[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Policy, Money, and Inflation By John C. Williams
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¡ØTextbook monetary theory holds that increasing the money supply leads to higher inflation. However, the Federal Reserve has tripled the monetary base since 2008 without inflation surging. With interest rates at historically low levels and the economy still struggling, the normal money multiplier process has broken down and inflation pressures remain subdued. The following is adapted from a presentation by the president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco to the Western Economic Association International on July 2, 2012.¡Ù
¤Ç¡¢¸µ¥Í¥¿¤È¤Ê¤ë¹Ö±é¥Æ¥¥¹¥È¤Ï¤³¤Á¤é¤Ë¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] of the remarks made by Mario Draghi
Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment Conference in London 26 July 2012
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¡ØI asked myself what sort of message I want to give to you; I wouldn¡Çt use the word ¡Èsell¡É, but actually I think the best thing I could do, is to give you a candid assessment of how we view the euro situation from Frankfurt. And the first thing that came to mind was something that people said many years ago and then stopped saying it: The euro is like a bumblebee. This is a mystery of nature because it shouldn¡Çt fly but instead it does. So the euro was a bumblebee that flew very well for several years. And now - and I think people ask ¡Èhow come?¡É - probably there was something in the atmosphere, in the air, that made the bumblebee fly. Now something must have changed in the air, and we know what after the financial crisis. The bumblebee would have to graduate to a real bee. And that¡Çs what it¡Çs doing.¡Ù
¡ØThe first message I would like to send, is that the euro is much, much stronger, the euro area is much, much stronger than people acknowledge today. Not only if you look over the last 10 years but also if you look at it now, you see that as far as inflation, employment, productivity, the euro area has done either like or better than US or Japan.¡Ù
¡ØThe second point, the second message I would like to send today, is that progress has been extraordinary in the last six months. If you compare today the euro area member states with six months ago, you will see that the world is entirely different today, and for the better.¡Ù
¡ØBut the third point I want to make is in a sense more political.¡Ù
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¡ØWhen people talk about the fragility of the euro and the increasing fragility of the euro, and perhaps the crisis of the euro, very often non-euro area member states or leaders, underestimate the amount of political capital that is being invested in the euro.¡Ù
¡ØAnd so we view this, and I do not think we are unbiased observers, we think the euro is irreversible. And it¡Çs not an empty word now, because I preceded saying exactly what actions have been made, are being made to make it irreversible.¡Ù
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¡ØBut there is another message I want to tell you.¡Ù
¡ØWithin our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.¡Ù
¡ØThere are some short-term challenges, to say the least. The short-term challenges in our view relate mostly to the financial fragmentation that has taken place in the euro area. Investors retreated within their national boundaries. The interbank market is not functioning. It is only functioning very little within each country by the way, but it is certainly not functioning across countries.¡Ù
¡ØAnd I think the key strategy point here is that if we want to get out of this crisis, we have to repair this financial fragmentation.¡Ù
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¡ØThe second point is in a sense a collective action problem: because national supervisors, looking at the crisis, have asked their banks, the banks under their supervision, to withdraw their activities within national boundaries. And they ring fenced liquidity positions so liquidity can¡Çt flow, even across the same holding group because the financial sector supervisors are saying ¡Èno¡É.¡Ù
¡ØSo even though each one of them may be right, collectively they have been wrong. And this situation will have to be overcome of course.¡Ù
¡ØAnd then there is a risk aversion factor. Risk aversion has to do with counterparty risk. Now to the extent that I think my counterparty is going to default, I am not going to lend to this counterparty. But it can be because it is short of funding. And I think we took care of that with the two big LTROs where we injected half a trillion of net liquidity into the euro area banks. We took care of that.¡Ù
¡ØThen you have the counterparty recess related to the perception that my counterparty can fail because of lack of capital. We can do little about that.¡Ù
¡ØThen there¡Çs another dimension to this that has to do with the premia that are being charged on sovereign states borrowings. These premia have to, as I said, with default, with liquidity, but they also have to do more and more with convertibility, with the risk of convertibility. Now to the extent that these premia do not have to do with factors inherent to my counterparty - they come into our mandate. They come within our remit.¡Ù
¡ØTo the extent that the size of these sovereign premia hampers the functioning of the monetary policy transmission channel, they come within our mandate. So we have to cope with this financial fragmentation addressing these issues.¡Ù
¤³¤ì¤Ï³Î¤«¤Ë¤½¤¦¤¤¤¦Ì̤¬¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤½¤ì¤³¤½¤µ¤Ã¤°ú¤¹ç¤¤¤Ë½Ð¤·¤¿¥»¥ó¥È¥ë¥¤¥¹Ï¢¶ä¥Ö¥é¡¼¥ÉÁíºÛ¤Î¥Ú¡¼¥Ñ¡¼Îà¤ÎÃæ¤Ë¤¢¤ë¡ØSeven Faces of "The Peril"¡Ù¤Ç¤ÏQE2¼Â»Ü¤ÎɬÍ×À¤ò¼çÄ¥¤¹¤ë¤ÈƱ»þ¤Ë¡¢À¯ºö¶âÍø¤òÄã°Ì¿å½à¤ÇĹ´ü²½¤¹¤ë¤È¥Ç¥Õ¥ì¶Ñ¹Õ¤Ë´Ù¤ë²ÄǽÀ¤¬¹â¤Þ¤ë¤Î¤Ç˾¤Þ¤·¤¯¤Ê¤¤¤È¤¤¤¦¼çÄ¥¤ò¤·¤Æ¤ª¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢Äã¶âÍø¤Ë¤è¤ê¥Ç¥Õ¥ì´üÂÔÄêÃå¤È¤¤¤¦ÌäÂê¤â³Î¤«¤Ë»ØÅ¦¤µ¤ì¤ë½ê¤Ç¤Ï¤¢¤í¤¦¤«¤È¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Faces of "The Peril"
FED¤ÎÃæ¿´Åª¤Ê¥Ó¥å¡¼¤Ç¤Ï¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤»¤ó¤¬¡¢ËèÅÙ°úÍѤ·¤Æ¤ª¤ê¤Þ¤¹¥»¥ó¥È¥ë¥¤¥¹Ï¢¶äÁíºÛ¤Î¥Ö¥é¡¼¥É¤µ¤ó¤Î½ê¤Ç¤Ï¡ØKey Policy Papers¡Ù¤Î½ê¤Ç¡Ø"Measuring Inflation: The Core is Rotten" ¡Ù¤Ê¤É¤È¤¤¤¦¤ªÞ¯Íî¤Ê¥Ú¡¼¥Ñ¡¼¤ò½Ð¤·¤Æ¤ª¤é¤ì¤Þ¤·¤Æ(¤Á¤Ê¤ß¤Ë½é½Ð¤Ï2011ǯ5·î8Æü)¡¢¡Ö¥³¥¢¥¤¥ó¥Õ¥ì¤Ç´ðÄ´¤Îʪ²Á¤ò¸«¤ë¤ÈËÜÍèÌÜɸ¤Ë¤¹¤Ù¤Áí¹çʪ²Á»Ø¿ô¤è¤ê¤â¥Ð¥¤¥¢¥¹¤¬¤¢¤ë¤Î¤Ç¶âÍ»À¯ºö±¿±Ä¾åÌäÂ꤬ͤë¡×¤È¤æ¡¼¤è¡¼¤Ê¤ªÏ䷤Ƥ¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢É¬¤º¤·¤â¡Ö¹ñºÝŪ¤Ê¥¹¥¿¥ó¥À¡¼¥É¡×¤Ê¤Î¤«¤È¤¤¤¦¤È¤³¤ì¤Þ¤¿µÄÏÀ¤¬µ¯¤¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦¥Õ¥§¡¼¥º¤Î¤è¤¦¤Êµ¤¤¬¤¹¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤¹¤±¤É¤Ë¤ã¤¢¡£
¡ØThe Bank of England and HM Treasury are today announcing the launch of the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS). The FLS is designed to boost lending to the real economy. Banks and building societies that increase lending to UK households and businesses will be able to borrow more in the FLS, and do so at lower cost than those that scale back lending.¡Ù
