¡ØOn the other hand, the economy could evolve in a way that would warrant a move toward less-accommodative policy. Accordingly, the Committee has been giving careful consideration to the elements of its exit strategy, and, as reported in the minutes of the June FOMC meeting, it has reached a broad consensus about the sequence of steps that it expects to follow when the normalization of policy becomes appropriate.¡Ù
¡ØIn brief, when economic conditions warrant, the Committee would begin the normalization process by ceasing the reinvestment of principal payments on its securities, thereby allowing the Federal Reserve's balance sheet to begin shrinking. At the same time or sometime thereafter, the Committee would modify the forward guidance in its statement. Subsequent steps would include the initiation of temporary reserve-draining operations and, when conditions warrant, increases in the federal funds rate target.¡Ù
¡ØFrom that point on, changing the level or range of the federal funds rate target would be our primary means of adjusting the stance of monetary policy in response to economic developments.¡Ù
¡ØSometime after the first increase in the federal funds rate target, the Committee expects to initiate sales of agency securities from its portfolio, with the timing and pace of sales clearly communicated to the public in advance. Once sales begin, the pace of sales is anticipated to be relatively gradual and steady, but it could be adjusted up or down in response to material changes in the economic outlook or financial conditions. Over time, the securities portfolio and the associated quantity of bank reserves are expected to be reduced to the minimum levels consistent with the efficient implementation of monetary policy.¡Ù ¡ØOf course, conditions can change, and in choosing the time to begin policy normalization as well as the pace of that process, should that be the next direction for policy, we would carefully consider both parts of our dual mandate.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] the temporary shocks that have been holding down economic activity pass, we expect to again see the effects of policy accommodation reflected in stronger economic activity and job creation. However, given the range of uncertainties about the strength of the recovery and prospects for inflation over the medium term, the Federal Reserve remains prepared to respond should economic developments indicate that an adjustment in the stance of monetary policy would be appropriate.¡Ù ¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢¾ì¹ç¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤Æ¤ÏÄɲäζâÍ»´ËϤ¬É¬Íפˤʤë²ÄǽÀ¤â¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤·¡¢¶âÍ»À¯ºö¤Î¥¹¥¿¥ó¥¹¤ÎÄ´À°(½Ð¸ýÀ¯ºö¤Ç¤¹¤«¤Ê)¤âɬÍפˤʤë²ÄǽÀ¤â¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤·¡¢¤½¤ì¤ÏŬµ¹Å¬ÀÚ¤ËÂбþ¤·¤Þ¤¹¤è¤È¤¤¤¦Ïäò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤è¤¦¤ËÆÉ¤á¤Þ¤¹¤¬¤É¤¦¤Ç¤·¤ç¡£
¡ØOn the one hand, the possibility remains that the recent economic weakness may prove more persistent than expected and that deflationary risks might reemerge, implying a need for additional policy support.¡Ù
¡ØOne option would be to provide more explicit guidance about the period over which the federal funds rate and the balance sheet would remain at their current levels.¡Ù
¡ØThe Federal Reserve could also reduce the 25 basis point rate of interest it pays to banks on their reserves, thereby putting downward pressure on short-term rates more generally.¡Ù
¡ØOf course, our experience with these policies remains relatively limited, and employing them would entail potential risks and costs. However, prudent planning requires that we evaluate the efficacy of these and other potential alternatives for deploying additional stimulus if conditions warrant.¡Ù
¡ØAs you know, that policy currently consists of two parts.¡Ù¡ØFirst, the target range for the federal funds rate remains at 0 to 1/4 percent and, as indicated in the statement released after the June meeting, the Committee expects that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.¡Ù¡ØThe second component of monetary policy has been to increase the Federal Reserve's holdings of longer-term securities, an approach undertaken because the target for the federal funds rate could not be lowered meaningfully further.¡Ù
