¡ØFor example, if further expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet were to undermine public confidence in our ability to exit smoothly from our accommodative policies at the appropriate time, inflation expectations could rise, putting the FOMC's price-stability objective at risk.¡Ù
¡ØAs I noted, inflation is currently subdued, and inflation expectations appear well anchored; neither the FOMC nor private forecasters are projecting the development of significant inflation pressures.¡Ù
¡ØAnother potential cost that the Committee takes very seriously is the possibility that very low interest rates, if maintained for a considerable time, could impair financial stability.¡Ù
¡ØOn the other hand, some risk-taking--such as when an entrepreneur takes out a loan to start a new business or an existing firm expands capacity--is a necessary element of a healthy economic recovery. Moreover, although accommodative monetary policies may increase certain types of risk-taking, in the present circumstances they also serve in some ways to reduce risk in the system, most importantly by strengthening the overall economy, but also by encouraging firms to rely more on longer-term funding, and by reducing debt service costs for households and businesses.¡Ù
¡ØIn any case, the Federal Reserve is responding actively to financial stability concerns through substantially expanded monitoring of emerging risks in the financial system, an approach to the supervision of financial firms that takes a more systemic perspective, and the ongoing implementation of reforms to make the financial system more transparent and resilient.¡Ù
¡ØAlthough a long period of low rates could encourage excessive risk-taking, and continued close attention to such developments is certainly warranted, to this point we do not see the potential costs of the increased risk-taking in some financial markets as outweighing the benefits of promoting a stronger economic recovery and more-rapid job creation.¡Ù
Äã¶âÍø¤ÎĹ´ü²½¤Ï²á¾ê¤Ê¥ê¥¹¥¯¥Æ¥¤¥¯¤ò¤â¤¿¤é¤¹¤Î¤Ï¤½¤ÎÄ̤ê¤Ç¤½¤Î¾õ¶·¤Ï¤¤Á¤ó¤È¥â¥Ë¥¿¡¼¤Ï¤·¤Þ¤¹¤¬¡¢¸½¾õ¤Ç¤Ï¤½¤ì¤é¤Î¥ê¥¹¥¯¤Ï¶âÍ»´ËÏÂÀ¯ºö¤Î¥á¥ê¥Ã¥È¤ò¾å²ó¤ë¡¢¤È¤Ï¸À¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢²¿µ¤¤Ë¤³¤³¤ò¸«¤ë¤È¡Öthe increased risk-taking in some financial markets ¡×¤È¤«¸À¤Ã¤Æ¤ë¤Î¤¬¤³¤ì¤Þ¤¿¤Û¤Û¡¼¤È¤¤¤¦´¶¤¸¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢¤Þ¤¢¥¹¥¿¥¤¥óÍý»ö¤Î¹Ö±é¤Ç¤ÎÀâÌÀ¤Ã¤ÆÉ¬¤º¤·¤â¶Ëü¤Ê¾¯¿ô°Õ¸«¤È¤¤¤¦»ö¤Ç¤Ï̵¤¤¤Î¤«¤Í¤¨¤È¤«»×¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤ÈÌÀÆü°Ê¹ß(´û¤Ëº£Æü¤Ï³¤¤ä¤ë¤Î̵Íý¤Èǧ¼±Ãæ^^)¤Î¥Í¥¿·Ñ³¤Ë°ÕÍߤ¬Í¯¤¯¤È¤¤¤¦¤â¤Î¤Ç¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹(^^)¡£
¡ØAnother aspect of the Federal Reserve's policies that has been discussed is their implications for the federal budget.¡Ù
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¡ØThe Federal Reserve earns substantial interest on the assets it holds in its portfolio, and, other than the amount needed to fund our cost of operations, all net income is remitted to the Treasury. With the expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, yearly remittances have roughly tripled in recent years, with payments to the Treasury totaling approximately $290 billion between 2009 and 2012.¡Ù
¡ØHowever, if the economy continues to strengthen, as we anticipate, and policy accommodation is accordingly reduced, these remittances would likely decline in coming years.¡Ù
¡ØFederal Reserve analysis shows that remittances to the Treasury could be quite low for a time in some scenarios, particularly if interest rates were to rise quickly.¡Ù
¥·¥Ê¥ê¥ª¤Î¥ê¥ó¥¯¤ÏµÓÃí¤Ë¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤¬ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] even in such scenarios, it is highly likely that average annual remittances over the period affected by the Federal Reserve's purchases will remain higher than the pre-crisis norm, perhaps substantially so.¡Ù
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¡ØMoreover, to the extent that monetary policy promotes growth and job creation, the resulting reduction in the federal deficit would dwarf any variation in the Federal Reserve's remittances to the Treasury.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Ben S. Bernanke Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. February 26, 2013
¡ØSince I last reported to this Committee in mid-2012, economic activity in the United States has continued to expand at a moderate if somewhat uneven pace.¡Ù
¡ØIn particular, real gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have risen at an annual rate of about 3 percent in the third quarter but to have been essentially flat in the fourth quarter. The pause in real GDP growth last quarter does not appear to reflect a stalling-out of the recovery. Rather, economic activity was temporarily restrained by weather-related disruptions and by transitory declines in a few volatile categories of spending, even as demand by U.S. households and businesses continued to expand.¡Ù
¡ØConsistent with the moderate pace of economic growth, conditions in the labor market have been improving gradually.¡Ù
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¡ØSince July, nonfarm payroll employment has increased by 175,000 jobs per month on average, and the unemployment rate declined 0.3 percentage point to 7.9 percent over the same period. Cumulatively, private-sector payrolls have now grown by about 6.1 million jobs since their low point in early 2010, and the unemployment rate has fallen a bit more than 2 percentage points since its cyclical peak in late 2009.¡Ù
¡ØAbout 4.7 million of the unemployed have been without a job for six months or more, and millions more would like full-time employment but are able to find only part-time work.¡Ù
¡ØHigh unemployment has substantial costs, including not only the hardship faced by the unemployed and their families, but also the harm done to the vitality and productive potential of our economy as a whole. Lengthy periods of unemployment and underemployment can erode workers' skills and attachment to the labor force or prevent young people from gaining skills and experience in the first place--developments that could significantly reduce their productivity and earnings in the longer term. The loss of output and earnings associated with high unemployment also reduces government revenues and increases spending, thereby leading to larger deficits and higher levels of debt.¡Ù
