[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] LIESMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about that same line in the statement. Does that mean that your tolerance for inflation will be higher in coming years, in the middle of the recovery? And, if not, what good is that language there if it doesn¡Çt tell people that the reaction function relative to inflation has changed? Secondly, stock prices are up today, so are oil prices and gold. Why aren¡Çt those part of the same reaction to the Fed¡Çs acts today?¡Ù
¡ØThe idea is to make sure we provide enough support so the economy will grow fast enough to bring unemployment down over time. I mean, as we look back at the last six months or so, we¡Çve seen unemployment at basically the same place it was in January. We¡Çve seen not enough jobs growth to bring down the unemployment rate, and what we need to see is more progress. And that¡Çs what we will be looking at.¡Ù
¡ØIn terms of the mid-2015 date, we think by that point that the economy will be recovering, we¡Çll be providing the support it needs. But if you look at our projections, you¡Çll see it doesn¡Çt involve any inflation, that we still believe that inflation is going to be close to our 2 percent target.¡Ù
¡ØSTEVE LIESMAN. All right, I just need to follow up. Does this-so you¡Çre saying it does not include greater tolerance for inflation, that you will-you would reverse course if inflation were to be above your target level, even given that statement?¡Ù
¡ØCHAIRMAN BERNANKE. Well, if inflation goes above the target level, as we talked about in our statement in January, we take a balanced approach. We bring inflation back to the target over time, but we do it in a way that takes into account the deviations of both of our objectives, you know, from their targets.¡Ù
¡ØMIKE MCKEE. You¡Çve made an eloquent explanation over the past couple of weeks of the Fed¡Çs ability to lower interest rates. But what¡Çs missing for many economists is how the transmission mechanism is going to work. Most people think this will have a minimal effect on rates. Can you give us an idea of how much you think it might push rates down, and why moving rates down a few basis points might change demand, which seems to be the problem in the economy?¡Ù
¡ØCHAIRMAN BERNANKE. Well, the ultimate effect is going to depend, of course, on how much we end up doing, and that, in turn, is going to depend on what the economy does. This is a conditional program; we¡Çre going to be providing accommodation according to how the economy evolves.¡Ù
¡ØI think that¡Çs the virtue of putting it this way, is that if the economy is weaker, we¡Çll provide more support; if the economy strengthens on its own or other headwinds die down, then it will require less support. So the amount of support we provide is going to depend on how the economy evolves.¡Ù
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¡ØWe do think that these policies can bring interest rates down-not just Treasury rates, but a whole range of rates, including mortgage rates and rates for corporate bonds and other types of important interest rates. It also affects stock prices. It affects other asset prices-home prices, for example. So looking at all the different channels of effect, we think it does have impact on the economy. It will have impact on the labor market, but, as again, the way I would describe it is a meaningful effect, a significant effect, but not a panacea, not a solution for the whole issue. We¡Çre just trying to get the economy moving in the right direction, to make sure that we don¡Çt stagnate at high levels of unemployment, that we¡Çre making progress towards more acceptable levels of unemployment.¡Ù
¡ØROBIN HARDING. Robin Harding from the Financial Times. Mr. Chairman, is this the limit of what the Fed could do? You refer in your statement to other policy tools. If the unemployment situation doesn¡Çt improve, then what other measures do you have available? Thank you.¡Ù
¡ØCHAIRMAN BERNANKE. Well, there¡Çs a variety of possibilities, and we continue to look at all different options. But the two primary types of tools, as I¡Çve discussed, are balance sheet actions-and, of course, we can restructure those, change those in various ways; the other type of tool is communication tools.¡Ù
¡ØAnd we could-we continue to work on how best to communicate with the public and how best to assure the public that the Fed will remain accommodative long enough to ensure recovery. So, working with our communications tools, clarifying our response to economic conditions, might be one way in which we could further provide accommodation.¡Ù
¡ØMARCY GORDON. Marcy Gordon with the Associated Press. One of the aspects we¡Çve seen in recent reports on unemployment is the shrinking labor force. Is that something that¡Çs of specific concern to you, and what does it tell us about the labor market and the economy?¡Ù
¡ØCHAIRMAN BERNANKE. Well, you are absolutely right.¡Ù
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¡ØAnd as I mentioned earlier, the unemployment decline last month was more than 100 percent accounted for by declines in participation. Some decline in participation is anticipated, is as expected. We¡Çre an aging society. We have more people retiring. Female participation has flattened out; it hasn¡Çt continued to climb as it did for several decades. We¡Çre seeing less participation among younger people, fewer college students taking part-time jobs and the like. So part of this decline in participation was something that we anticipated quite a long time ago, but part of it is cyclical. Part of it reflects the fact that some people-because they have essentially given up or at least are very discouraged-have decided to leave the labor force. And the anticipation is that if the economy really were to strengthen, and labor markets were to strengthen, at least some of those people would come back into the labor force. They might even temporarily raise the unemployment rate because they¡Çre now looking again.¡Ù