¡ØThe Federal Reserve's acquisition of longer-term Treasury securities boosted the prices of such securities and caused longer-term Treasury yields to be lower than they would have been otherwise. In addition, by removing substantial quantities of longer-term Treasury securities from the market, the Fed's purchases induced private investors to acquire other assets that serve as substitutes for Treasury securities in the financial marketplace, such as corporate bonds and mortgage-backed securities. ¡Ù¡ØBy this means, the Fed's asset purchase program--like more conventional monetary policy--has served to reduce the yields and increase the prices of those other assets as well. The net result of these actions is lower borrowing costs and easier financial conditions throughout the economy. We know from many decades of experience with monetary policy that, when the economy is operating below its potential, easier financial conditions tend to promote more rapid economic growth. Estimates based on a number of recent studies as well as Federal Reserve analyses suggest that, all else being equal, the second round of asset purchases probably lowered longer-term interest rates approximately 10 to 30 basis points. Our analysis further indicates that a reduction in longer-term interest rates of this magnitude would be roughly equivalent in terms of its effect on the economy to a 40 to 120 basis point reduction in the federal funds rate.¡Ù
¡ØIn June, we completed the planned purchases of $600 billion in longer-term Treasury securities that the Committee initiated in November, while continuing to reinvest the proceeds of maturing or redeemed longer-term securities in Treasuries. Although we are no longer expanding our securities holdings, the evidence suggests that the degree of accommodation delivered by the Federal Reserve's securities purchase program is determined primarily by the quantity and mix of securities that the Federal Reserve holds rather than by the current pace of new purchases. Thus, even with the end of net new purchases, maintaining our holdings of these securities should continue to put downward pressure on market interest rates and foster more accommodative financial conditions than would otherwise be the case.¡Ù
¡ØWhen we began this program, we certainly did not expect it to be a panacea for the country's economic problems. However, as the expansion weakened last summer, developments with respect to both components of our dual mandate implied that additional monetary accommodation was needed. In that context, we believed that the program would both help reduce the risk of deflation that had emerged and provide a needed boost to faltering economic activity and job creation. ¡Ù
¡ØThe experience to date with the round of securities purchases that just ended suggests that the program had the intended effects of reducing the risk of deflation and shoring up economic activity. In the months following the August announcement of our policy of reinvesting maturing and redeemed securities and our signal that we were considering more purchases, inflation compensation as measured in the market for inflation-indexed securities rose from low to more normal levels, suggesting that the perceived risks of deflation had receded markedly. This was a significant achievement, as we know from the Japanese experience that protracted deflation can be quite costly in terms of weaker economic growth. ¡Ù
¡ØWith respect to employment, our expectations were relatively modest; estimates made in the autumn suggested that the additional purchases could boost employment by about 700,000 jobs over two years, or about 30,000 extra jobs per month. Even including the disappointing readings for May and June, which reflected in part the temporary factors discussed earlier, private payroll gains have averaged 160,000 per month in the first half of 2011, compared with average increases of only about 80,000 private jobs per month from May to August 2010.¡Ù ¸µ¡¹¤½¤³¤Þ¤ÇÂ礤¯´üÂԤϤ·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤»¤ó¤Ç¡¢QE2¤Î¼Â»Ü¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤ÆÄɲäǷî¤Ë3Ëü¿Í¤Î¸ÛÍÑÁϽФò´üÂÔ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤·¤¿¤¬¡¢²¿¤È̱´Ö¤Î¸ÛÍѼԿô¤Ïºòǯ8·î¤Þ¤Ç¤Î·îÊ¿¶Ñ8Ëü¿Í¤«¤é·î16Ëü¿Í¤ËÁý¤¨¤Þ¤·¤¿¤è!!!!!!¤ÈƲ¡¹¤Î¥É¥ä´é¡£ ¤¨?5·î¤È6·î¤Î»Äǰ¤Ê¥Ç¡¼¥¿??¥¢¥ì¤Ï°ì»þŪÍ×°ø¤Ç¤¹¤è°ì»þŪÍ×°ø¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦
¡ØNot all of the step-up in hiring was necessarily the result of the asset purchase program, but the comparison is consistent with our expectations for employment gains. Of course, we will be monitoring developments in the labor market closely.¡Ù
¡ØThe U.S. economy has continued to recover, but the pace of the expansion so far this year has been modest. After increasing at an annual rate of 2-3/4 percent in the second half of 2010, real gross domestic product (GDP) rose at about a 2 percent rate in the first quarter of this year, and incoming data suggest that the pace of recovery remained soft in the spring. At the same time, the unemployment rate, which had appeared to be on a downward trajectory at the turn of the year, has moved back above 9 percent.¡Ù
