最初の『Developments in Financial Markets and the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet』からで、2パラグラフ目(特にMinutesには番号が振られて居る訳ではなくて、あたくしが物は試しに便宜的に最初から通しで振っています。以下同様)の後半に長期国債の買入に関する案の説明がありましてですな。
『The Desk judged that if it continued reinvesting principal payments from the Federal Reserve System's holdings of agency debt and agency MBS in longer-term Treasury securities, then it could purchase additional longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of about $75 billion per month while avoiding disruptions in market functioning. The Manager indicated that implementing a sizable increase in the System's holdings of Treasury securities most effectively likely would entail a temporary relaxation of the 35 percent per-issue limit on SOMA holdings under which the Desk had been operating; whether, and to what extent, the System's holdings of some issues would exceed 35 percent would depend on the specific securities that dealers choose to offer at future auctions.』
『Finally, the Manager summarized the implications for the Federal Reserve's balance sheet and income statement of alternative decisions that the Committee might make about the size and maturity distribution of the SOMA's securities holdings.』
ほほう。
『Participants discussed the Desk's tentative operational plans; they also discussed the potential effects of an expansion of the System's holdings of longer-term securities on financial markets and institutions and on the economy, and the channels through which those effects could occur.』
いつもはサラサラと流す(流さないとしんどいから^^)『Staff Review of the Economic Situation』も今回は比較的真面目に読んでみたのですが・・・・・
第6パラグラフより。
『Real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) rose at a moderate rate in the third quarter. Rising equity prices likely resulted in some further improvement in net worth over the same period. 』
『Activity in the housing market remained exceptionally weak. Although sales of new and existing homes turned up in August and September, the still-low level of demand suggested that the payback for the earlier boost to sales from the homebuyer tax credit had not yet faded.』
という現状認識でして、
『Moreover, despite further declines in mortgage interest rates in recent months, other factors continued to restrain housing demand, including consumer pessimism about the outlook for jobs and income, the depressed rate of household formation, and tight underwriting standards for mortgages. 』
『In addition, the moratoriums recently announced by some banks on the sale of properties they had seized in foreclosures were likely to damp home sales further in the near term. Starts of new single-family houses rose somewhat in August and September, but the pace of construction was still noticeably below the already-depressed level of the preceding year. New homebuilding appeared to be weighed down by the backlog of unsold existing homes and tight lending conditions for acquisition, development, and construction loans.』
でですね、第19パラグラフになるのですが、『Staff Review of the Economic Situation』の部分でモーゲージ金利に関する指摘をしているのですが、そちらではモーゲージ金利の低下でリファイナンスは活発に行われているけれども、新規住宅取得に向けた買入はそんなに増えてませんよという話をしていまして、よーするに長期金利低下による住宅市場への影響は、住宅市場そのものというよりはモーゲージローンのリファイナンス活動による効果の方が大きいという感じになるのではないかと思われる次第。
『Residential mortgage refinancing activity moved up in late September and early October, from an already high level, as the average interest rate on fixed-rate mortgages fell further over the intermeeting period. In contrast, the level of applications for mortgages to purchase homes remained anemic.』
でですな、一方で白川総裁は香港でこんな講演を。 [外部リンク] and Emerging Economies-- Two-speed Recovery --』ってお題が既にこうバーナンキ講演(お題は『Rebalancing the Global Recovery』)にぶつけたかのようなお題になっておりますので大変に興味深いのでありますが、昨日は本業多忙の為あまり読んでいる時間が無くて残念無念。
[外部リンク] in recent months, some officials in emerging market economies and elsewhere have argued that accommodative monetary policies in the advanced economies, especially the United States, have been producing negative spillover effects on their economies. In particular, they are concerned that advanced economy policies are inducing excessive capital inflows to the emerging market economies, inflows that in turn put unwelcome upward pressure on emerging market currencies and threaten to create asset price bubbles. 』
『To a large degree, these capital flows have been driven by perceived return differentials that favor emerging markets, resulting from factors such as stronger expected growth--both in the short term and in the longer run--and higher interest rates, which reflect differences in policy settings as well as other forces. As figures 6 and 7 show, even before the crisis, fast-growing emerging market economies were attractive destinations for cross-border investment.』
『However, beyond these fundamental factors, an important driver of the rapid capital inflows to some emerging markets is incomplete adjustment of exchange rates in those economies, which leads investors to anticipate additional returns arising from expected exchange rate appreciation.』
>incomplete adjustment of exchange rates >incomplete adjustment of exchange rates >incomplete adjustment of exchange rates
『The exchange rate adjustment is incomplete, in part, because the authorities in some emerging market economies have intervened in foreign exchange markets to prevent or slow the appreciation of their currencies. The degree of intervention is illustrated for selected emerging market economies in figure 8. 』