¡ØThe introduction of the FLS occurs against the backdrop of a euro-area debt crisis which has revealed severe vulnerabilities in the European banking system and has led to a marked deterioration in the outlook for the UK economy over the past twelve months. In spite of the policy actions of the authorities, the flow of credit through the banking system - which households and many businesses necessarily rely on - has remained impaired. The FLS is designed to tackle this problem by reducing the price at which banks and building societies are able to fund themselves.¡Ù
¡ØIn the publication of an exchange of letters between the Governor and the Chancellor, accompanied by a background Explanatory Note and a Market Notice, the Bank and HM Treasury have today outlined the design and operation of the FLS. From today, eligible banks and building societies are encouraged to ensure they build up sufficient eligible collateral pre-positioned with the Bank to support their future use of the scheme. The FLS will open for drawings on 1 August. For 18 months thereafter, banks and building societies will be able to borrow UK Treasury Bills from the Bank for a period of up to 4 years against DWF-eligible collateral, for a fee.¡Ù
¡ØParticipating banks and building societies will be able to borrow up to 5% of their stock of existing lending to the real economy, plus any net expansion of lending during a reference period (from end-June 2012 to end-December 2013). In other words, for every pound of additional real economy lending an institution advances, an additional pound of access to the scheme will be permitted for that institution.¡Ù
¡ØThere is no upper limit on the size of either individual or aggregate borrowing under the scheme. By way of illustration, 5% of the stock of existing loans is equivalent to roughly ¡ò80bn across all potentially eligible banks and building societies.¡Ù
¡ØThe price of each institution¡Çs borrowing in the FLS will depend on its volume of lending to the real economy during the reference period. For banks or building societies maintaining or expanding their lending over that period, the fee will be 0.25% pa on the amount borrowed. After accounting for the cost of using the T-bills to borrow money, the total cost of funding for an institution using the FLS will be lower than current term funding rates, even for the strongest institutions. So as banks increase lending, their overall funding costs will fall. For banks or building societies whose lending declines, the fee will increase linearly, up to a maximum of 1.5% pa where lending decreases by 5% or more.¡Ù
¡ØThe FLS is designed to encourage broad participation so that as many institutions as possible have incentives to lend more to the UK real economy through, for example, business loans and residential mortgages, than they otherwise would have. Access to the scheme will be for those banks and building societies who sign up for the Bank¡Çs Discount Window Facility. Institutions will be permitted additional access to the scheme, pound-for-pound with any increase in lending, provided they have sufficient DWF-eligible collateral. The amount borrowed from the Bank of England, and the amount lent to households and firms, by each participating institution will be made public by the Bank of England on a quarterly basis.¡Ù
¡ØAlthough the Bank will not be indemnified for the operation of the FLS, the exchange of letters published today shows that the Bank has sought and received an assurance from the Government that the objectives of the Scheme lie within its remit. In addition, the FLS will be overseen by a joint Bank / HMT Oversight Board, which will meet on a quarterly basis.¡Ù
¡ØCommenting on the launch of the Scheme, the Governor of the Bank of England said: ¡ÈThis joint action by the Bank and the Treasury creates strong incentives for banks to expand their lending to the real economy. The more banks expand lending, the more they can use the Scheme. That will encourage banks to make loans to families and businesses both cheaper and more easily available". The Chancellor of the Exchequer said: ¡ÈToday¡Çs announcements aim to make mortgages and loans cheaper and more easily available, providing welcome support to businesses that want to expand and families aspiring to own their own home. The Treasury and the Bank of England are taking coordinated action to inject new confidence into our financial system and support the flow of credit to where it is needed in the real economy - showing that we are not powerless to act in the face of the eurozone debt storm.¡É¡Ù
6·îFOMCµÄ»öÍ׻ݤγ¤¤Ç¤¢¤ë¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Review of the Financial Situation¡Ù¤Î½ê¤ÇÌÌÇò¤¤Éôʬ¤¬¤¢¤Ã¤¿¤Î¤Ç°úÍÑ¡£
¡ØThere was limited evidence of increased strains in unsecured, short-term dollar funding markets over the intermeeting period despite heightened concerns about the situation in Europe.¡Ù
¡ØIn secured funding markets, the overnight general collateral Treasury repo rate edged higher. Market participants attributed some portion of the firming in short-term rates over the past several months to a temporary increase in short-dated Treasury securities held by dealers as a result of cumulative net Treasury issuance of such securities and sales of these securities by the Federal Reserve under its maturity extension program.¡Ù
¡ØIn the economic projection prepared by the staff for the June FOMC meeting, the forecast for real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the near term was revised down. The revision reflected data indicating a slower pace of private-sector job gains, more-subdued retail sales, a lower trajectory for personal income, greater restraint in government purchases, and weaker net exports than the staff anticipated at the time of the previous projection.¡Ù
¡ØMoreover, recent adverse developments in Europe and tighter domestic financial conditions led the staff to revise down somewhat the medium-term forecast for real GDP growth. ¡Ù
¡ØWith the drag from fiscal policy anticipated to increase next year, the staff projected that the growth rate of real GDP would not materially exceed that of potential output until 2014 when economic activity was expected to accelerate gradually, supported by accommodative monetary policy, further improvements in credit availability, and rising consumer and business sentiment.¡Ù
¡ØIncreases in economic activity were anticipated to narrow the wide margin of slack in labor and product markets only slowly over the projection period, and the unemployment rate was expected to still be elevated at the end of 2014.¡Ù
¡ØThe staff's near-term projection for inflation was revised down from the forecast prepared for the April FOMC meeting, reflecting a greater-than-expected drop in consumer energy prices. However, the staff's projection for inflation over the medium term was essentially unchanged. With the upward pressure from the earlier run-up in crude oil prices on consumer energy prices unwinding and oil prices expected to decline further, long-run inflation expectations anticipated to remain stable, and substantial resource slack persisting over the forecast period, the staff continued to project that inflation would be subdued through 2014.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants' Views on Current Conditions and the Economic Outlook¡Ù¤«¤é¾¯¡¹¡£
¡ØIn their discussion of the economic situation and outlook, participants agreed that the information received since the Committee's previous meeting suggested that the economy had continued to expand moderately, though many noted that a variety of indicators showed smaller gains than had been anticipated. ¡Ù