¡ØIn part, the recent weaker-than-expected economic performance appears to have been the result of several factors that are likely to be temporary. Notably, the run-up in prices of energy, especially gasoline, and food has reduced consumer purchasing power. In addition, the supply chain disruptions that occurred following the earthquake in Japan caused U.S. motor vehicle producers to sharply curtail assemblies and limited the availability of some models.¡Ù
¡ØLooking forward, however, the apparent stabilization in the prices of oil and other commodities should ease the pressure on household budgets, and vehicle manufacturers report that they are making significant progress in overcoming the parts shortages and expect to increase production substantially this summer.¡Ù
¡ØMuch of the slowdown in aggregate demand this year has been centered in the household sector, and the ability and willingness of consumers to spend will be an important determinant of the pace of the recovery in coming quarters.¡Ù
¡ØReal disposable personal income over the first five months of 2011 was boosted by the reduction in payroll taxes, but those gains were largely offset by higher prices for gasoline and other commodities. Households report that they have little confidence in the durability of the recovery and about their own income prospects. Moreover, the ongoing weakness in home values is holding down household wealth and weighing on consumer sentiment.¡Ù
¡ØOn the positive side, household debt burdens are declining, delinquency rates on credit card and auto loans are down significantly, and the number of homeowners missing a mortgage payment for the first time is decreasing. The anticipated pickups in economic activity and job creation, together with the expected easing of price pressures, should bolster real household income, confidence, and spending in the medium run.¡Ù
¡ØMost of the recent rise in inflation appears likely to be transitory, and FOMC participants expected inflation to subside in coming quarters to rates at or below the level of 2 percent or a bit less that participants view as consistent with our dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability. ¡Ù
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¡ØIn identifying possible risks to financial stability, a few participants expressed concern that credit conditions in some sectors--most notably the agriculture sector--might have eased too much amid signs that investors in these markets were aggressively taking on more leverage and risk in order to obtain higher returns. ¡Ù
¡ØHowever, a number of participants pointed out that the recent faster pace of price increases was widespread across many categories of spending and was evident in inflation measures such as trimmed means or medians, which exclude the most extreme price movements in each period. The discussion of core inflation and similar indicators reflected the view expressed by some participants that such measures are useful for forecasting the path of inflation over the medium run. In addition, reports from business contacts indicated that some already had passed on, or were intending to try to pass on, at least a portion of their higher costs to customers in order to maintain profit margins.¡Ù
¡ØMost participants expected that much of the rise in headline inflation this year would prove transitory and that inflation over the medium term would be subdued as long as commodity prices did not continue to rise rapidly and longer-term inflation expectations remained stable.¡Ù
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¡ØNevertheless, a number of participants judged the risks to the outlook for inflation as tilted to the upside.¡Ù
¡ØMoreover, a few participants saw a continuation of the current stance of monetary policy as posing some upside risk to inflation expectations and actual inflation over time. However, other participants observed that measures of longer-term inflation compensation derived from financial instruments had remained stable of late, and that survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations also had not changed appreciably, on net, in recent months. These participants noted that labor costs were rising only slowly, and that persistent slack in labor and product markets would likely limit upward pressures on prices in coming quarters. Participants agreed that it would be important to pay close attention to the evolution of both inflation and inflation expectations.¡Ù