¡ØSo the participation rate over and above-the decline in participation rate over and above the downward trend is just one of the other indicators of a generally weak labor market. And it¡Çs why I said earlier that we do want to look at a range of indicators, not just the unemployment rate, although that¡Çs a very important indicator, not just payrolls, although that also is a leading indicator, but participation, hours, part-time work, and a variety of other measures which suggest that our labor market is still in quite weak condition.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] economies have moved somewhat deeper into a deceleration phase.¡Ù(º£²ó) ¡ØOverseas economies have shown moderate improvement, though limited in scope; on the whole, they still have not emerged from a deceleration phase.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØJapan's economy registered relatively high growth in the first half of 2012, supported by the firmness in domestic demand. Nonetheless, the pick-up in economic activity has come to a pause, reflecting the aforementioned developments in overseas economies.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØJapan's economic activity has started picking up moderately as domestic demand remains firm mainly supported by reconstruction-related demand.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢¡Östarted picking up moderately¡×¤È¤·¤Æ¤¤¤¿¤â¤Î¤¬¡Öthe pick-up in economic activity has come to a pause¡×¤È¡¢¤³¤Á¤é¤â±Ñʸ¤Ç¸«¤¿Êý¤¬¥Ë¥å¥¢¥ó¥¹¤È¤·¤Æ²¼Êý½¤Àµ¤·¤Þ¤·¤¿¤Í¤¨¤È¤¤¤¦´¶¤¸¤¬¤¹¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¤É¤¦¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤«¡£¤·¤«¤·¡Öaforementioned¡×¤Ã¤Æ³Î¤«¤Ë±Ñϼŵ¸«¤ë¤È¡ÖÀè¤Ë½Ò¤Ù¤¿¡×¤Ã¤ÆÌõ¤¬¤¢¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢Ã桹¤ªÌܤ˳ݤ«¤ì¤Ê¤¤Ã±¸ì¤Î¤è¤¦¤Êµ¤¤¬¤¹¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤¹¤±¤ì¤É¤â(^^)¡£
¡ØAgainst the backdrop of these developments, economic activity is expected to level off more or less and the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI to remain at around 0 percent for the time being.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØAs for the outlook, Japan's economy is expected to return to a moderate recovery pat has domestic demand remains firm and overseas economies emerge from the deceleration phase. The year-on-year rate of change in the CPI is expected to remain at around 0 percent for the time being.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢CPI¤Î¸«Ä̤·¤Î½ê¤ËÁ°²ó¤âº£²ó¤â¡Öfor the time being¡×¤Ã¤Æ¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤Î¤Ç¡¢CPI¤Î¸«Ä̤·¤½¤Î¤â¤Î¤ËÊѲ½¤¬¤¢¤ëÌõ¤Ç¤Ï¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤»¤ó¡£¤·¤«¤·²£¤Ð¤¤¤Ã¤Æ¡Ölevel off more or less¡×¤Ã¤Æ¸À¤¦¤Î¤«¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦
¡ØRegarding risks, there remains a high degree of uncertainty about the global economy, including the prospects for the European debt problem, the momentum toward recovery for the U.S. economy, and the likelihood of emerging and commodity-exporting economies simultaneously achieving price stability and economic growth. Furthermore, attention should be paid to the effects of financial and foreign exchange market developments on economic activity and prices.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØRegarding risks to the economic outlook, there remains a high degree of uncertainty about the global economy, including the prospects for the European debt problem, the momentum toward recovery for the U.S. economy, and the likelihood of emerging and commodity-exporting economies simultaneously achieving price stability and economic growth. Regarding risks to the price outlook, careful attention should be paid to future developments in international commodity prices and in medium- to long-term inflation expectations.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØBased on these economic and price developments, the Bank of Japan judged it appropriate to expand the total size of the Program substantially by about 10 trillion yen and take the aforementioned measure to ensure the steady implementation of asset purchases. These measures in pursuit of powerful monetary easing will make financial conditions for such economic entities as firms and households even more accommodative by further encouraging a decline in longer-term market interest rates and a reduction in risk premiums. The Bank expects that, together with the cumulative effects of earlier policy measures, today's decision to enhance monetary easing will ensure the return of Japan's economy to a sustainable growth path with price stability.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢¤³¤³¤Ç¡Ömeasures in pursuit of powerful monetary easing¡×¤ÈÆþ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢ºÇ¸å¤Î¥Ñ¥é¥°¥é¥Õ¤Ë¤Ï¸µ¡¹¡Öthe Bank has been providing support to strengthen the foundations for economic growth and pursuing powerful monetary easing.¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬¤´¤¶¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¡Öpursuing powerful monetary easing¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤ò2²óÆþ¤ì¤ë·Á¤Ç¤Þ¤¢¶¯Ä´¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤Ê¤È¤¤¤¦½ê¤Ç¤Ï¤´¤¶¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£
9·î18ÆüÆüËÜ»þ´Ö¤ÎÄ«»þÅÀ¤Ç¤Ï½é¹Æ¤Ç¤¹¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] you know, the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy under a dual mandate from Congress to promote maximum employment and price stability. The United States has enjoyed broad price stability since the mid-1990s and continues to do so today. The employment situation, however, remains a grave concern. While the economy appears to be on a path of moderate recovery, it isn¡Çt growing fast enough to make significant progress reducing the unemployment rate. Fewer than half of the 8 million jobs lost in the recession have been restored. And, at 8.1 percent, the unemployment rate is nearly unchanged since the beginning of the year and is well above normal levels.¡Ù
¡ØThe weak job market should concern every American. High unemployment imposes hardship on millions of people, and it entails a tremendous waste of human skills and talents. Five million Americans have been unemployed for more than six months, and millions more have left the labor force--many of them doubtless because they have given up on finding suitable work. As the skills of the long-term unemployed atrophy and as their connections to the labor market wither, they may find it increasingly difficult to get good jobs, to their and their families¡Ç cost, of course, but also to the detriment of our nation¡Çs productive potential.¡Ù
¡ØThe FOMC has taken several actions this year. In January, it extended its forward guidance, stating that it anticipated that the federal funds rate will remain near current levels until late 2014. In June, the Committee decided to continue through the end of the year the previously established program to extend the average maturity of the securities it holds by buying longer-term securities and selling an equivalent amount of shorter-term securities. However, incoming data confirm that the modest pace of growth continues to be inadequate to generate much progress on unemployment. With inflation anticipated to run at or below our 2 percent objective, the Committee has become convinced that further policy accommodation is warranted to strengthen the recovery and support the gains we have begun to see in housing and other sectors.¡Ù