でまあその図8ってえのは何かと申しますと、
『The vertical axis of this graph shows the percent change in the real effective exchange rate in the 12 months through September. The horizontal axis shows the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves as a share of GDP over the same period. 』
『The graph also illustrates that some emerging market economies have intervened at very high levels and others relatively little. Judging from the changes in the real effective exchange rate, the emerging market economies that have largely let market forces determine their exchange rates have seen their competitiveness reduced relative to those emerging market economies that have intervened more aggressively.』
『It is instructive to contrast this situation with what would happen in an international system in which exchange rates were allowed to fully reflect market fundamentals. In the current context, advanced economies would pursue accommodative monetary policies as needed to foster recovery and to guard against unwanted disinflation. At the same time, emerging market economies would tighten their own monetary policies to the degree needed to prevent overheating and inflation. The resulting increase in emerging market interest rates relative to those in the advanced economies would naturally lead to increased capital flows from advanced to emerging economies and, consequently, to currency appreciation in emerging market economies. This currency appreciation would in turn tend to reduce net exports and current account surpluses in the emerging markets, thus helping cool these rapidly growing economies while adding to demand in the advanced economies. Moreover, currency appreciation would help shift a greater proportion of domestic output toward satisfying domestic needs in emerging markets. The net result would be more balanced and sustainable global economic growth.』
『Given these advantages of a system of market-determined exchange rates, why have officials in many emerging markets leaned against appreciation of their currencies toward levels more consistent with market fundamentals?』
『The principal answer is that currency undervaluation on the part of some countries has been part of a long-term export-led strategy for growth and development. This strategy, which allows a country's producers to operate at a greater scale and to produce a more diverse set of products than domestic demand alone might sustain, has been viewed as promoting economic growth and, more broadly, as making an important contribution to the development of a number of countries.』
『However, increasingly over time, the strategy of currency undervaluation has demonstrated important drawbacks, both for the world system and for the countries using that strategy.』
[外部リンク] Views on Current Conditions and the Economic Outlook』の最後のパラグラフを見るあるヨロシ。PDFだと8枚目になるみたいです。つーか今日はそこしか見てない(汗)。
『Participants generally agreed that the most likely economic outcome would be a gradual pickup in growth with slow progress toward maximum employment. They also generally expected that inflation would remain, for some time, below levels the Committee considers most consistent, over the longer run, with maximum employment and price stability.』
『However, participants held a range of views about the risks to that outlook. Most saw the risks to growth as broadly balanced, but many saw the risks as tilted to the downside. Similarly, a majority saw the risks to inflation as balanced; some, however, saw downside risks predominating while a couple saw inflation risks as tilted to the upside. 』
『Participants also differed in their assessments of the likely benefits and costs associated with a program of purchasing additional longer-term securities in an effort to provide additional monetary stimulus, though most saw the benefits as exceeding the costs in current circumstances. 』
キタキタ。で、この次に注目するあたくし。
『Most participants judged that a program of purchasing additional longer-term securities would put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and boost asset prices; some observed that it could also lead to a reduction in the foreign exchange value of the dollar.』
『Most expected these changes in financial conditions to help promote a somewhat stronger recovery in output and employment while also helping return inflation, over time, to levels consistent with the Committee's mandate.』
『In addition, several participants argued that the stimulus provided by additional securities purchases would help protect against further disinflation and the small probability that the U.S. economy could fall into persistent deflation--an outcome that they thought would be very costly. 』
『Some participants, however, anticipated that additional purchases of longer-term securities would have only a limited effect on the pace of the recovery; they judged that the economy's slow growth largely reflected the effects of factors that were not likely to respond to additional monetary policy stimulus and thought that additional action would be warranted only if the outlook worsened and the odds of deflation increased materially.』
『Some participants noted concerns that additional expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet could put unwanted downward pressure on the dollar's value in foreign exchange markets.』