¡ØA few participants noted that the adoption by the Committee of an explicit numerical inflation objective could help keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored.¡Ù
¡ØAnother participant, however, expressed concern that the adoption of such an objective could, in effect, alter the relative importance of the two components of the Committee's dual mandate.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants also discussed the medium-term outlook for monetary policy.¡Ù
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¡ØSome participants noted that if economic growth remained too slow to make satisfactory progress toward reducing the unemployment rate and if inflation returned to relatively low levels after the effects of recent transitory shocks dissipated, it would be appropriate to provide additional monetary policy accommodation.¡Ù
¡ØOthers, however, saw the recent configuration of slower growth and higher inflation as suggesting that there might be less slack in labor and product markets than had been thought.¡Ù
¡ØSeveral participants observed that the necessity of reallocating labor across sectors as the recovery proceeds, as well as the loss of skills caused by high levels of long-term unemployment and permanent separations, may have temporarily reduced the economy's level of potential output. In that case, the withdrawal of monetary accommodation may need to begin sooner than currently anticipated in financial markets.¡Ù
¡ØA few participants expressed uncertainty about the efficacy of monetary policy in current circumstances but disagreed on the implications for future policy.¡ÙÊ̤ξ¤Î¥á¥ó¥Ð¡¼¤Ï¸½ºß¤Î¶âÍ»À¯ºö¤Î͸úÀ¤ËÂФ¹¤ëÉԳμÂÀ¤ò»ØÅ¦¤¹¤ë¤â¤Î¤Î¡¢Àè¹Ô¤¤Î¶âÍ»À¯ºö¤Ë´Ø¤¹¤ë¥¤¥ó¥×¥ê¥±¡¼¥·¥ç¥ó¤Ë´Ø¤·¤Æ¤ÏƱ°Õ¤·¤Ê¤¤¤È¡£
¡ØOn the one hand, a few members noted that, depending on how economic conditions evolve, the Committee might have to consider providing additional monetary policy stimulus, especially if economic growth remained too slow to meaningfully reduce the unemployment rate in the medium run.¡Ù
¡ØOn the other hand, a few members viewed the increase in inflation risks as suggesting that economic conditions might well evolve in a way that would warrant the Committee taking steps to begin removing policy accommodation sooner than currently anticipated.¡Ù
¡ØIn follow-up to discussions at the January meeting, the Committee turned to consideration of policies aimed at supporting effective communication with the public regarding the outlook for the economy and monetary policy. The subcommittee on communication, chaired by Governor Yellen and composed of Governor Duke and Presidents Fisher and Rosengren, proposed policies for Committee participants and for Federal Reserve System staff to follow in their communications with the public in order to reinforce the public's confidence in the transparency and integrity of the monetary policy process.¡Ù
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¡ØBy unanimous vote, the Committee approved the policies.¡Ù
µÓÃí¤¬¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¡¢(The policies are available at [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] and [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] all supported the policies, but several of them emphasized that the policy for staff, in particular, should be applied with judgment and common sense so as to avoid interfering with legitimate research.¡Ù
6·îFOMCµÄ»öÍ×»Ý [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] the staff still projected real GDP to increase at a moderate rate in the second half of 2011 and in 2012, with the ongoing recovery in activity receiving continued support from accommodative monetary policy, further increases in credit availability, and anticipated improvements in household and business confidence. The average pace of real GDP growth was expected to be sufficient to bring the unemployment rate down very slowly over the projection period, and the jobless rate was anticipated to remain elevated at the end of 2012.¡Ù
¡ØAlthough increases in consumer food and energy prices slowed a bit in recent months, the continued step-up in core consumer price inflation led the staff to raise slightly its projection for core inflation over the coming quarters. However, headline inflation was still expected to recede over the medium term, as increases in food and energy prices and in non-oil import prices were anticipated to ease further. As in previous forecasts, the staff continued to project that core consumer price inflation would remain relatively subdued over the projection period, reflecting both stable long-term inflation expectations and persistent slack in labor and product markets.¡Ù