¡ØAccordingly, the FOMC decided today on new actions, electing to expand its purchase of securities and extend its forward guidance regarding the federal funds rate. Specifically, the Committee decided to purchase additional agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) at a pace of $40 billion per month. The new MBS purchases--combined with the existing maturity extension program and the continued reinvestment of principal payments from agency debt and agency MBS already on our balance sheet--will result in an increase in our holdings of longer-term securities of about $85 billion each month for the remainder of the year.¡Ù
¡ØThe program of MBS purchases should increase the downward pressure on long-term interest rates more generally, but also on mortgage rates specifically, which should provide further support to the housing sector by encouraging home purchases and refinancing.¡Ù
¡ØThe Committee also took two steps to underscore its commitment to ongoing support for the recovery.¡Ù
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¡ØFirst, the Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial developments in coming months, and if we do not see substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market, we will continue the MBS purchase program, undertake additional asset purchases, and employ our policy tools as appropriate until we do. We will be looking for the sort of broad-based growth in jobs and economic activity that generally signal sustained improvement in labor market conditions and declining unemployment. Of course, in determining the size, pace, and composition of any additional asset purchases, we will, as always, take appropriate account of the inflation outlook and of their efficacy and costs.¡Ù
¡ØAdditionally, the Committee emphasized that it expects a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy to remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.¡Ù
¡ØIn particular, the Committee today kept the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and stated that it anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015.¡Ù
(2)¥¬¥¤¥À¥ó¥¹Ê¸¸À¤ÎÁ°¤ËÆþ¤ì¤¿¡ØTo support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.¡Ù
ËèÅÙ¤ª¤Ê¤¸¤ß¤Î¥é¥Ã¥«¡¼Åܤê¤ÎÀ¼ÌÀ¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢º£²ó¤Ïµ¤¹ç¤ÎÆþ¤êÊý¤¬°ã¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] 15, 2012 Richmond Fed President Lacker Comments on FOMC Dissent
¡ØThe Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided on September 13, 2012, to purchase additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee released a statement after the meeting saying that it expects a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy to remain appropriate for a considerable period after the economic recovery strengthens, and that it currently anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015.¡Ù
¡ØI dissented because I opposed additional asset purchases at this time.¡Ù
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¡ØFurther monetary stimulus now is unlikely to result in a discernible improvement in growth, but if it does, it¡Çs also likely to cause an unwanted increase in inflation.¡Ù
¡ØEconomic activity has been growing, on average, at a modest pace, and inflation has been fluctuating around 2 percent, which the Committee has identified as its inflation goal. Unemployment does remain high by historical standards, but improvement in labor market conditions appears to have been held back by real impediments that are beyond the capacity of monetary policy to offset. In such circumstances, further monetary stimulus runs the risk of raising inflation in a way that threatens the stability of inflation expectations.¡Ù
¡ØI also dissented because I disagreed with the characterization of the time period over which the stance of monetary policy would be highly accommodative and the federal funds rate would be exceptionally low.¡Ù
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¡ØI believe that such an implied commitment to provide stimulus beyond the point at which the recovery strengthens and growth increases would be inconsistent with a balanced approach to the FOMC¡Çs price stability and maximum employment mandates.¡Ù
¡ØThese purchases are intended to reduce borrowing rates for conforming home mortgages. Such purchases, as compared to purchases of an equivalent amount of U.S. Treasury securities, distort investment allocations and raise interest rates for other borrowers. Channeling the flow of credit to particular economic sectors is an inappropriate role for the Federal Reserve. As stated in the Joint Statement of the Department of Treasury and the Federal Reserve on March 23, 2009, ¡ÈGovernment decisions to influence the allocation of credit are the province of the fiscal authorities.¡É¡Ù
¡ØJEFFREY LACKER: The effects are very hard to gauge, but my sense is that this is going to have a greater effect on inflation and a minimal impact on jobs. And while asset purchases are not without some costs and risks down the road, at some point, we're going to need to sell these securities and raise interest rates when the economy recovers more fully. And the larger a balance sheet is, I think the riskier that process becomes. It becomes more sensitive to fine errors and trickier to get out of the large asset positions we're in.¡Ù
¡ØLACKER: Well, that's a good question and that's a very controversial aspect to this decision as well, an aspect I opposed as well. I think the theory behind it, first of all, it's a deep and liquid market, and the impetus, I think, is to aid the housing market. That's an area that's fallen short in this recovery. In most other U.S. postwar recoveries, we've seen a pretty sharp snapback in housing.
Of course, the reason it hasn't come back in this recovery is that this recession was essentially caused by us building too many houses prior to the recession. We still have a huge overhang of houses that haven't been sold that are vacant. And it's going to take us a while before we want the houses we have, much less need to build more.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] in real GDP. . . . . 1.7 to 2.0 ¡¡¡¡2.5 to 3.0 ¡¡¡¡3.0 to 3.8 ¡¡3.0 to 3.8¡¡¡¡ 2.3 to 2.5 June projection . . . . . . ¡¡¡¡1.9 to 2.4¡¡¡¡ 2.2 to 2.8¡¡¡¡ 3.0 to 3.5¡¡ n.a. ¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡2.3 to2.5
Unemployment rate. . . . . 8.0 to 8.2¡¡¡¡ 7.6 to 7.9¡¡ 6.7 to 7.3 ¡¡6.0 to 6.8¡¡ 5.2 to 6.0 June projection . . . . . ¡¡¡¡8.0 to 8.2 ¡¡¡¡7.5 to 8.0¡¡ 7.0 to 7.7¡¡¡¡¡¡ n.a.¡¡¡¡¡¡ 5.2 to 6.0
PCE inflation. . . . . . . ¡¡¡¡1.7 to 1.8¡¡ 1.6 to 2.0 ¡¡¡¡1.6 to 2.0 ¡¡¡¡1.8 to 2.0¡¡¡¡ 2.0 June projection . . . . . . 1.2 to 1.7 ¡¡¡¡1.5 to 2.0 ¡¡¡¡1.5 to 2.0 ¡¡¡¡n.a. ¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡2.0
Core PCE inflation . . . . .1.7 to 1.9¡¡¡¡ 1.7 to 2.0 ¡¡¡¡1.8 to 2.0 ¡¡1.9 to 2.0 June projection . . . . . . 1.7 to 2.0 ¡¡¡¡1.6 to 2.0 ¡¡¡¡1.6 to 2.0¡¡¡¡ n.a.