『Several participants saw a risk that a further increase in the size of the Federal Reserve's asset portfolio, with an accompanying increase in the supply of excess reserves and in the monetary base, could cause an undesirably large increase in inflation. However, it was noted that the Committee had in place tools that would enable it to remove policy accommodation quickly if necessary to avoid an undesirable increase in inflation.』
『A significant portion of these fluctuations has reflected changes in investor risk aversion, with the dollar tending to appreciate when risk aversion is high. In particular, much of the decline over the summer in the foreign exchange value of the dollar reflected an unwinding of the increase in the dollar’s value in the spring associated with the European sovereign debt crisis. The dollar’s role as a safe haven during periods of market stress stems in no small part from the underlying strength and stability that the U.S. economy has exhibited over the years.』
『Fully aware of the important role that the dollar plays in the international monetary and financial system, the Committee believes that the best way to continue to deliver the strong economic fundamentals that underpin the value of the dollar, as well as to support the global recovery, is through policies that lead to a resumption of robust growth in a context of price stability in the United States.』
『In sum, on its current economic trajectory the United States runs the risk of seeing millions of workers unemployed or underemployed for many years. As a society, we should find that outcome unacceptable. Monetary policy is working in support of both economic recovery and price stability, but there are limits to what can be achieved by the central bank alone.』
『The Federal Reserve is nonpartisan and does not make recommendations regarding specific tax and spending programs. However, in general terms, a fiscal program that combines near-term measures to enhance growth with strong, confidence-inducing steps to reduce longer-term structural deficits would be an important complement to the policies of the Federal Reserve.』
『Let me address the case of the United States specifically. As I described, the U.S. unemployment rate is high and, given the slow pace of economic growth, likely to remain so for some time. Indeed, although I expect that growth will pick up and unemployment will decline somewhat next year, we cannot rule out the possibility that unemployment might rise further in the near term, creating added risks for the recovery. Inflation has declined noticeably since the business cycle peak, and further disinflation could hinder the recovery.』
『In particular, with shorter-term nominal interest rates close to zero, declines in actual and expected inflation imply both higher realized and expected real interest rates, creating further drags on growth.』
9月のFOMC議事要旨でも指摘されていた話ですな。
『The Federal Reserve’s policy target for the federal funds rate has been near zero since December 2008, so another means of providing monetary accommodation has been necessary since that time.』
短期名目金利の目標が下げられないから他の手段が必要と。
『Accordingly, the FOMC purchased Treasury and agencybacked securities on a large scale from December 2008 through March 2010, a policy that appears to have been quite successful in helping to stabilize the economy and support the recovery during that period. Following up on this earlier success, the Committee announced this month that it would purchase additional Treasury securities. In taking that action, the Committee seeks to support the economic recovery, promote a faster pace of job creation, and reduce the risk of a further decline in inflation that would prove damaging to the recovery.』
『Although securities purchases are a different tool for conducting monetary policy than the more familiar approach of managing the overnight interest rate, the goals and transmission mechanisms are very similar.』
『In particular, securities purchases by the central bank affect the economy primarily by lowering interest rates on securities of longer maturities, just as conventional monetary policy, by affecting the expected path of short-term rates, also influences longer-term rates.』
と、思いっきり長期金利引下げの話をしているのですな。
『Lower longer-term rates in turn lead to more accommodative financial conditions, which support household and business spending.』
いやまあそれはそうなんですが。
『As I noted, the evidence suggests that asset purchases can be an effective tool; indeed, financial conditions eased notably in anticipation of the Federal Reserve’s policy announcement.』
『Incidentally, in my view, the use of the term “quantitative easing” to refer to the Federal Reserve’s policies is inappropriate.』
今回の政策内容と「量的緩和」と呼ぶのは適切ではありません!!!だそうで(^^)。
『Quantitative easing typically refers to policies that seek to have effects by changing the quantity of bank reserves, a channel which seems relatively weak, at least in the U.S. context.』
『In contrast, securities purchases work by affecting the yields on the acquired securities and, via substitution effects in investors’ portfolios, on a wider range of assets.』
[外部リンク] Two-Speed Global Recovery』という小見出しで、まあ要するに世界経済の回復で新興国と先進国の回復速度とその水準に違いがありますねという話をしていまして、その次に米国経済の話をしています。