¡ØParticipants generally interpreted the information that became available during the intermeeting period as suggesting that economic growth would most likely remain moderate over coming quarters and then pick up very gradually. Most participants saw the incoming information as indicating somewhat slower growth in total demand, output, and employment over coming quarters than they had projected in April, and most carried forward some of that downward revision to their projections of medium-term growth.¡Ù
¡ØHowever, some participants judged that the recent weakness in a variety of economic indicators was more likely to prove transitory, and thought that the outlook beyond this year was essentially unchanged.¡Ù
¡ØReflecting the projected moderate pace of growth in production and employment, most participants anticipated that the unemployment rate would decline only slowly.¡Ù
¡ØA number of factors continued to be seen as likely to limit the economic expansion to a moderate pace in the near term; these included slow growth or even contraction in some major foreign economies, ongoing and prospective fiscal tightening in the United States, modest growth in household income, and--despite some recent signs of improvement--continued weakness in the housing sector. As in April, participants expected that most of the factors restraining economic expansion would ease over time, and so anticipated that the recovery eventually would gain strength.¡Ù
¡ØHowever, strains in global financial markets, which stemmed primarily from fiscal and banking concerns in Europe, had become more pronounced over the intermeeting period and continued to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook; the possibility of a sharper-than-anticipated fiscal tightening in the United States also posed a downside risk.¡Ù
¡ØLooking beyond the temporary effects on inflation of this year's fluctuations in oil and other commodity prices, almost all participants continued to anticipate that inflation over the medium-term would run at or below the 2 percent rate that the Committee judges to be most consistent with its statutory mandate.¡Ù
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¡ØIn one participant's judgment, appropriate monetary policy would lead to inflation modestly greater than 2 percent for a time in order to bring unemployment down somewhat faster.¡Ù
¡ØSome participants indicated that they saw persistent slack in resource utilization as posing downside risks to the outlook for inflation; a few participants judged that the highly accommodative stance of monetary policy posed upside risks to the medium-term inflation outlook.¡Ù
¡ØMeasures of consumer price inflation declined over the intermeeting period, mainly reflecting reductions in oil and gasoline prices since earlier in the year.¡Ù
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¡ØSeveral participants noted that they saw little if any evidence of price pressures, commenting that increases in labor costs continued to be subdued and that non-energy commodity prices had declined of late.¡Ù
¡ØWith longer-run inflation expectations well anchored and the unemployment rate elevated, almost all participants anticipated that inflation in coming quarters and over the medium run would be at or below the 2 percent rate that the Committee judges to be most consistent with its mandate; several had revised down their inflation forecasts.¡Ù
¡ØMost participants viewed the risks to their inflation outlook as being roughly balanced.¡Ù
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¡ØSome participants, however, saw persistent slack in resource utilization as weighting the risks to the outlook for inflation to the downside. In contrast, a few saw inflation risks as tilted to the upside; they generally were skeptical of models that rely on economic slack to forecast inflation and were concerned that maintaining the current highly accommodative stance of monetary policy over the medium run risked eroding the stability of inflation expectations, with a couple noting that large long-run fiscal imbalances also posed a risk.¡Ù
ºÇ½é¤Ë¡ØDiscussion of Communications regarding Economic Projections¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬¤´¤¶¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤³¤Á¤é¤Ç¤ÏÍפ¹¤ë¤ËSEP¤Ç¤Î¸«¤»Êý¤ò¹¹¤Ë½¼¼Â¤µ¤»¤Þ¤¹¤ª!¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬ÏÀµÄ¤µ¤ì¤Æ¤ª¤ê¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØMeeting participants discussed several possibilities for enhancing the clarity and transparency of the Committee's economic projections and their role in policy decisions and policy communications.¡Ù
¡ØIn particular, participants noted that while the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) provides information about their individual projections of key macroeconomic variables and about the path of monetary policy that each sees as appropriate and consistent with his or her projections, the SEP does not provide guidance about how those diverse views come together in the Committee's collective judgment about the outlook and appropriate policy as expressed in its postmeeting statement.¡Ù
¡ØMany participants indicated that if it were possible to construct a quantitative economic projection and associated path of appropriate policy that reflected the collective judgment of the Committee, such a projection could potentially be helpful in clarifying how the outlook and policy decisions are related.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants discussed examples of the economic and policy projections published by a number of foreign central banks. Participants generally indicated a willingness to explore adjustments to the SEP, while highlighting the importance of communicating not only the Committee's collective judgment but also the diversity of their views regarding the economic outlook and monetary policy. Many participants noted that developing a quantitative forecast that reflects the Committee's collective judgment could be challenging, given the range of their views about the economy's structure and dynamics.¡Ù
¡ØSeveral participants judged that the incremental gains in transparency that would result from developing and presenting such a consensus projection would be modest, given the breadth of information already provided in the Committee's policy statements, the minutes of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, and the Chairman's press briefings.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants agreed to continue to explore ways to increase clarity and transparency in the Committee's policy communications; many noted that the Committee had introduced a number of changes in its communications over the past year or so, and emphasized that further changes should be considered carefully. At the end of the discussion, the Chairman asked the subcommittee on communications to explore the feasibility and workability of potential approaches to developing an FOMC consensus forecast.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants' Views on Current Conditions and the Economic Outlook¡Ù¤ÎÃæ¤ÇÌÌÇò¤¤µÄÏÀ¤¬¤¢¤Ã¤¿¤Î¤Ç¤½¤ÎÊÕ¤«¤é¡£
¡ØMeeting participants again discussed the extent of slack in labor markets.¡Ù