¤Ç¡¢¼¡¤¬¡ØParticipants' Views on Current Conditions and the Economic Outlook¡Ù¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢º£²ó¤Ï¤³¤ÎÊÕ¤¬¿§¡¹¤È¥ª¥â¥í¥¤¤Î¤Ç¤¹(¤Ä¤Þ¤êºòÆü¤ÏÁ°¿¶¤ê¤ß¤¿¤¤¤Ê¤â¤ó)¡£
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¡ØIn their discussion of the economic situation and outlook, meeting participants agreed that the economic information received during the intermeeting period indicated that the economic recovery was continuing at a moderate pace, though somewhat more slowly than they had anticipated at the time of the April meeting.¡Ù ´Ë¤ä¤«¤Ê·Êµ¤²óÉü¤Ï·Ñ³¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤â¤Î¤Î¡¢4·îFOMC»þÅÀ¤ÇÁÛÄꤷ¤Æ¤¤¤¿¤è¤ê¤â¤½¤Î¥Ú¡¼¥¹¤ÏÃÙ¤¤¤È¤Ê¡£
¡ØParticipants noted several transitory factors that were restraining growth, including the global supply chain disruptions in the wake of the Japanese earthquake, the unusually severe weather in some parts of the United States, a drop in defense spending, and the effects of increases in oil and other commodity prices this year on household purchasing power and spending.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants expected that the expansion would gain strength as the influence of these temporary factors waned.¡Ù
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¡ØNonetheless, most participants judged that the pace of the economic recov ery was likely to be somewhat slower over coming quarters than they had projectedin April.¡Ù
¡ØThis judgment reflected the persistent weakness in the housing market, the ongoing efforts by some households to reduce debt burdens, the recent sluggish growth of income and consumption, the fiscal contraction at all levels of government, and the effects of uncertainty regarding the economic outlook and future tax and regulatory policies on the willingness of firms to hire and invest.¡Ù
¡ØMoreover, the recovery remained subject to some downside risks, such as the possibility of a more extended period of weak activity and declining prices in the housing sector, the chance of a larger-than-expected near-term fiscal tightening, and potential financial and economic spillovers if the situation in peripheral Europe were to deteriorate further.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants still projected that the unemployment rate would decline gradually toward levels they saw as consistent with the Committee's dual mandate, but at a more gradual pace than they had forecast in April.¡Ù
¡ØWhile higher prices for energy and other commodities had boosted inflation this year, with commodity prices expected to change little going forward and longer-term inflation expectations stable, most participants anticipated that inflation would subside to levels at or below those consistent with the Committee's dual mandate.¡Ù
¡ØMeeting participants generally noted that the most recent data on employment had been disappointing, and new claims for unemployment insurance remained elevated. The recent deterioration in labor market conditions was a particular concern for FOMC participants because the prospects for job growth were seen as an important source of uncertainty in the economic outlook, particularly in the outlook for consumer spending.¡Ù
¡ØSeveral participants reported feedback from business contacts who were delaying hiring until the economic and regulatory outlook became more certain and who indicated that they expected to meet any near-term increase in the demand for their products without boosting employment; these participants noted the risk that such cautious attitudes toward hiring could slow the pace at which the unemployment rate normalized.¡Ù
¡ØWage gains were generally reported to be subdued, although wages for a few skilled job categories in which workers were in short supply were said to be increasing relatively more rapidly. ¡Ù
¡ØÇä³Ý¶â¤äºß¸Ë¤Ê¤É¤òôÊݤȤ¹¤ëÍ»»ñ¤Ï¡¢Æ°»º¡¦ºÄ¸¢Ã´ÊÝÍ»»ñ(Asset Based Lending)¤È¸Æ¤Ð¤ì¡¢Êƹñ¤Ç¤ÏÀ¹¤ó¤Ë¹Ô¤ï¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£¤³¤ÎABL¤Ï¡¢ÉÔÆ°»ºÃ´ÊÝÍ»»ñ¤ËÈæ¤Ù¤Æ¡¢Ã´ÊݲÁÃͤÎɾ²Á¤Ê¤É¤ÎÌÌ¤ÇÆñ¤·¤µ¤òȼ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£¥Ó¥¸¥Í¥¹¤Î²áÄø¤ÇÀ¸¤¸¤ë»ñ»º¤Î²ÁÃͤϡ¢¤½¤Î¥Ó¥¸¥Í¥¹¤ÎÆâÍÆ¤ä¶È³¦Æ°¸þ¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¡¢¼Ú¤ê¼ê¤È¶âÍ»µ¡´Ø¤¬¿¼¤¯Íý²ò¤·¹ç¤ï¤Ê¤±¤ì¤Ð¡¢É¾²Á¤¬¤Ç¤¤Ê¤¤¤«¤é¤Ç¤¹¡£¤·¤«¤·¡¢ÀѶËŪ¤Ë¤½¤¦¤¤¤¦¼ê´Ö¤ò¤«¤±¤ë¤³¤È¤Ë¤Ï¡¢ÉÔÆ°»ºÃ´Êݤä·Ð±Ä¼Ô¤Î¸Ä¿ÍÊݾڤ¬¤Ê¤¤´ë¶È¤Ë¤â¡¢»ñ¶âĴã¤Ø¤ÎÆ»¤¬³«¤«¤ì¤ë¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦Â礤ʥá¥ê¥Ã¥È¤¬¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¡£¤³¤¦¤·¤¿¥á¥ê¥Ã¥È¤ò³è¤«¤¹¤è¤¦¡¢´ë¶È¤È¶âÍ»µ¡´Ø¤¬Æó¿Í»°µÓ¤Ç¼ý±×µ¡²ñ¤Î³«Âó¤Ë¼è¤êÁȤߡ¢¤³¤ì¤Þ¤ÇËä¤â¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤¿À®Ä¹¤Î²ê¤¬ÆüËÜÁ´ÂΤǰé¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤¯¤è¤¦¡¢´üÂÔ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£¡Ù