¡ØCHAIRMAN BERNANKE: Good afternoon. Earlier today, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) approved new measures to support the recovery and employment growth. I¡Çll get to the specifics of our actions in a few moments, but I will first describe the economic conditions that motivated the Committee¡Çs decision to take additional actions.¡Ù
¡ØAs you know, the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy under a dual mandate from Congress to promote maximum employment and price stability. The United States has enjoyed broad price stability since the mid-1990s and continues to do so today. The employment situation, however, remains a grave concern. While the economy appears to be on a path of moderate recovery, it isn¡Çt growing fast enough to make significant progress reducing the unemployment rate. Fewer than half of the 8 million jobs lost in the recession have been restored. And, at 8.1 percent, the unemployment rate is nearly unchanged since the beginning of the year and is well above normal levels.¡Ù
¡ØThe weak job market should concern every American. High unemployment imposes hardship on millions of people, and it entails a tremendous waste of human skills and talents. Five million Americans have been unemployed for more than six months, and millions more have left the labor force-many of them doubtless because they have given up on finding suitable work. As the skills of the long-term unemployed atrophy and as their connections to the labor market wither, they may find it increasingly difficult to get good jobs, to their and their families¡Ç cost, of course, but also to the detriment of our nation¡Çs productive potential.¡Ù
¡ØThe Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial developments in coming months. If the outlook for the labor market does not improve substantially, the Committee will continue its purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities, undertake additional asset purchases, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate until such improvement is achieved in a context of price stability. ¡Ù(º£²ó)
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢Àè¤Û¤É¿½¤·¾å¤²¤¿¡Ö¥Ø¥Ã¥¸¡×¤Ï¤³¤³¤ÇÆþ¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤±¤ì¤É¤â¡¢Ï«Æ¯»Ô¾ì¤¬¸²Ãø¤Ë²þÁ±¤¹¤ë¤Þ¤Ç¤ÎMBS¹ØÆþ¤ª¤è¤Ó¸ú¤¤¬°¤¤¾ì¹ç¤ÎÄÉ²Ã¹ØÆþ¤òÀë¸À¤È¤¤¤¦°ÒÀª¤ÎÎɤ¤Ïäò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢Ä¶ÃÙ¹Ô»ØÉ¸¤Î¼º¶È¤Î²þÁ±¤Ë¥³¥ß¥Ã¥È¥¥¿¡¼¤Ç¤Ï¤¢¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤½¤³¤Ë¤Ï¡Öin a context of price stability¡×¤ò¤µ¤¹¤¬¤ËÆþ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤¬¥Ø¥Ã¥¸¤Ç¤¹¤ï¤Ê¡£
¤ó¤Ç¤â¤Ã¤Æ¤Þ¤¢ÃæÄ¹´üŪ¤Ëʪ²Á¤¬°ÂÄꤷ¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦¸«Ä̤·¤Î¸µ¤Ç¤ÏÇãÆþ¤Î·Ñ³¤ª¤è¤ÓϫƯ»Ô¾ì¾õ¶·¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤Æ¤ÏÇãÆþ³ÈÂ礬³¤¯¤È¤¤¤¦°ÕÌ£¤Ç¤Ï´ËÏÂŪ¥¹¥¿¥ó¥¹¤Î³ÈÂ祥¿¥³¥ì(²¿¤»·ÐºÑ¤Î¸½¾õǧ¼±²þÁ±¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤·)¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤±¤ì¤É¤â¡¢Êª²Á¤¬¾å¾º¤·¤Æ¤¯¤ë¤ÈÀ¯ºö±¿±Ä¤¬ÆÅ¤·¤¯Æñ¤·¤¯¤Ê¤ë¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Ê¤¢¤È»×¤ï¤ì¤ë¼¡Âè¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢ÆÃ¤ËÍèǯ¤Ë¤Ê¤ë¤Èʪ²Á½Å»ëÇɤÎÃ϶èÏ¢¶äÁíºÛ¤¬É¼·è¸¢»ý¤Ä¤Î¤Ç¡¢¡Öin a context of price stability¡×¤Î²ò¼á¤ÇFOMCÆâÉô¤Î°Õ¸«¤¬³ä¤ì¤½¤¦¤Ê°´¨¤âÃפ·¤Þ¤¹¡£¤Þ¤¢Êª²Á¤¬¾å¾º¤·¤Ê¤±¤ì¤Ð̵ÌäÂê¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤±¤ì¤É¤â¡£
¡ØIn determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases, the Committee will, as always, take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¤Þ¤¢¤Ä¤Þ¤ê¤³¤ÎÊÕ¤ê¤Îʸ¸À¤Ã¤ÆÄɲôËÏ¤Τª¤«¤ï¤êͤë¤Ù¤·¤È¤¤¤¦ÀѶËŪ¤ÊÏäò¤·¤Ê¤¬¤é¤â¡¢¡ÖϫƯ»Ô¾ì¤Î¸²Ãø¤Ê²þÁ±¡×¤È¤¤¤¦Éôʬ¤Ï¤Þ¤¢¶ñÂÎŪ¤Ê¿ôÃͤȤ«½Ð¤µ¤Ê¤¤¤ÇºÛÎ̤Î;ÃϤò»Ä¤·¤¿¾å¤Ë¡¢¡Öin a context of price stability¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤âÆþ¤ì¤Æ¡¢Êª²Á¾ðÀª¤Ë¤âÇÛθ¤¹¤ë¤È¤«¥×¥í¥³¥óÈæ³Ó¤Îʸ¸À¤âÆþ¤ì¤Æ¡¢Àè¹Ô¤¤Î¼«Í³ÅÙ¤ò³ÎÊݤ¹¤ë¤è¤¦¤Ë¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤Ê¡£
¡ØTo support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens. ¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØTo support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy. ¡Ù(Á°²ó)
Á°²óʬ¤ÏÂè3¥Ñ¥é¥°¥é¥Õ¤Ë¤Ê¤ê¤Þ¤¹¡£ºÇ½é¤Î½ê¤Ç¶âÍ»À¯ºö¤Î¡Öhighly accommodative stance¡×¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æº£²ó¤Ï¡Öfor a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens¡×¤È¤¤¤¦É½¸½¤Ç²¡¤·¾å¤²²ðÆþ¥Á¥Ã¥¯¤Êɽ¸½¤Ë¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤¬¡¢¤½¤ì¤ÏºÇ½é¤ÎÊý¤Ç¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¤è¤¦¤Ë¡¢º£²ó¤Ï·ÐºÑ¤Î¸½¾õǧ¼±¤ÈÀè¹Ô¤¸«Ä̤·¤¬²þÁ±¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ëÃæ¤Ç¤ÎÄɲôËϤò¼Â»Ü¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬¤¢¤ë¤Î¤Ç¡¢¤½¤¦¤¤¤¦°ÕÌ£¤Ç¤ÏÀè¹Ô¤¤Î·ÐºÑ¸«Ä̤·¤È¶âÍ»À¯ºö±¿±Ä¥¹¥¿¥ó¥¹¤¬Ä¾ÀÜ¥ê¥ó¥¯¤·¤Þ¤»¤ó¤è(=Àè¹Ô¤¤Î¸«Ä̤·¤¬°ú¤¾å¤²¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤â¶âÍ»´ËÏÂ¥¹¥¿¥ó¥¹¤ò·Ñ³¤¹¤ë¤«¤â¤·¤ì¤Þ¤»¤ó¤è)¤È¤¤¤¦Ïä乤ʡ£
¡ØIn particular, the Committee also decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØIn particular, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØVoting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Dennis P. Lockhart; Sandra Pianalto; Jerome H. Powell; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Jeremy C. Stein; Daniel K. Tarullo; John C. Williams; and Janet L. Yellen.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØVoting against the action was Jeffrey M. Lacker, who opposed additional asset purchases and preferred to omit the description of the time period over which exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØVoting against the action was Jeffrey M. Lacker, who preferred to omit the description of the time period over which economic conditions are likely to warrant an exceptionally low level of the federal funds rate.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
À¼ÌÀʸ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August suggests that economic activity has continued to expand at a moderate pace in recent months. ¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØInformation received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June suggests that economic activity decelerated somewhat over the first half of this year.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØGrowth in employment has been slow, and the unemployment rate remains elevated. ¡Ù(º£²ó) ¡ØGrowth in employment has been slow in recent months, and the unemployment rate remains elevated. ¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØHousehold spending has continued to advance, but growth in business fixed investment appears to have slowed. The housing sector has shown some further signs of improvement, albeit from a depressed level. ¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØBusiness fixed investment has continued to advance. Household spending has been rising at a somewhat slower pace than earlier in the year. Despite some further signs of improvement, the housing sector remains depressed. ¡Ù(Á°²ó)