でもってその次が『Monetary Policy in the United States』ということでPDFファイル版だと本文4ページ辺りからになるのですが、ここでは今回の金融政策に関する波及経路やら効果やらについての話があってこれが中々どうなのかよという感じになっています。まあ具体的に言えば先日引用したカンサスシティ連銀ホーニッグ総裁のツッコミに対する答えに全然なってねええええという所でしょうか。まあ一番オモロイのはこの辺りになりますので、お時間の無い方は本分4ページから6ページまでを読むのが吉。
で、その先が多分今回のスピーチのメインテーマになっているのですが、『Global Policy Challenges and Tensions』っていう部分で新興国などの一部からの「FRBはバブルを輸出して通貨安政策をしてケシカラン」という指摘に反論しているのですが、まあ1行で言ってしまうと「新興国が自国通貨を今まで安く抑える政策をしているのが良くないのです(キリッ)」という事でして、途中から殆ど中国名指し状態なのが大変お洒落。
その次は実はもう斜め読み状態だったのですが『Improving the International System』って所では世界経済のリバランスが自由な為替レートを通じて行われるというようなまあ美しい話をしているのですけれども、何か微妙感の漂う内容となっています。
『Accordingly, the essential challenge for policymakers around the world is to work together to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome--namely, a robust global economic expansion that is balanced, sustainable, and less prone to crises.』
『In the United States, the recession officially ended in mid-2009, and--as shown infigure 3--real GDP growth was reasonably strong in the fourth quarter of 2009 and the first quarter of this year. However, much of that growth appears to have stemmed from transitory factors, including inventory adjustments and fiscal stimulus.』
『Since the second quarter of this year, GDP growth has moderated to around 2 percent at an annual rate, less than the Federal Reserve’s estimates of U.S. potential growth and insufficient to meaningfully reduce unemployment.』
『As shown in figure 5, various measures of underlying inflation have beentrending downward and are currently around 1 percent, which is below the rate of 2 percent or a bit less that most Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants judge as being most consistent with the Federal Reserve’s policy objectives in the long run. With inflation expectations stable, and with levels of resource slack expected to remain high, inflation trends are expected to be quite subdued for some time.』
『QE2 actions approach fiscal policy actions. Purchasing private assets or long-term Treasury securities shifts risk from investors to the Federal Reserve and, ultimately, to U.S. taxpayers. It also encourages greater attempts to influence what assets the Federal Reserve purchases. When the Federal Reserve buys long-term securities - such as the $1.2 trillion in mortgage backed securities it purchased during the financial crisis - it favors some segments of the market over others.』
『And when the Federal Reserve is a ready buyer of government debt, it becomes a convenient source of cash for fiscal programs. During a crisis this may be justified, but as a policy instrument during normal times it is very dangerous precedent.』
『Third, rather than inflation rising to 2 or 3 percent, and demand rising in a systematic fashion, we have no idea at what level inflation might settle. It could remain where it is or inflation expectations could become unanchored and perhaps increase to 4 or 5 percent.』
『Not knowing what the outcome might be makes quantitative easing a very risky strategy. It amounts to attempting to fine-tune inflation expectations-a variable we cannot precisely or accurately measure-over the next decade.』
『And why might inflation expectations become unanchored?』
『The budget deficit for 2011 is expected to be about $1 trillion. Even if the Federal Reserve were to purchase only $500 billion-and this amount in itself is a source of considerable uncertainty-that would appear to monetize one-half of the 2011 budget deficit. In addition, the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet-now and over the next decade-will influence inflation expectations. Expanding the balance sheet by another $500 billion to $1 trillion over the next year, and perhaps keeping the balance sheet at $3 trillion for the next several years, or increasing it even further, risks undermining the public’s confidence in the Fed’s commitment to long run price stability, a key element of its mandate.』
『While QE2 might work in clean theoretical models, I am less confident it will work in the real world. Again, I will note that the FOMC has never shown itself very good at fine-tuning exercises or in setting and managing inflation and inflation expectations to achieve the desired results.』
『Given the likely size of actions and the time horizon over which QE2 would be in place, inflation expectations might very well increase beyond targeted levels, soon followed by a rise in long-term Treasury rates, thereby negating one of the textbook benefits of the policy.』
以下昨日の続き。 [外部リンク] Risks and QE2』でして、まあここからがホーニッグ総裁の本領発揮なのですが、まあこの論点整理はこれはこれで興味ありますので、だらだらと引用していこうかと。
『I believe there are legitimate reasons to be cautious when considering this approach. A meaningful evaluation of QE2 must consider not simply whether benefits actually exist but, if they do, how large they are and whether they are larger than possible costs.』
『Based on recent research and the earlier program of purchasing long-term securities-known as LSAP-I think the benefits are likely to be smaller than the costs.』