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¡ØSome participants judged that the unemployment rate was being substantially boosted by structural factors such as mismatches between the skills of unemployed workers and those required for available jobs, a view that would imply less slack in labor markets than suggested by a simple comparison of the current unemployment rate to participants' estimates of its longer-run normal level.¡Ù
¡ØOne implication of the view that there is relatively little slack is that providing more monetary stimulus would be likely to raise inflation above the Committee's objective.¡Ù
¡ØSome other participants acknowledged that structural factors were contributing to unemployment, but said that, in their view, slack remained high and weak aggregate demand was the major reason that the unemployment rate was still elevated. These participants cited a range of evidence to support their judgment: the still-high fraction of workers who report working part-time jobs because they cannot find full-time work; research showing that job-finding rates among the long-term unemployed were somewhat higher in the recent past than a year earlier; anecdotal evidence to the effect that employers do not see long spells of unemployment as making applicants less attractive for most jobs; and reports that employers were receiving large numbers of applications for each opening and were being especially discriminating when filling vacant positions.¡Ù
Some other¥á¥ó¥Ð¡¼¤Ï¹½Â¤Í×°ø¤Ï¤¢¤ë¤â¤Î¤Î¡¢¿§¡¹¤Ê»ØÉ¸¤ò¸«¤ë¤Ë¥¹¥é¥Ã¥¯¤ÏÂ礤¤¤Î¤Ç¤Ï¤Ê¤¤¤«¤È¤¤¤¦Ïäò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤Î¤Ç¡¢¤³¤Î¿Í¤¿¤Á¤ÏÄɲôËϤˤ½¤³¤Þ¤ÇÈ¿ÂФ·¤Ê¤¤¥¿¥¤¥×¡£
¡ØAnother participant pointed to research showing that, in many countries, inflation is less responsive to downward pressure from labor market slack when inflation is already low than when inflation is elevated, and to evidence that firms in the United States have been reluctant to cut nominal wages in recent years, as indications that sizable slack might not cause inflation to decline from its already low level. These arguments imply that slack in labor markets remains considerable and therefore that a reduction in the unemployment rate toward its longer-run normal level would not have much effect on inflation. ¡Ù
BOE¤Î¥Ú¡¼¥¸(²¿¤«¥ì¥¤¥¢¥¦¥È¤¬ÊѤʵ¤¤¬¤¹¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¥ï¥·¤ÎPC¤Î¤»¤¤¤«¤Ê) [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Release - Further information and correspondence in relation to the BBA Libor Review in 2008
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[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] information and correspondence in relation to the BBA Libor Review in 2008 (¥á¡¼¥ë¤Î¥³¥Ô¡¼¤òPDF¤Ë¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¥¢¥Û¤Î¤è¤¦¤Ë½Å¤¤¤Î¤ÇÃí°Õ)
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] of Bank/Federal Reserve/BBA communications about BBA Libor Review in 2008
¡ØIn light of the change in the risks to the outlook for inflation since the time of the May Inflation Report, all members of the Committee judged that further economic stimulus was required in order to meet the inflation target in the medium term.¡Ù
¡ØA potentially significant, but hard to calibrate, additional stimulus would come from the FLS, the prospective relaxation of regulatory liquidity requirements, and the activation of the Bank¡Çs ECTR facility. These policies could affect the level of aggregate demand, as well as the economy¡Çs supply capacity. The key question for the Committee was whether an additional stimulus was required over and above these initiatives.¡Ù
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¡ØAll members expected the recently announced policy initiatives to boost the supply of credit and provide a fillip to economic activity. Most members felt that the case for adding to this by undertaking further purchases of gilts, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, at this meeting was nevertheless compelling and stronger than at the previous meeting.¡Ù
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¡ØFor them, while there were risks to medium-term inflation in both directions, developments since the previous meeting meant that the upside risks had declined and the possible cost of erring on the side of providing a greater stimulus was less than that of providing too little.¡Ù
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¡ØThose members discussed the case for undertaking additional asset purchases, of either ¡ò50 billion or ¡ò75 billion. On balance, and in light of the potential stimulus provided by the other recent and prospective policy initiatives, these members judged that an additional ¡ò50 billion of asset purchases was appropriate at this meeting in order to balance the risks to inflation around the 2% target in the medium term.¡Ù
¡ØIn the judgement of other members, the balance of risks around the outlook for inflation in the medium term had shifted less since the time of the May Inflation Report. While inflation had fallen, and was expected to fall further, this was very largely a consequence of temporary price-level effects resulting from the reduction in oil prices. Moreover, they expected the policy initiatives announced during the month to have a sufficiently large impact on the supply of credit and on economic activity that no further stimulus was warranted at this meeting. The extent of that economic support could be assessed over the coming months.¡Ù
¡ØAt the previous month¡Çs meeting, the Committee had considered the case for a reduction in Bank Rate below 0.5%, and had judged that such a policy continued to have drawbacks that made it less attractive than an extension of the asset purchase programme.¡Ù
¡ØBut the impact of the FLS and other policy initiatives might, in time, alter the Committee¡Çs assessment of the effectiveness of such a rate reduction. The Committee could review this option again when the impact of the FLS and other policy initiatives was more readily apparent; that was unlikely to be for several months.¡Ù
¡ØIn view of the weaker economic outlook, subdued projected path for inflation, and significant downside risks to economic growth, the FOMC decided to ease monetary policy at its June meeting by continuing its maturity extension program (or MEP) through the end of this year.¡Ù
¡ØThe MEP combines sales of short-term Treasury securities with an equivalent amount of purchases of longer-term Treasury securities. As a result, it decreases the supply of longer-term Treasury securities available to the public, putting upward pressure on the prices of those securities and downward pressure on their yields, without affecting the overall size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. By removing additional longer-term Treasury securities from the market, the Fed's asset purchases also induce private investors to acquire other longer-term assets, such as corporate bonds and mortgage backed-securities, helping to raise their prices and lower their yields and thereby making broader financial conditions more accommodative.¡Ù
¡ØEconomic growth is also being supported by the exceptionally low level of the target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent and the Committee's forward guidance regarding the anticipated path of the funds rate. As I reported in my February testimony, the FOMC extended its forward guidance at its January meeting, noting that it expects that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014. The Committee has maintained this conditional forward guidance at its subsequent meetings.¡Ù