ɽ¸½¤¬¤Á¤Þ¤Á¤ÞÊѤï¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤¬¡¢²È·×¾ÃÈñ¤Ë´Ø¤·¤Æ¤Ï¸½¾õȽÃǤ¬¾å¤¬¤ê¡¢´ë¶ÈÅê»ñ¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤Ï¸½¾õȽÃǤ¬²¼¤¬¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£¤ó¤Ç¤â¤Ã¤Æ½»Â𥻥¯¥¿¡¼¤Ë´Ø¤·¤Æ¤Ï½¾Íè¼çʸ¤¬¡Öthe housing sector remains depressed¡×¤È¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤¿¤Î¤ËÂФ·¤Æº£²ó¤Ï¼çʸ¤¬¡ÖThe housing sector has shown some further signs of improvement¡×¤È¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤ª¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¡Ö¹¹¤Ë´ö¤é¤«¤Î²þÁ±¤ÎÃû¤·¤¬¸«¤é¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤ë¡×¤¬¼çʸ¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¤³¤Á¤é¤Ï ¸½¾õȽÃDzþÁ±¤Ç¤¹¤Ê¡£
¡ØInflation has been subdued, although the prices of some key commodities have increased recently. Longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØInflation has declined since earlier this year, mainly reflecting lower prices of crude oil and gasoline, and longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØConsistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee is concerned that, without further policy accommodation, economic growth might not be strong enough to generate sustained improvement in labor market conditions. ¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØConsistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects economic growth to remain moderate over coming quarters and then to pick up very gradually. Consequently, the Committee anticipates that the unemployment rate will decline only slowly toward levels that it judges to be consistent with its dual mandate. ¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØFurthermore, strains in global financial markets continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook. The Committee also anticipates that inflation over the medium term likely would run at or below its 2 percent objective.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØFurthermore, strains in global financial markets continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook. The Committee anticipates that inflation over the medium term will run at or below the rate that it judges most consistent with its dual mandate.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
³¤³°¤Î¶âÍ»»Ô¾ì¥¬¡¼¤È¤¤¤¦ÏäϤޤ¢¤¤¤Ä¤âÄ̤ê¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢º£²ó¤Ïʪ²Á¤Î½ê¤Ë´Ø¤·¤Æ¡Öit judges most consistent with its dual mandate¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¸À¤¤Êý¤Ç¤Ï¤Ê¤¯¤Æ¡Öits 2 percent objective¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¸À¤¤Êý¤ËÊѹ¹¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤Þ¤¢¤³¤ì¤Ïº£²ó¤ÎÄɲôËÏ·èÄê¤Ë¤ª¤¤¤ÆÏ«Æ¯»Ô¾ì½Å»ë¤Î¤è¤¦¤Ê¥¹¥¿¥ó¥¹¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë»ö¤ËÂФ·¤Æ¡Öʪ²Á¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤â¤Á¤ã¤ó¤È¸«¤Æ¹Ô¤¤Þ¤¹¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤ò¶¯Ä´¤¹¤ë¤¿¤á¤Ë¡Ö2%¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¿ôÃͤòÌÀ¼¨²½¤·¤Æ¥Ð¥é¥ó¥¹¼è¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦½ê¤À¤È»×¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØTo support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. ¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØThe Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØThese actions, which together will increase the Committee¡Çs holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¤Ç¤Í¡¢º£Ä«¤Î½ñ¤Êª¤Ç¤½¤³¤Þ¤Ç¾ÜºÙÀâÌÀ¤¬¹Ô¤±¤ë¤«È½¤é¤Ê¤¤¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬(Âç´À)¡¢²ñ¸«¤ÎËÁƬ¤Ç¤Î¡ÖOpening Statement¡×¤òÆÉ¤ß¤Þ¤¹¤È¤½¤Á¤é¤Ç¤Ï¡ØThe program of MBS purchases should increase the downward pressure on long-term interest rates more generally, but also on mortgage rates specifically, which should provide further support to the housing sector by encouraging home purchases and refinancing.¡Ù(ºÇ½é¤ÎÊý¤Çʤ٤¿URL¤ÎÃæ¤Ë¤¢¤ë²ñ¸«¤Î¥ª¡¼¥×¥Ë¥ó¥°¥¹¥Æ¡¼¥È¥á¥ó¥È¤Î2¥Ú¡¼¥¸¤Î¥±¥Ä¤ÎÊÕ¤ê¤Ë¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹)¤È¸À¤¦É÷¤ËÀâÌÀ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¡Ö¥â¡¼¥²¡¼¥¸¶âÍø¤ËÂФ·¤Æ¤è¤ê¸ú²Ì¤¬¤¢¤ë¡×¤È¤¤¤¦·Á¤Ç¥â¡¼¥²¡¼¥¸¶âÍø¤Î°ú¤²¼¤²¤ò¶¯Ä´¤·¤Æ¤ª¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢°ì¤Ä¤Ë¤ÏĹ´ü¶âÍø¤Î°ú¤²¼¤²¤ò¶¯Ä´¤·¤¹¤®¤Ê¤¤¤è¤¦¤Ë¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤È¡¢¤â¤¦°ì¤Ä¤Ï¡Ö½»Âð»Ô¾ì¡×¤ò¶¯Ä´¤¹¤ë¤³¤È¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤ÆQEÈãȽ¤Ø¤ÎÅú¤¨¤Ë¤·¤è¤¦¤È¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤«¤Ê¤È»×¤¤¤Þ¤·¤¿¡£
¡ØBefore I take your questions, I¡Çd like to briefly address three concerns that have been raised about the Federal Reserve¡Çs accommodative monetary policy. The first is the notion that the Federal Reserve¡Çs securities purchases are akin to fiscal spending. The second is that a policy of very low rates hurts savers. The third is that the Federal Reserve¡Çs policies risk inflation down the road.¡Ù(ºÇ½é¤ÎÊý¤Çʤ٤¿URL¤ÎÃæ¤Ë¤¢¤ë²ñ¸«¤Î¥ª¡¼¥×¥Ë¥ó¥°¥¹¥Æ¡¼¥È¥á¥ó¥È¤Î4¥Ú¡¼¥¸¤Î¿¿¤óÃæÊÕ¤ê¤Ë¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹)
¡ØIn light of the policy actions the FOMC has taken to date, as well as the economy's natural recovery mechanisms, we might have hoped for greater progress by now in returning to maximum employment. Some have taken the lack of progress as evidence that the financial crisis caused structural damage to the economy, rendering the current levels of unemployment impervious to additional monetary accommodation. The literature on this issue is extensive, and I cannot fully review it today. However, following every previous U.S. recession since World War II, the unemployment rate has returned close to its pre-recession level, and, although the recent recession was unusually deep, I see little evidence of substantial structural change in recent years.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: Under the new OMTs, will the purchases continue to be conducted by the national central banks according to the capital key, and will they take the risks associated with these purchases according to the capital share that they have of the ECB?¡Ù