6·îFOMCµÄ»öÍ×»Ý [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] pressures on core consumer prices appeared to reflect the elevated prices of commodities and other imports, along with notable increases in motor vehicle prices likely arising from the effects of recent supply chain disruptions and the resulting extremely low level of automobile inventories.¡Ù
¡ØHeadline consumer price inflation, which had risen in the first quarter, edged down a bit in April and May, as the prices of consumer food and energy decelerated from the pace seen in previous months. More recently, survey data through the middle of June pointed to declines in retail gasoline prices, and prices of food commodities appeared to have decreased somewhat. Excluding food and energy, core consumer price inflation picked up in April and May, pushing the 12-month change in the core consumer price index through May above its level of a year earlier.¡Ù
¡ØHowever, near-term inflation expectations from the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers moved down a little in May and early June from the high level seen in April, and longer-term inflation expectations remained within the range that has generally prevailed over the preceding few years.¡Ù
¡ØWith the recent data on spending, income, production, and labor market conditions mostly weaker than the staff had anticipated at the time of the April FOMC meeting, the near-term projection for the rate of increase in real gross domestic product (GDP) was revised down. The effects of the disaster in Japan and of higher commodity prices on the rate of increase in real consumer spending were expected to hold down U.S. real GDP growth in the near term, but those effects were anticipated to be transitory.¡Ù
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¡ØHowever, the staff also read the incoming economic data as suggesting that the underlying pace of the recovery was softer than they had previously anticipated, and they marked down their outlook for economic growth over the medium term.¡Ù
¡ØNevertheless, the staff still projected real GDP to increase at a moderate rate in the second half of 2011 and in 2012, with the ongoing recovery in activity receiving continued support from accommodative monetary policy, further increases in credit availability, and anticipated improvements in household and business confidence. The average pace of real GDP growth was expected to be sufficient to bring the unemployment rate down very slowly over the projection period, and the jobless rate was anticipated to remain elevated at the end of 2012.¡Ù
¡ØAlthough increases in consumer food and energy prices slowed a bit in recent months, the continued step-up in core consumer price inflation led the staff to raise slightly its projection for core inflation over the coming quarters. However, headline inflation was still expected to recede over the medium term, as increases in food and energy prices and in non-oil import prices were anticipated to ease further. As in previous forecasts, the staff continued to project that core consumer price inflation would remain relatively subdued over the projection period, reflecting both stable long-term inflation expectations and persistent slack in labor and product markets.¡Ù
6·îFOMCµÄ»öÍ×»Ý [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] in Financial Markets and the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet¡Ù¤Î½ê¤Ë¤´¤¶¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤¬¡¢
¡ØIn light of ongoing strains in some foreign financial markets, the Committee considered a proposal to extend its dollar liquidity swap arrangements with foreign central banks past August 1, 2011. Following their discussion, members unanimously approved the following resolution:¡Ù
¤¢¤È¡¢¼¡¤Î¥³¡¼¥Ê¡¼¤¬¡ØDynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢DSGE¥â¥Ç¥ë¤¬¤É¤¦¤·¤¿¤³¤¦¤·¤¿¤È¤¤¤¦Ï䬤¢¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤¢¤¿¤¯¤·Åª¤Ë¤Ï¤Õ¡¼¤óÄøÅÙ¤·¤«¶½Ì£¤¬Ìµ¤¤(¤¹¤¤¤Þ¤»¤ó)¤Î¤Ç·ëÏÀ¤é¤·¤Éôʬ¤À¤±°ì±þ°úÍÑ¡£
¡ØIn discussing the staff presentation, meeting participants expressed the view that DSGE models are a useful addition to the wide range of analytical approaches traditionally used at the Federal Reserve, in part because they provide an internally consistent way of exploring how the behavior of economic agents might change in response to systematic adjustments to policy. Some participants also expressed interest in seeing on a regular basis projections of key macroeconomic variables and other products from the DSGE models developed in the System.¡Ù