¡ØReflecting its concerns about the slow pace of progress in reducing unemployment and the downside risks to the economic outlook, the Committee made clear at its June meeting that it is prepared to take further action as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants at the June FOMC meeting indicated that they see a higher degree of uncertainty about their forecasts than normal and that the risks to economic growth have increased. I would like to highlight two main sources of risk: The first is the euro-area fiscal and banking crisis; the second is the U.S. fiscal situation.¡Ù
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¤¹¤Î¤Ç¡¢¼Áµ¿±þÅú¤òÆÉ¤Þ¤Ê¤¤¤È¤¤¤±¤Ê¤¤¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤½¤Á¤é¤ÏÀè¤Û¤É¤ÎFRB¤Î¥Ú¡¼¥¸¤ÎÊý¤Ë¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤è¤¦¤Ë¡ØHearing transcripts are posted to this website as they become available.¡Ù¤È¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤Î¤Ç¡¢¤½¤ì¤¬½Ð¤Æ¤«¤éÆÉ¤à¤È¤¤¤¦´¶¤¸¤Ç¡£
¤Þ¤¢²¿¤À¡¢LIBOR¥Í¥¿¤ÎÏäò¤¹¤ë¾ì¹ç¤Ï¤Þ¤º¸µ¡¹¤ÎÄêµÁ¤ò½ÏÃΤ¹¤Ù¤·¤È¤¤¤¦»ö¤Ç¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] of England correspondence with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and British Bankers¡Ç Association in relation to Libor
¡ØIn their discussion of monetary policy for the period ahead, members agreed that it would be appropriate to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent in order to support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the 2 percent rate that the Committee judges most consistent with its mandate. In addition, all members but one agreed that it would be appropriate to continue through the end of this year the Committee's program to extend the average maturity of the Federal Reserve's holdings of securities; specifically, they agreed to continue purchasing Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years at the current pace of about $44 billion per month while selling or redeeming an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of approximately 3 years or less. These steps would increase the Federal Reserve's holdings of longer-term Treasury securities by about $267 billion while reducing its holdings of shorter-term Treasury securities by the same amount. Members also agreed to maintain the Committee's existing policy regarding the reinvestment of principal payments from Federal Reserve holdings of agency securities into agency MBS. ¡Ù
¡ØMembers generally judged that continuing the maturity extension program would put some downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative.¡Ù
¡ØSome members noted the risk that continued purchases of longer-term Treasury securities could, at some point, lead to deterioration in the functioning of the Treasury securities market that could undermine the intended effects of the policy.¡Ù
¡ØHowever, members generally agreed that such risks seemed low at present, and were outweighed by the expected benefits of the action.¡Ù
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¡ØSeveral members noted that the downward pressure on longer-term rates from continuing the Committee's maturity extension program was likely to be modest.¡Ù
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¡ØOne member anticipated little if any effect on economic growth and unemployment and did not agree that the outlook for economic activity and inflation called for further policy accommodation.¡Ù
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¡ØWith respect to the statement to be released following the meeting, members agreed that only relatively small modifications to the first two paragraphs were needed to reflect the incoming economic data and the changes to the economic outlook.¡Ù
¤Ø¡¼¤È¤¤¤¦´¶¤¸¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤³¤ÎÁ°¤ÎÀ¼ÌÀʸ¤Îʸ¸ÀÊѹ¹¤Ï¡Öonly relatively small modifications¡×¤À¤½¤¦¤Ç¤¹¤Î¡£
¡ØIn light of their assessment of the economic situation, almost all members again agreed to indicate that the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy and currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.¡Ù
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¡ØSome Committee members indicated that their policy judgment reflected in part their perception of significant downside risks to growth, especially since the Committee's ability to respond to weaker-than-expected economic conditions would be somewhat limited by the constraint imposed on monetary policy when the policy rate is at or near its effective lower bound. Members again noted that the forward guidance is conditional on economic developments and that the date given in the statement would be subject to revision should there be a significant change in the economic outlook.¡Ù
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¡ØA few members expressed the view that further policy stimulus likely would be necessary to promote satisfactory growth in employment and to ensure that the inflation rate would be at the Committee's goal. Several others noted that additional policy action could be warranted if the economic recovery were to lose momentum, if the downside risks to the forecast became sufficiently pronounced, or if inflation seemed likely to run persistently below the Committee's longer-run objective.¡Ù
¤Þ¤¢¤³¤ÎÊÕ¤¬»Ô¾ì¤¬¼ºË¾¤·¤¿¤È¤«¤¤¤¦½ê¤À¤È»×¤¦¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢³Î¤«¤Ë¤³¤Î´¶¤¸¤À¤Èľ¤°¤ËÄɲôËÏ¤Τª¤«¤ï¤ê¤¬¤È¤¤¤¦´¶¤¸¤Ï¤·¤Þ¤»¤ó¤Ç¤¹¤Ê¤È¤¤¤¦½ê(¤µ¤Ã¤¤ÏĹ´üºÄ¤ÎÇ㤤²á¤®¤ÎÊÀ³²¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤ÎµÄÏÀ¤â¤¢¤Ã¤¿¤·)¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢³ä¤ÈÁá¤á¤ÎÄɲôËϤÎÏäò¼çÄ¥¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤¬¡ÖA few members¡×¤·¤«¤¤¤Ê¤¯¤Æ¡¢·ÐºÑ¤Î²óÉü¤¬¥â¥á¥ó¥¿¥à¤ò¼º¤Ã¤¿¤ê¥¤¥ó¥Õ¥ì¤¬»ý³Ū¤ËÄã²¼¤·¤½¤¦¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤¿¤éÄɲôËϤ¬ÀµÅö²½¤µ¤ì¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦Ïäò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤¬¡ÖSeveral others¡×¤Ç¤¹¤«¤½¤¦¤Ç¤¹¤«¤È¡£
¡ØThe Committee agreed that it was prepared to take further action as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.¡Ù
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¡ØA few members observed that it would be helpful to have a better understanding of how large the Federal Reserve's asset purchases would have to be to cause a meaningful deterioration in securities market functioning, and of the potential costs of such deterioration for the economy as a whole.¡Ù
Mr. Lacker dissented because he opposed continuation of the maturity extension program. He did not believe that further monetary stimulus at this time would make a substantial difference for economic growth and employment without also increasing inflation by more than would be desirable. In Mr. Lacker's view, the outlook for economic growth had clearly weakened of late, but he questioned whether the maturity extension program would have much effect in current circumstances. Should inflation fall substantially and persistently below the Committee's 2 percent goal, however, he felt that monetary stimulus might then be appropriate to ensure the return of inflation toward target.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Views on Current Conditions and the Economic Outlook¡Ù¤ÏºÇ½é¤Ë³µÏÀ¤¬Íè¤Æ¡¢¤½¤Î¸å¸ÄÊ̼ûÍ×¹àÌÜ¡¢Ï«Æ¯»Ô¾ì¡¢¥¤¥ó¥Õ¥ì¤Î½ç¤ËÏä¬Íè¤Æ¡¢ºÇ¸å¤Ë¤Þ¤¿¤Þ¤È¤á¤¬Íè¤ë¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦Ê¸¾Ï¹½À®¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤ª¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤Î¤Ç¡¢ºÇ½é¤ÈºÇ¸å¤òÆÉ¤ó¤Ç¡¢¤µ¤é¤ËÅÓÃæ¤Ë¤¢¤ë¤Á¤ç¤Ã¤ÈŤá¤Î¥Ñ¥é¥°¥é¥Õ¤Î½ê¤ò¸«¤ë¤ÈÂçÂΤ½¤³¤¬µÄÏÀ¤Î¥Ý¥¤¥ó¥È¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¡¢¤Þ¤¢¤½¤¦¤¤¤¦ÆÉ¤ßÊý¤ò¤¹¤ë¤È¤½¤ó¤Ê¤ËÂç³°¤·¤·¤Ê¤¤¤È»×¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØIn their discussion of the economic situation and outlook, participants agreed that the information received since the Committee's previous meeting suggested that the economy had continued to expand moderately, though many noted that a variety of indicators showed smaller gains than had been anticipated.¡Ù