『Some estimates suggest that purchasing $500 billion of long-term securities might reduce interest rates by as little as 10 to 25 basis points. The LSAP program was effective, in part, because we were in a crisis. Financial markets were not functioning properly, or at all, during the depths of the financial crisis. In such a situation, it is reasonable that central bank purchases would be useful and effective. However, currently the markets are far calmer than in the fall of 2008. The financial crisis has passed and financial markets are operating more normally. One could argue, in fact, that with markets mostly restored to pre-crisis functioning, the effect of asset purchases could be even smaller than the 10 to 25 basis point estimate.』
『I would also suggest that even if we achieved slightly lower interest rates, the effect on economic activity is likely to be small. Interest rates have systematically been brought down to unprecedented low levels and kept there for an extended period. The economy’s response has been positive but modest.』
で、更にホーニッグさんとしては、金利を若干引き下げる事に成功したとしても、それが経済活動に与える影響が大きくないのではないかという指摘をしている訳でございますな。既に金利は異例の低金利政策を「for an extended period」継続している事によって低い水準にあり、金利引下げの効果は勿論プラスだろうが小さいのではないでしょうかっつー事ですな。
『In fact, right now the economy and banking system are awash in liquidity with trillions of dollars lying idle or searching for places to be deployed or, perhaps more recently, going into inflation hedges. Dumping another trillion dollars into the system now will most likely mean they will follow the same path into excess reserves, or government securities, or “safe” asset purchases. The effect on equity prices is likely to be minor as well.』
『There simply is no strong evidence the additional liquidity would be particularly effective in spurring new investment,accelerating consumption, or cushioning or accelerating the deleveraging that is hopefully winding down.』
『If the purported benefits are small, what are the possible costs?』
ということで、効果が小さいでしょうという話をした後にコストの話になります。
○コストその1:QE2のターゲットが無い事による弊害
いきなりこの部分がゴシックになっておりましてですな(^^)。
『First, without clear terms and goals, quantitative easing becomes an open-ended commitment that leads to maintaining the funds rate too low and the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet too large. The result is a further misallocation of resources, more imbalances and more volatility.』
『There is no working framework that defines how a quantitative easing program would be managed. How long would the program continue, and what would be the ultimate size? Would purchases of long-term assets continue until the unemployment rate is 9 percent or 8 percent or even less? Would purchases continue until inflation rises to 2 percent or 3 percent or more? Would the program aim to reduce the 10-year Treasury rate to 2? percent or 2 percent or even less?』
『Without answers to these and other questions, QE2 becomes an open-ended policy that introduces additional uncertainty into markets with few offsetting benefits.』
『As central bank assets expand under quantitative easing, what will be the exit strategy? In the midst of a financial crisis, we may not have the luxury of thinking about the exit strategy. In current circumstances, however, we must define an exit strategy if the objective is to raise inflation but contain interest rate expectations. If history is any indication, without an exit strategy the natural tendency will be to maintain an accommodative policy for too long.』
『While I agree that the tools are available to reduce excess reserves when that becomes appropriate, I do not believe that the Federal Reserve, or anyone else, has the foresight to do it at the right time or right speed. It may work in theory. In practice, however, the Federal Reserve doesn’t have a good track record of withdrawing policy accommodation in a timely manner.』
最後の一文、 >the Federal Reserve doesn’t have a good track record of withdrawing policy accommodation in a timely manner. ってのは中々厳しい指摘で、つまりバーナンキ副議長時代にお前さん何やっていましたっけということだと思ったのはあたくしの読み方に問題がありますかそうですか(^^)。
[外部リンク] issue is, of course, that while private jobs are being added within the economy, it is not enough to bring unemployment down to where we all would like to see it. Unemployment remains stubbornly high at 9.6 percent.』
失業率の水準は望ましいと考える水準に対して十分ではないとな。
『With such numbers, there is, understandably, a desire and considerable pressure for the Federal Reserve to “do something, anything” to get the economy back to full employment. And for many, including many economists, this means having the Federal Reserve maintain its zero interest rate policy or further still, engage in a second round of quantitative easing - now called QE2. Some are even suggesting these actions are necessary for the Federal Reserve to comply with its statutory mandate.』
『The FOMC's policy mandate is defined in the Federal Reserve Act, which requires that: "The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long-run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long-run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates."』
ここの文をまとめて書いてあるのを久々に見たので思わず引用してしまった、今更の話で正直スマンカッタ。
『There is, within the Act, a clear recognition that our policy goals are long-run in nature. In this way, the Act recognizes that monetary policy works with long and variable lags. Thus, the FOMC should focus on fostering maximum employment and stable prices in the timeframe that monetary policy can legitimately affect - the future. The FOMC must be mindful of this fact and be cautious in pursuing elusive short-term goals that have unintended and sometimes disruptive effects.』