¡ØFinally, participants encouraged further staff work to improve these models by, for example, expanding the range of questions they can be used to address.¡Ù
¡ØThe Committee discussed strategies for normalizing the stance and conduct of monetary policy, following up on its discussion of this topic at the April meeting. Participants stressed that the Committee's discussions of this topic were undertaken as part of prudent planning and did not imply that a move toward such normalization would necessarily begin sometime soon. For concreteness, the Committee considered a set of specific principles that would guide its strategy of normalizing the stance and conduct of monetary policy.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants discussed several specific elements of the principles, including how they should characterize the monetary policy framework that the Committee would adopt after the conduct of policy returned to normal and whether the principles should encompass the possible timing between the normalization steps. At the conclusion of the discussion, all but one of the participants agreed on the following key elements of the strategy that they expect to follow when it becomes appropriate to begin normalizing the stance and conduct of monetary policy:¡Ù
¡ØThe Committee will determine the timing and pace of policy normalization to promote its statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability.¡Ù
¡ØTo begin the process of policy normalization, the Committee will likely first cease reinvesting some or all payments of principal on the securities holdings in the SOMA.¡Ù
¡ØAt the same time or sometime thereafter, the Committee will modify its forward guidance on the path of the federal funds rate and will initiate temporary reserve-draining operations aimed at supporting the implementation of increases in the federal funds rate when appropriate.¡Ù
¤½¤ì¤ÈƱ»þ¤Þ¤¿¤Ï¤½¤Î¾¯¡¹¸å¤Ë¼Â»Ü¤¹¤ë¤Î¤Ï¡ÖFFͶƳÌÜɸ¤Ë´Ø¤¹¤ë¥¬¥¤¥À¥ó¥¹Ê¸¸À(for an extended period)¤ÎÊѹ¹¡×¤È¡Ö°ì»þŪ¤Ê¥ê¥¶¡¼¥ÖµÛ¼ý¥ª¥Ú¥ì¡¼¥·¥ç¥ó(¥ê¥Ð¡¼¥¹¥ì¥Ý¤È¤«¥¿¡¼¥à¥Ç¥Ý¥¸¥Ã¥È¥Õ¥¡¥·¥ê¥Æ¥£¡¼¤È¤«)¤ò³«»Ï¤·¤ÆÉ¬Íפʻþ¤ËFF¥ì¡¼¥È¤ò°ú¤¾å¤²¤ë¤è¤¦¤Ë¤Ç¤¤ë¤è¤¦¤Ë¤¹¤ë¡×¤È¤¤¤¦»ö¤À¤½¤¦¤Ç¡£
¡ØWhen economic conditions warrant, the Committee's next step in the process of policy normalization will be to begin raising its target for the federal funds rate, and from that point on, changing the level or range of the federal funds rate target will be the primary means of adjusting the stance of monetary policy. During the normalization process, adjustments to the interest rate on excess reserves and to the level of reserves in the banking system will be used to bring the funds rate toward its target.¡Ù
¤Ç¡¢¤³¤³ÆÉ¤ó¤Ç¤¤¤Æ¡Ö¤Û¡¼¡×¤È»×¤Ã¤¿¤Î¤Ï¶âÍøÍ¶Æ³¤Ë´Ø¤·¤Æ¡Øchanging the level or range of the federal funds rate target¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦Ê¸¸À¤¬Æþ¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë»ö¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢¶âÍøÍ¶Æ³À¯ºö¥á¥¤¥ó¤ËÌ᤹¤È¤·¤Æ¤â¡¢Ä¶²á½àÈ÷¤¬²áÂç¤Ë¤¢¤ëÃæ¤Ç¤Ï¼Â¸úFF¶âÍø¤ÎÄ´À°¤ò¥Ô¥ó¥Ý¥¤¥ó¥È¤Ç¼Â»Ü¤¹¤ë¤Î¤ÏÆñ¤·¤¤Ì̤¬¤¢¤ë¤«¤â¤·¤ì¤Ê¤¤¤ÈFOMC¥á¥ó¥Ð¡¼¤¬Ç§¼±¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Æ¡¢¤â¤·¤«¤·¤¿¤éºÇ½é¤ÎÍø¾å¤²¤Î»þ¤Ë¤ÏͶƳÌÜɸ¤ò¥Ô¥ó¥Ý¥¤¥ó¥È¤Ç¤Ï¤Ê¤¯¤Æ¥ì¥ó¥¸¤Ç°ú¤¾å¤²¤È¤Ê¤ë²ÄǽÀ¤â¤¢¤ë¤Î¤«¤Ê¤¢¤È¤«»×¤¦¤Î¤Ç¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¡£
¡ØSales of agency securities from the SOMA will likely commence sometime after the first increase in the target for the federal funds rate. The timing and pace of sales will be communicated to the public in advance; that pace is anticipated to be relatively gradual and steady, but it could be adjusted up or down in response to material changes in the economic outlook or financial conditions.¡Ù
¡ØOnce sales begin, the pace of sales is expected to be aimed at eliminating the SOMA's holdings of agency securities over a period of three to five years, thereby minimizing the extent to which the SOMA portfolio might affect the allocation of credit across sectors of the economy. Sales at this pace would be expected to normalize the size of the SOMA securities portfolio over a period of two to three years. In particular, the size of the securities portfolio and the associated quantity of bank reserves are expected to be reduced to the smallest levels that would be consistent with the efficient implementation of monetary policy.¡Ù
