
『Holding open this possibility is not without cost. With credit potentially available from the Federal Reserve, institutions would have insufficient incentives to manage their liquidity to protect against unusual market events. 』
『Hence, the emergency credit would generally be provided only to groups of institutions that were regulated and supervised to limit such moral hazard. If the Federal Reserve did not directly supervise the institutions that would potentially receive emergency discount window credit, we would need an ongoing and collaborative relationship with the supervisor. The supervisor should ensure that any institution with implicit access to emergency discount window credit nevertheless maintained conservative liquidity policies. The supervisor would also provide critical insight into the financial condition of the borrower and the quality of the available collateral and more generally whether lending was necessary and appropriate.』