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¡ØDraghi: Well, the answer to the first question is yes.¡Ù
¡ØAnd my second question is, this is kind of the third attempt at making a bond purchase programme work: you did it in May 2010, you did it again in August 2011, and they did not seem to work. What makes you think and why should people be convinced that this third attempt will work?¡Ù
¡ØAnd the second is actually very, very important. We certainly discussed that. I would, by the way, disagree that the other two programmes have not worked in such a kind of decisive way, but let me talk about the present programme.¡Ù
¡ØThe present programme is very, very different from any other programme we had in the past.¡Ù
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¡ØFirst of all, we have this conditionality element. That is, I would say, the most important difference, because it really puts together our intervention with an ownership of the economic programme that a certain country has, by the country¡Çs government, but also by the other governments that have to vote in favour of the EFSF interventions. That is one of the differences, and I think it is probably the most important.¡Ù
¡ØThe second one is that there is going to be much greater transparency: as I said before, we will publish the OMT holdings, the duration, the issuer, the market value. So there is going to be much more transparency.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: Two questions, please. (ºÇ½é¤Î¤Ï³ä°¦)And my second question is: Unlimited bond purchases are something very new. The SMP is in the past. Now, we have unlimited purchases. What is the rationale for this? Is it to say: ¡ÈLook guys, we have spent more than ¥æ¡¼¥í200 billion buying these bonds and still monetary policy measures are not being transmitted.¡É- Is it to ensure better transmission of monetary policy that you have decided this, which is a big step?¡Ù
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¡ØOn the second point - yes, we think that having it, ex ante, unlimited in size is adequate to reach our objectives.¡Ù
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[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] is said that the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl once stated that "I did not like many of the monetary policy decisions of the Bundesbank, but as a citizen, I am very glad about the existence of the Bundesbank." As this episode shows, the Bundesbank is well known for its independence and achievements in securing price stability.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: I also have a question on the conditionality. In your statement, you say that ¡Èthe involvement of the IMF shall be sought¡É. Does that mean that the involvement of the IMF is a firm condition or is it just the preferred scenario? My second question is: am I right in understanding that you will retain your senior status for bonds bought under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) and for all other bonds held by the Eurosystem? And finally, did you discuss a change in interest rates at your meeting today?¡Ù
¡ØDraghi: The involvement of the IMF is sought for the design of the policy conditionality, but we cannot dictate what it should do. It is an independent institution, but if the Board of the IMF, its management and its Managing Director want to participate in the programme, they would be more than welcome. This is definitely the preferred scenario.¡Ù
¡ØHowever, because I can read the question on your mind - is this a condition sine qua non? - it is important to explain how the ECB is retaining its independence in all this. We have provided governments with a broad framework for conditionality, but it is very much up to the governments themselves, the European Union, the European Commission and the IMF to decide on the precise nature of this conditionality. It is important that the Governing Council retains full discretion and full independence when deciding on issues relating to monetary policy.¡Ù
¡ØWhat we have put in place today is an effective backstop to remove tail risks from the euro area, and the ECB will retain its independence throughout.¡Ù
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¡ØWith regard to seniority, the statement on outright monetary purchases does not apply to the SMP holdings.¡Ù
¡ØFinally, yes, we discussed interest rates today, but it was decided that it was not the right time to make a change. The reason for this is, in a sense, given in the introductory statement. When we last decided to reduce rates, we had anticipated this weakening in the business cycle.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: Mr Draghi, will the purchases be unlimited in amount and time? And my second question is: Spain is facing a huge refinancing hump at the end of October. Will the ECB¡Çs new programme be up and running in time for this?¡Ù
¡ØDraghi: Well, on the first question, there are no ex-ante limits on the amount of Outright Monetary Transactions. And the size - as I think it said in the first press release or the introductory statement - is going to be adequate to meet our objectives.¡Ù
¡ØAs regards Spain, we have designed a parcours, a path, and it is now in the hands of the government and the Eurogroup - in the hands of the government of Spain and the governments of the euro area.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: I have two questions, Mr Draghi. First of all, was there any discussion in today¡Çs meeting regarding any other liquidity programmes, like an LTRO?¡Ù
¡ØAnd my second question is: All global markets were waiting for this today. Even the Turkish central bank was waiting for it. Does this put pressure on you when deciding things?¡Ù
¡ØAnd we are obviously all under pressure. It is not just me; the whole of the Governing Council has taken very important decisions today - also for the ECB as an institution - so we are fully aware of that.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: Mr Draghi, I think I am right in saying that in the statement, you are explicitly not providing any kind of level at which you think a bond yield of a country that applies for this is excessive. In fact, the language seems to basically say ¡Èyou will know when it is there and then you will do it and you will tell us about it afterwards¡É - is that broadly it? Is there any more detail you can give us in terms of the work that the experts were doing over the last few weeks to try and figure out how you decide when a bond is suffering from convertibility risk?