¤½¤Î̾¤â¤º¤Ð¤êQuantitative Easing (QE) Conference¤¬¼Â»Ü¤µ¤ì¤Þ¤·¤¿¤È¤æ¡¼¥á¥â¤À¤±ºî¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¤Î¤Ç¡¢¤Þ¤¢¤³¤ÎÁ°Àڤ俼ê·Á¤Î·èºÑ¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç(´À)¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] his presentation, Bullard discussed the use of balance sheet policy (or quantitative easing) to conduct stabilization policy once short-term nominal interest rates are near zero.¡Ù
¡Ø¡ÈThe purchase and sale of liquid assets, such as Treasury securities, is very similar to ordinary monetary policy, except that a particular nominal interest rate target is not set,¡É he said.¡Ù
¡ØBullard focused mostly on the Fed¡Çs second round of quantitative easing (which is commonly referred to as ¡ÈQE2¡É), analyzing the motivation for and effectiveness of this policy action.¡¡Overall, Bullard said that QE2 was classic monetary policy easing.¡¡¡ÈThis experience shows that monetary policy can be eased aggressively even when the policy rate is near zero,¡É he said.¡Ù
¡ØWhen short-term nominal interest rates are near zero, Bullard said, ¡Èasset purchases at longer maturities can substitute for ordinary monetary policy.¡É¡¡These purchases put downward pressure on nominal interest rates further out the yield curve and upward pressure on expected inflation.¡Ù
¡ØWith the policy rate near zero since December 2008, the FOMC has voted to pursue a balance sheet policy twice.¡¡The first quantitative easing program¡½announced in late November 2008 and expanded in March 2009¡½consisted of more than $1.7 trillion in purchases of agency debt, agency mortgage-backed securities, and long-term Treasury debt.¡¡The second quantitative easing program¡½announced in November 2010¡½included $600 billion in purchases of longer-term Treasury debt.¡Ù
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¡Ø¡ÈBalance sheet policy, like all monetary policy, should be conducted in a state-contingent way,¡É Bullard added.¡¡(In other words, policy should be adjusted based on the state of the economy.)¡Ù
¡ØRegarding the motivation for QE2, Bullard highlighted the disinflation trend that developed during 2010 and the slower pace of recovery during the summer of 2010.¡¡¡ÈThese developments left the U.S. at risk of a Japanese-style outcome,¡É he said.¡¡The ¡ÈJapanese experience with mild deflation and a near-zero nominal interest rate has been poor.¡É¡Ù
¡ØIn 2010, U.S. monetary policy included a near-zero policy rate, a large balance sheet, and ¡Èextended period¡É language for the near-zero policy rate.¡¡Lengthening the ¡Èextended period¡É in response to the economic developments could potentially be counter-productive and send the U.S. to a Japanese-style outcome.¡¡In order to avoid that, the FOMC voted to pursue QE2.¡Ù
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¡ØMarkets began pricing in additional FOMC action after Chairman Ben Bernanke¡Çs Jackson Hole speech in late August 2010.¡¡Although the FOMC made the decision to purchase additional assets in November 2010, ¡Èmost effects were already priced into financial markets at that point,¡É Bullard said.¡Ù
¡Ø¡ÈThe financial market effects of QE2 looked the same as if the FOMC had reduced the policy rate substantially,¡É Bullard said.¡¡¡ÈIn particular, real interest rates declined, inflation expectations rose, the dollar depreciated, and equity prices rose.¡¡These are the ¡Æclassic¡Ç financial market effects one might observe when the Fed eases monetary policy in ordinary times.¡É¡Ù
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢¼ÂºÝ¤ËQE2¤ä¤Ã¤¿¤é¤É¤¦¤Ê¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬¥¹¥é¥¤¥É¥·¥ç¡¼¤Ç¤ÏPDF¥Õ¥¡¥¤¥ë¤Î22ËçÌÜÊդ꤫¤é¡ØExpected inflation increased¡Ù(¥×¥ì¥¼¥ó¤è¤ê)¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤ÇTIPS¤Î¿ôÃÍ¡¢¡ØThe dollar depreciated¡Ù(¥×¥ì¥¼¥ó¤è¤ê)¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤ÇËǰײýŸå¤Î̾Ìܥɥ륤¥ó¥Ç¥Ã¥¯¥¹¡¢¡ØReal interest rates declined¡Ù(¥×¥ì¥¼¥ó¤è¤ê)¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç5ǯʪTIPS¤ÎÍø²ó¤ê¡¢¡ØEquity prices increased¡Ù(¥×¥ì¥¼¥ó¤è¤ê)¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤ÇWilshire5000PriceIndex¤Ã¤Ä¡¼¤Î¤¬½Ð¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¸ú²Ì¤¬¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¤È¤¤¤¦Ïäò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØAlthough the financial market effects were priced in ahead of the November decision, Bullard said that the effects of QE2 on the real economy would be expected to lag by six to 12 months.¡Ù
¡Ø¡ÈReal effects are difficult to disentangle because other shocks hit the economy in the meantime,¡É he said, adding this seems to have happened during the first half of 2011.¡¡Disentangling the real effects is a standard problem in evaluating monetary policy, he noted.¡Ù