『Proponents of QE2 argue that it would provide a near-term boost to the economy by lowering long-term interest rates while raising inflation. These benefits would arise from the purchase of U.S. Treasury securities, which would lead to lower U.S. Treasury and corporate rates. These lower interest rates would then stimulate consumer and business demand in several ways, including encouraging mortgage refinancing that could lead to increased consumer spending, boosting exports through a likely lower exchange rate, and fostering higher equity prices, thereby creating additional wealth. Such a move is said to be consistent with the FOMC’s September 21, 2010 announcement, which stated that it was “prepared to provide additional accommodation if needed to support the economic recovery and to return inflation, over time, to levels consistent with its mandate.”』
『Such easing, it is hoped, would bring inflation back up to something closer to 2 percent, a rate that many judge to be consistent with the Federal Reserve’s mandate. In addition, higher inflation would increase demand as consumers move purchases forward to avoid paying higher prices in the future. So, with these purported benefits, why would anyone disagree?』
ということで次の章からが『New Risks and QE2』というホーニッグ節爆発のコーナーになるのでありますが、肝心の本文に来る前に時間が無くなったので明日に続くのでございまする(いつもの事ですがどうもすいません)。
Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, Vitor Constancio, Vice-President of the ECB Frankfurt am Main, 4 November 2010 (unicode使わないので一部フォント形式が変わっております)
『Question: Just to go back to the US decision very briefly. Would you still say that the US favours a strong dollar after the Fed decision yesterday? It did push up the euro by 2 cents, so how would you describe that, I mean does that qualify for a brutal move almost?』(2番目の質問は割愛)
『Trichet: On your first point, I never comment, as you know, on moves on the market on a day-to-day basis or minute-by-minute basis. Second, I have no indication that would change my trust in the fact that the Federal Reserve Chairman and the Secretary of the Treasury, not to mention the President of the United States, are not playing the strategy or tactics of a weak dollar. I have no reason not to believe them, and again I trust their statement that it is in the interest of the United States to have a strong dollar, strong vis-a-vis the other major floating currencies, including the euro. And I fully share this view.』
『Question : (最初の質問は割愛)My second question relates to the repeated warnings that we have heard in recent weeks against keeping interest rates too low for too long. Are you ready to repeat that warning now and can you explain what is behind these warnings? Would the ECB consider raising interest rates before inflationary pressures actually call for such a move? 』
『Trichet: As regards your second question on interest rates, I can only say once again that you know the extent to which we are never pre-committed. Our doctrine is that we take decisions that are appropriate, taking into account that we have to deliver price stability over the medium term. I also said, and that it is very important, that there is no correlation between non-standard measures on the one hand and our own interest rates on the other. We can move interest rates without necessarily having totally ended the non-standard measures. We have always made that point and I will continue to do so. That said, taking everything into account, as we always do, we consider the present interest rates to be appropriate.』
『Question : (最初の質問は割愛)And, second, a question with regards to money market rates: the three-month EURIBOR is actually now above the ECB benchmark rate of 1%. Aren’t you, on the other hand, discouraging interbank lending if you continue to offer banks three-month loans at 1%?』
『Trichet: On your second point, we consider that the unlimited supply of liquidity is there. As I also explained last time, the banks are asking for all they need, because there is no limit, either on the main refinancing operations, or for the one-month window, or for the three-month window. So, because we did not change our rates (neither the MRO nor the deposit rate was changed), what we have observed in the market is that the positioning of EONIA, the very short-term rates, is dependent on the decisions of the banks themselves. It is a kind of equilibrium which depends on what the banks themselves are asking for, and you can see that it goes up and down from time to time, very much depending on the demand from the banks themselves. So, there is no particular signal there. The only important observation I would make is that it shows that we are in a normalising process, and that is an important element. But again, from our part, there was no signal at all - no monetary policy signal. This normalising has been taking place under our eyes, and we will see what happens later on. That is the observation I would make, and I have to say that, for me, a normalising is something positive. It also indicates that perhaps the EONIA means more today than it meant before, because before perhaps only a very small fraction of the institutions had access to this very low interest rate refinancing.』
『To promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to expand its holdings of securities. 』