¡ØGrowth in employment, in particular, appeared to have slowed in recent months, and the unemployment rate remained elevated. Business fixed investment had continued to advance, and household spending appeared to be rising at a somewhat slower pace than earlier in the year. There were further signs of improvement in the housing sector, but the level of activity remained very low. Volatility in financial markets increased over the intermeeting period, and investors' appetite for riskier assets declined, likely in response to heightened fiscal and financial strains in Europe as well as some weaker-than-expected incoming data about the U.S. economy and foreign economies. Inflation had slowed somewhat, mainly reflecting the decline in the prices of crude oil and gasoline in recent months, and longer-term inflation expectations remained stable.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants generally interpreted the information that became available during the intermeeting period as suggesting that economic growth would most likely remain moderate over coming quarters and then pick up very gradually. Most participants saw the incoming information as indicating somewhat slower growth in total demand, output, and employment over coming quarters than they had projected in April, and most carried forward some of that downward revision to their projections of medium-term growth.¡Ù
¡ØHowever, some participants judged that the recent weakness in a variety of economic indicators was more likely to prove transitory, and thought that the outlook beyond this year was essentially unchanged.¡Ù
¡ØReflecting the projected moderate pace of growth in production and employment, most participants anticipated that the unemployment rate would decline only slowly.¡Ù
¡ØA number of factors continued to be seen as likely to limit the economic expansion to a moderate pace in the near term; these included slow growth or even contraction in some major foreign economies, ongoing and prospective fiscal tightening in the United States, modest growth in household income, and--despite some recent signs of improvement--continued weakness in the housing sector.¡Ù
¡ØAs in April, participants expected that most of the factors restraining economic expansion would ease over time, and so anticipated that the recovery eventually would gain strength.¡Ù
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¡ØHowever, strains in global financial markets, which stemmed primarily from fiscal and banking concerns in Europe, had become more pronounced over the intermeeting period and continued to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook; the possibility of a sharper-than-anticipated fiscal tightening in the United States also posed a downside risk.¡Ù
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¡ØLooking beyond the temporary effects on inflation of this year's fluctuations in oil and other commodity prices, almost all participants continued to anticipate that inflation over the medium-term would run at or below the 2 percent rate that the Committee judges to be most consistent with its statutory mandate.¡Ù
¡ØIn one participant's judgment, appropriate monetary policy would lead to inflation modestly greater than 2 percent for a time in order to bring unemployment down somewhat faster.¡Ù
¡ØSome participants indicated that they saw persistent slack in resource utilization as posing downside risks to the outlook for inflation; a few participants judged that the highly accommodative stance of monetary policy posed upside risks to the medium-term inflation outlook.¡Ù
¡ØMany FOMC participants judged that overall financial conditions had become somewhat less supportive of growth in demand for goods and services.¡Ù
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¡ØInvestors' concerns about the sovereign debt and banking situation in the euro area reportedly intensified during the intermeeting period, leading to higher risk spreads and lower prices for riskier assets including equities and to broad-based appreciation of the U.S. dollar on foreign exchange markets. In contrast, a few participants observed that the marked drop in yields on longer-term U.S. Treasury securities could provide some impetus to growth.¡Ù
¡ØFocusing more narrowly on the banking sector in the United States, it was noted that measures of credit quality for bank loans generally had continued to improve, that bank capital levels were quite high, and that banks had ample liquidity. Consumer and business loans were increasing, although credit standards remained tight and commercial and residential real estate lending were relatively weak.¡Ù
¡ØA few participants indicated that they were seeing signs that very low interest rates might be inducing some investors to take on imprudent risks in the search for higher nominal returns.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants discussed the risk that strains in global financial markets and pressures on European financial institutions could worsen and spill over to parts of the domestic financial sector, and some noted the importance of undertaking adequate preparations to address such spillovers if they were to occur; it also was recognized that investor sentiment could improve and strains in global markets might ease.¡Ù
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¡ØSeveral participants commented that it would be desirable to explore the possibility of developing new tools to promote more-accommodative financial conditions and thereby support a stronger economic recovery.¡Ù
¤Þ¤¢Àè½µ¤Ë½Ð¤Æ¤¿¤ó¤Ç¤¹¤±¤É¤Í(´À) [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] of FPC Meeting held on 22 June 2012
ËÜʸ¤Ï¤³¤Á¤é [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] June 2010, the Chancellor of the Exchequer set out a plan for fundamental changes to the system of UK financial regulation. In July 2010 and February 2011, the Government published consultation documents on the proposed changes, and in January 2012 introduced the Financial Services Bill to Parliament. The legislation will establish a Financial Policy Committee (FPC) charged with a primary objective of identifying, monitoring and taking action to remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system. In June 2012, the Chancellor announced that the Government would amend the Bill to give the FPC a secondary objective to support the economic policy of the Government.¡Ù