And the second question is, since this is all designed to protect the transmission mechanism or repair it, would you say that the transmission mechanism is also broken in a sense in Germany, where perhaps the bonds are suffering from a sort of convertibility premium, and will you be doing anything to fix that?¡Ù
¡ØDraghi: The answer to your last question is, if bond markets are distorted in the euro area, they are distorted in all directions. And this is one of the causes of the impairment of monetary policy transmission. And that is really the objective of this programme: it is to repair monetary policy transmission and to recreate the singleness of monetary policy for the euro area.¡Ù
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¡ØNow, on the specific question you had whether we had in mind a specific yield target - the answer is no. No, just because the repair of monetary policy transmission is a complex concept, so we will be looking at a variety of issues.¡Ù
¡ØThe level of yield ceilings is one, but there are also spreads - CDS spreads, bid-ask spreads - and more generally the conditions of liquidity, so we have a variety of indicators. Volatility is also very important, in terms of the indicators that we plan to take into consideration in planning our interventions.¡Ù
¡ØDraghi: Well, it was not unanimous. There was one dissenting view. We do not disclose the details of our work. It is up to you to guess.¡Ù
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¡ØQuestion: Mr Draghi, you repeated that the euro is irreversible. What gives you the democratic legitimation, the authority to say that? Because I have looked it up in the Treaty. It does not say anywhere that it is the role of the ECB to decide what kind of currency the European countries have. Thank you.¡Ù
¡ØDraghi: What I said exactly is that - and I repeat what I said in London the first time - we will do whatever it takes within our mandate - within our mandate - to have a single monetary policy in the euro area, to maintain price stability in the euro area and to preserve the euro. And we say that the euro is irreversible. So unfounded fears of reversibility are just what they are: unfounded fears. And we think this falls squarely within our mandate.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: The FAZ warned the other day about what they have called - pardon me - the ¡Èliraisation¡É of the euro, moving away from a Deutschmark culture to a lira culture. The FDP wants to protest the decisions you have taken today, because they say they are in breach of Article 123 of the EU Treaty of financing governments. Can you explain to us why they are wrong?¡Ù
¡ØIt shows that it is not only the decision of former lira members or others, it is basically the almost unanimous decision of the Governing Council. So, first of all, I would not identify with this caricature of it being a southern cabal or an Italian thing. No, it is not. It is the Governing Council that, in its almost unanimous decision, has taken this measure.¡Ù
¡ØSecond, no, we are sure that we are acting within our mandate, that we are not violating Article 123. It is pretty explicit: it says for purchases on the primary market, this is a violation, not for purchases on the secondary market as I have stated this programme will work. And incidentally, outright purchases of bonds are identified, in Article 18 of the Statute of the ECB, as one of the various possible tools that our monetary policy has and can use. So we are not creating anything new here.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: Mr Draghi, how can you be sure the fact that the monetary impulse of the ECB seems not to be reaching a big part of the euro area is really a problem of ¡Èmonetary transmission¡É and not maybe a problem of ¡Èliquidity trap¡É?¡Ù
¡ØDraghi: We have substantial, significant and important evidence that the European monetary area is now fragmented. We see this from a variety of indicators: not only the level of yields, the yield spreads, but also volatility, and especially liquidity conditions in many parts of the euro area. So, the actions we decided on today are geared to repairing monetary policy transmission channels in a way that our standard monetary policy can address its primary objective, i.e. maintaining price stability. In other words, these decisions are necessary to restore our capacity to pursue the objective of price stability in the euro area and to restore the singleness of monetary policy in the euro area.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: When I listened to your words, I thought that there was quite a lot of Weidmann in it. I was quite surprised. But outside, there is a lot of pressure on you to put less Weidmann in your statements in the future. I fear that that will happen. What do you think?¡Ù
¡ØDraghi: I am what I am, really. I think one thing that is required for this job, for me and my colleagues in the Governing Council, is that you have to think with your head, and external pressures do not really have a role to play in your decision-making.¡Ù
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¡ØQuestion: Especially, Mr Weidman - I mean, Mr Draghi - all the conditionality. You have talked constantly about conditionality. Every second word was ¡Èconditionality¡É. I am a German. I really think your approach is great, but you know the markets. You know all these markets are putting pressure on you and your colleagues. In four weeks we will be sitting here again at another press conference. I hope that this conditionality will stay and you will not give ground regarding this issue of conditionality.¡Ù
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¡ØDraghi: Certainly, certainly. And as I have said before, you know, all of us are convinced, all of the Governing Council is convinced, that really you need two legs to make it work. We are all convinced that having just one leg does not work. As you have said, Brian, we have had previous experience of this, and that was basically one leg and did not work. We need both to make it work. And I think that is a general conviction. Again, I think there is unfortunately a misconception - especially, I would say, in this country - about how the Governing Council works, and this is not accurate.¡Ù