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¡ØThe Government intends the FPC to be a Committee of the Bank of England¡Çs Court of Directors, and in February 2011 the Court created an interim FPC to undertake, as far as possible, the future statutory FPC¡Çs macroprudential role. Although lacking the proposed statutory powers of Direction and Recommendation of the statutory FPC, the interim FPC contributes to maintaining financial stability by identifying, monitoring and publicising risks to the stability of the financial system and advising action to reduce and mitigate them. It also carries out preparatory work and analysis in advance of the creation of the permanent FPC.¡Ù
¡ØThe Committee meets at least four times a year and a record of each meeting is published within six weeks. The next meeting of the FPC will be on 14 September and the record of that meeting will be published on 27 September.¡Ù
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢¤½¤Î¼¡¤Î¥Ú¡¼¥¸¤Ë¡ØRECORD OF FINANCIAL POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON 22 JUNE 2012¡Ù¤Ã¤Æ¤Î¤¬¤´¤¶¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦
¡ØThe interim Financial Policy Committee unanimously agreed the following policy recommendations:¡Ù
¡ØEffective from 6 July 2012, Danmarks Nationalbank's lending rate, interest rate on certificates of deposit and discount rate are reduced by 0.25 percentage point. The current account rate is unchanged. The interest rate reduction is a consequence of the reduction by the European Central Bank of its monetary policy rates by 0.25 percentage point.¡Ù
¡ØEffective from the above date, Danmarks Nationalbank's interest rates are:
Lending rate: 0.20 per cent Certificates of deposit: -0.20 per cent Current account: 0.0 per cent Discount rate: 0.0 per cent¡Ù
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¡ØIn connection with the introduction of negative interest rate on certificates of deposit the current account limits will be revised upward. The new current account limits can be found at Danmarks Nationalbank's homepage: www.nationalbanken.dk under "Rules - Monetary and foreign-exchange policy".¡Ù
¡ØDanmarks Nationalbank is responsible for monetary policy in Denmark. The objective of monetary policy is to keep the krone stable vis-a-vis the euro. Danmarks Nationalbank conducts monetary policy by setting the monetary policy interest rates, i.e. the discount rate, the current-account rate, the lending rate and the rate of interest on certificates of deposit. The interest rates are determined by the Board of Governors of Danmarks Nationalbank, and can be changed as required at any time.¡Ù
¡ØThe monetary policy counterparties have access to the monetary policy instruments, i.e. they can place liquidity with Danmarks Nationalbank as overnight deposits (current-account deposits) and participate in Danmarks Nationalbank's weekly and monthly market operations. In the weekly market operations, counterparties can obtain 7-day loans against collateral, or deposit liquidity for 7 days by purchasing certificates of deposit. In the monthly market operations the counterparties can obtain 6-month loans against collateral. The interest rate on 6-month loans is variable, set at Danmarks Nationalbank's 7-day lending rate. The monetary policy counterparties are free to determine the volume of loans at the weekly and monthly operations.¡Ù
¡ØThe collateral basis, which is applied to obtain loans in Danmarks Nationalbank, consists of securities, mainly government and covered bonds, and banks' own credit claims of good quality.¡Ù
¡ØThe net positions of the monetary policy counterparties are their portfolios of certificates of deposit and current-account deposits, less their loans from Danmarks Nationalbank. The net positions are primarily affected by fluctuations in government payments and Danmarks Nationalbank's purchase and sale of foreign exchange. In the weekly market operations, the monetary policy counterparties normally structure their net positions so that the total current-account deposit covers the expected liquidity requirement for the next week. When major liquidity fluctuations are expected, Danmarks Nationalbank may announce in advance that it will buy back or sell certificates of deposit outside the fixed market operations. Danmarks Nationalbank may also buy back or sell certificates of deposit without prior announcement. Danmarks Nationalbank can also when and to the extent it is needed perform liquidity-adjusting deposit and lending operations in kroner. The rate of interest and maturity of the operations will reflect market conditions. ¡Ù
¡ØLimits have been set for the size of the monetary policy counterparties' current-account deposits. The purpose of these limits is to prevent the build-up of large current-account deposits that may be used for speculation in interest-rate and/or exchange-rate changes. If the total limit for the counterparties is exceeded, current-account deposits in excess of the individual limits will be converted into certificates of deposit.¡Ù
¡ØTechnically , it is possible to obtain negative interest rates with the existing monetary-policy instruments. In exceptional circumstances it may be necessary for Danmarks Nationalbank to lower the rate of interest on certificate of deposit so that it becomes negative. Such a scenario would imply that the current-account rate will be higher than the rate of interest on certificate deposit and the current-account limits will be revised upward. If the total current-account deposits exceed the overall limit, Danmarks Nationalbank will convert the current-account deposits into certificates of deposit.¡Ù
¤Á¤Ê¤ß¤ËƦ¤Ä¤¤¤Ç¤Ë¤³¤Á¤é¤ò¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] and foreign-exchange policy
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¡ØThe Nationalbank's counterparties in foreign-exchange transactions in Danish kroner are determined in accordance with the market conditions. Requirements regarding a significant market activity subject to the given foreign-exchange conditions and capacity to handle payments via the international financial network SWIFT form the basis for the Nationalbank's choice of counterparties in the foreign-exchange market for Danish kroner. If the Danish exchange rate reaches the upper or lower limit within ERM II, the number of counterparties may be extended. Potential new counterparties will be obliged to settle their foreign-exchange transactions with the Nationalbank via a payment-after-payment procedure.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] statement to the press conference (with Q&A) Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Vitor Constancio, Vice-President of the ECB, Frankfurt am Main, 5 July 2012
¡ØQuestion: You quite rightly pointed out that we have got a divergence in the euro zone in terms of bank lending. Is there anything you can do to prevent the credit crunch that seems to be emerging in places like Italy and Spain?¡Ù
¡ØAnd the second question is also on the EFSF and the ESM fund. We know that if it does come to a situation where Spain does need extra aid, it will probably cover it, but what will happen if Italy also needs aid?¡Ù
¡ØDraghi: What happens if everybody needs it? It is a big question.¡Ù
¡ØOn the first question, generally speaking, the idea that the ECB could channel funds via the bank lending channel to a specific category of firms or households is as wrong as the idea that the ECB should make sure banks don¡Çt buy government bonds as otherwise it is monetary financing. ¡ÈWrong¡É is probably too strong, but certainly both ideas are very, very hard to implement, requiring us to make sure that the banks do certain things or don¡Çt do certain things.¡Ù