¡ØQuestion: Mr Draghi, on the maturity of the assets that you would intend to purchase under the OMTs you said between one and three years. Could you explain: does this involve bonds that have a residual maturity of that amount of time, i.e. a ten-year bond that has two or three years left to run as well as ones whose face maturity is that time? And my second question is about the conditionally aspect: you mentioned that the OMTs would be suspended if countries did not fulfil the necessary conditions set out in the MoU. Given that these purchases are explicitly for monetary policy purposes, does this mean that you will suspend the ECB¡Çs independence if the countries do not fulfil the conditions? I don¡Çt quite understand this contradiction; maybe you could elaborate on that for me?¡Ù
¡ØDraghi: On the first question, the ¡Èthree years¡É is to be understood in the way you mentioned. And it is three years because it seemed to us the maximum most effective maturity to target: it is close to our short-term policy rates; it affects also the medium-term yield curve; it is close to the rates that are being used to lend to the private sector; it is, in a certain sense, similar to the maturity we used for the LTROs; and also, in a very indirect way, it decreases concerns about our seniority over the bond holdings. So, there are many good reasons for choosing the ¡Èthree years¡É. ¡Ù
¡ØOn ¡Èconditionality¡É, the assessment of the Governing Council is that we are in a situation now where you have large parts of the euro area in what we call a ¡Èbad equilibrium¡É, namely an equilibrium where you may have self-fulfilling expectations that feed upon themselves and generate very adverse scenarios.¡Ù
¡ØSo, there is a case for intervening, in a sense, to ¡Èbreak¡É these expectations, which, by the way, do not concern only the specific countries, but the euro area as a whole. And this would justify the intervention of the central bank.¡Ù
¡ØIf the central bank were to intervene without any actions on the part of governments, without any conditionality, the intervention would not be effective and the Bank would lose its independence. At the same time, we see that we are in a bad equilibrium and, therefore, policy action, though convincing, does not seem to produce - at least not in the relatively medium term - the results for which it is geared. So that is why we need both legs for this action.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] statement to the press conference (with Q&A) Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Vitor Constancio, Vice-President of the ECB, Frankfurt am Main, 6 September 2012
¡ØLadies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today¡Çs meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the President of the Eurogroup, Prime Minister Juncker, and by the Commission Vice-President, Mr Rehn.¡Ù
¡ØBased on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged.¡Ù
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¡ØOwing to high energy prices and increases in indirect taxes in some euro area countries, inflation rates are expected to remain above 2% throughout 2012, to fall below that level again in the course of next year and to remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. Consistent with this picture, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains subdued. Inflation expectations for the euro area economy continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.¡Ù
¡ØEconomic growth in the euro area is expected to remain weak, with the ongoing tensions in financial markets and heightened uncertainty weighing on confidence and sentiment. A renewed intensification of financial market tensions would have the potential to affect the balance of risks for both growth and inflation.¡Ù
¡ØIt is against this background that the Governing Council today decided on the modalities for undertaking Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in secondary markets for sovereign bonds in the euro area. As we said a month ago, we need to be in the position to safeguard the monetary policy transmission mechanism in all countries of the euro area.¡Ù
¡ØWe aim to preserve the singleness of our monetary policy and to ensure the proper transmission of our policy stance to the real economy throughout the area. OMTs will enable us to address severe distortions in government bond markets which originate from, in particular, unfounded fears on the part of investors of the reversibility of the euro.¡Ù
¡ØHence, under appropriate conditions, we will have a fully effective backstop to avoid destructive scenarios with potentially severe challenges for price stability in the euro area. Let me repeat what I said last month: we act strictly within our mandate to maintain price stability over the medium term; we act independently in determining monetary policy; and the euro is irreversible.¡Ù
¡ØIn order to restore confidence, policy-makers in the euro area need to push ahead with great determination with fiscal consolidation, structural reforms to enhance competitiveness and European institution-building. At the same time, governments must stand ready to activate the EFSF/ESM in the bond market when exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability exist - with strict and effective conditionality in line with the established guidelines.¡Ù
¡ØThe adherence of governments to their commitments and the fulfilment by the EFSF/ESM of their role are necessary conditions for our outright transactions to be conducted and to be effective. Details of the Outright Monetary Transactions are described in a separate press release. ¡Ù
¡ØFurthermore, the Governing Council took decisions with a view to ensuring the availability of adequate collateral in Eurosystem refinancing operations. The details of these measures are also elaborated in a separate press release.¡Ù
¡ØThe risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area are assessed to be on the downside. They relate, in particular, to the tensions in several euro area financial markets and their potential spillover to the euro area real economy. These risks should be contained by effective action by all euro area policy-makers.¡Ù
¡ØRisks to the outlook for price developments continue to be broadly balanced over the medium term. Upside risks pertain to further increases in indirect taxes owing to the need for fiscal consolidation. The main downside risks relate to the impact of weaker than expected growth in the euro area, particularly resulting from a further intensification of financial market tensions, and its effects on the domestic components of inflation. If not contained by effective action by all euro area policy-makers, such intensification has the potential to affect the balance of risks on the downside. ¡Ù