¡ØWe have to remember that their decisions are basically business decisions. What we could do and what we have done with respect to this is broaden the eligibility rules of collateral so as to attract the greatest number of banks, including those banks of a small/medium size which we believe are closest to the SMEs. But we have also done another thing, recently, at the last Governing Council meeting. We broadened the collateral eligibility so that banks can actually use the assets they create in lending to the real economy as collateral in borrowing from the ECB.¡Ù
¡ØSo they are not only using government bonds, they are now also using credit claims and asset-backed securities of a lower rating, which means that for the banks in a sense it is now very useful to lend to the real economy because that way they also generate collateral that they can use for funding themselves. And we want to do this to keep the risk for the ECB balance sheet - and I have said this many times - very, very low.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: I have two questions. Apart from the interest rate decision, were there any other options that you discussed, such as other non-conventional measures, like a new LTRO?¡Ù
¡ØAnd fairly unusually for me, I will also tell you why we did not discuss that - because we have to have non-standard measures which are effective, and they have to be effective in an area which is fragmented. So, that is why it is not obvious that there are measures that can be effective in a highly fragmented area.¡Ù
¡ØEven though, as I have said, market sentiment seems to be improving slightly. For example, one of the remaining benefits of the LTROs is, I think, that we have not seen signs of outflows from the euro area. And this is actually quite important. I think one of the reasons why the euro summit was such a success is that leaders showed that this is a monetary union that is meant to last. They showed their commitment to making it a success. They started identifying an end point - a goal. They started, through the Van Rompuy report, drafting a pact in order to achieve this goal and started identifying conditions that had to be satisfied in order to undertake this journey together. I think this is why the euro summit was viewed so positively by markets and by everybody.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: We¡Çve just had a question about EU banking supervision. First, do you see a pan-European banking union as a system only for the largest systemically important financial institutions or for all banks? And second, would the ECB do the supervising itself or would it outsource it to a separate body?¡Ù
¡ØDraghi: I would say that it is far too early to respond to these questions, as the European Council meeting only took place a few days ago. However, let me give you a few messages of a general, albeit very important, nature.¡Ù
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¡ØFirst, with its decision to introduce a unified supervision of banks in the euro area, the European Council has made a very important step towards creating a ¡Èfinancial markets union¡É rather than a banking union. Furthermore, the leaders have committed substantial political capital to this decision. We expect that the proposal of the European Commission - after all, it is the competence of the Commission - in consultation with the European Parliament and the ECB, will be as strong as the commitment that the leaders have made in taking this decision. And we are confident that this will be the case.¡Ù
¡ØSecond, whatever the proposal may be, it should be such that the ECB can carry out any tasks assigned to it in an effective, rigorous and independent way, without risk to its reputation.¡Ù
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¡ØThird, any new tasks in terms of supervision should be strictly separate from monetary policy tasks. There should be no contamination between the two areas and we will certainly find ways to make it sure that this is the case.¡Ù
¡ØFourth, the ECB should remain independent in carrying out these tasks.¡Ù
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¡ØFifth, it is essential that we work together with the national supervisors. I myself was a supervisor for six years when I was Governor of the Banca d¡ÇItalia, where supervision is one of the bank¡Çs areas of competence. Therefore, I know only too well that the knowledge, the skills, the competence, the history and the traditions are at the national level, and we plan to make full use of this fortunate situation.¡Ù
¡ØFinally, there is an issue that is, in a sense, broader: new tasks will entail a higher level of democratic accountability. The Governing Council started to discuss this today, and we basically all agree on all the principles that I have just mentioned, especially the last one. We stand ready to meet higher standards of democratic accountability, as they will be asked of us by the citizens of Europe and especially those of the euro area.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: I wonder if you have a timeline in mind for when the ECB would be ready to assume this unified banking supervision, considering that there has been talk of the Commission¡Çs proposal coming by the end of the year, but also given that fact that it is quite essential for this to be done quickly, as direct lending from the ESM to banks depends on it. I wonder if you have a date in mind when this would be fully operational?(2ÈÖÌܤμÁÌä¤Ï³ä°¦)¡Ù
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¡ØDraghi: On the first point, we do not have a date, because, as I have said, the final proposal is a Commission proposal drawn up in consultation with the ECB and the European Parliament.¡Ù
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¡ØI am sure that this will be done as speedily as possible. I would not dramatise too much the need for doing things fast. It is better to do things well. It has been said that this supervisory proposal and the eventual agreement should come very soon because this would enable the ESM to recapitalise banks directly. So, the two things have been linked with each other. But what happens if the proposal is not ready? Well, the public debt of an individual country will increase temporarily, because they will borrow from the EFSF.¡Ù
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¡ØBut we all know that this will occur with the expectation of a decrease later on, once the supervision mechanism is in place. So it is a temporary blip in public debt which can be easily absorbed by markets. We all want to have everything ¡Èwell done¡É and ¡Ènow¡É. But if I had to choose, I would rather focus on it being ¡Èwell done¡É, because, if it is well done, we can then cope with whatever else occurs and we know that a delay of two or three months will not cause a drama.¡Ù
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢¤Þ¤¢³Î¤«¤Ë½Ð¤Æ¤¯¤ëÆâÍÆ¤¬Á᤯¤Æ¤â¥À¥á¥À¥á¤À¤Ã¤¿¤é¥Þ¥º¡¼¤Ê¤Î¤Ï¶Ä¤ëÄ̤ê¤Ç¤Ï¤´¤¶¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤¬¡¢¤À¤«¤é¤È¤¤¤Ã¤Æ¤¤Ã¤Á¤ê½ÐÍ褿¤â¤Î¤ò½Ð¤¹¤Î¤ËÂФ·¤Æ¡Öa delay of two or three months will not cause a drama¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤â¤É¤¦¤«¤Ê¤È¤¤¤¦µ¤¤¬Á´ÎϤǤ¹¤ë¤Î¤À¤¬¡£2¡¢3¤«·î¤âÃè¤Ö¤é¤ê¤ó¤À¤Ã¤¿¤é»Ô¾ì¤¬µö¤µ¤ó¤È»×¤¦¤Î¤À¤¬¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