¡ØThe recent increase in gasoline prices, which reflects both higher crude oil prices and wider refining margins, is hitting family budgets. However, overall inflation remains low. Over the second half of 2012, the price index for personal consumption expenditures rose at an annual rate of 1-1/2 percent, similar to the rate of increase in the first half of the year. Measures of longer-term inflation expectations have remained in the narrow ranges seen over the past several years. Against this backdrop, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) anticipates that inflation over the medium term likely will run at or below its 2 percent objective.¡Ù
¡ØWith unemployment well above normal levels and inflation subdued, progress toward the Federal Reserve's mandated objectives of maximum employment and price stability has required a highly accommodative monetary policy. Under normal circumstances, policy accommodation would be provided through reductions in the FOMC's target for the federal funds rate--the interest rate on overnight loans between banks. However, as this rate has been close to zero since December 2008, the Federal Reserve has had to use alternative policy tools.¡Ù
¡ØThese alternative tools have fallen into two categories. The first is "forward guidance" regarding the FOMC's anticipated path for the federal funds rate. Since longer-term interest rates reflect market expectations for shorter-term rates over time, our guidance influences longer-term rates and thus supports a stronger recovery. The formulation of this guidance has evolved over time. Between August 2011 and December 2012, the Committee used calendar dates to indicate how long it expected economic conditions to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate. At its December 2012 meeting, the FOMC agreed to shift to providing more explicit guidance on how it expects the policy rate to respond to economic developments. Specifically, the December postmeeting statement indicated that the current exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate "will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored."¡Ù
¡ØAn advantage of the new formulation, relative to the previous date-based guidance, is that it allows market participants and the public to update their monetary policy expectations more accurately in response to new information about the economic outlook.¡Ù
¡ØThe new guidance also serves to underscore the Committee's intention to maintain accommodation as long as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with stable prices.¡Ù
¡ØThe second type of nontraditional policy tool employed by the FOMC is large-scale purchases of longer-term securities, which, like our forward guidance, are intended to support economic growth by putting downward pressure on longer-term interest rates.¡Ù
¡ØThe Federal Reserve has engaged in several rounds of such purchases since late 2008. Last September the FOMC announced that it would purchase agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month, and in December the Committee stated that, in addition, beginning in January it would purchase longer-term Treasury securities at an initial pace of $45 billion per month. These additional purchases of longer-term Treasury securities replace the purchases we were conducting under our now-completed maturity extension program, which lengthened the maturity of our securities portfolio without increasing its size. The FOMC has indicated that it will continue purchases until it observes a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] the Distinction Matters¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦½ê¤«¤é¡£
¡ØTo summarize the argument thus far, I have drawn a distinction between two views of risk-taking in credit markets. According to the primitives view, changes over time in effective risk appetite reflect the underlying preferences and beliefs of end investors. According to the institutions view, such changes reflect the imperfectly aligned incentives of the agents in large financial institutions who do the investing on behalf of these end investors. But why should anybody care about this distinction?¡Ù
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¡ØOne reason is that your view of the underlying mechanism shapes how you think about measurement. Consider this question: Is the high-yield bond market currently overheated, in the sense that it might be expected to offer disappointing returns to investors? What variables might one look at to shape such a forecast?¡Ù
¡ØIn a primitives-driven world, it would be natural to focus on credit spreads, on the premise that more risk tolerance on the part of households would lead them to bid down credit spreads; these lower spreads would then be the leading indicator of low expected returns.¡Ù
¡ØOn the other hand, in an institutions-driven world, where agents are trying to exploit various incentive schemes, it is less obvious that increased risk appetite is as well summarized by reduced credit spreads. Rather, agents may prefer to accept their lowered returns via various subtler nonprice terms and subordination features that allow them to maintain a higher stated yield.¡Ù
¡ØAgain, the use of PIK bonds in LBOs is instructive. A long time ago, Steve Kaplan and I did a study of the capital structure of 1980s-era LBOs. What was most noteworthy about the PIK bonds in those deals was not that they had low credit spreads. Rather, it was that they were subject to an extreme degree of implicit subordination.¡Ù
¡ØWhile these bonds were not due to get cash interest for several years, they stood behind bank loans with very fast principal repayment schedules, which in many cases required the newly leveraged firm to sell a large chunk of its assets just to honor these bank loans. Simply put, much of the action--and much of the explanatory power for the eventual sorry returns on the PIK bonds--was in the nonprice terms.¡Ù
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¡ØIt is interesting to think about recent work by Robin Greenwood and Sam Hanson through this lens.¡Ù
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¡ØThey show that if one is interested in forecasting excess returns on corporate bonds (relative to Treasury securities) over the next few years, credit spreads are indeed helpful, but another powerful predictive variable is a nonprice measure: the high-yield share, defined as issuance by speculative-grade firms divided by total bond issuance.¡Ù
¡ØWhen the high-yield share is elevated, future returns on corporate credit tend to be low, holding fixed the credit spread. Exhibit 1 provides an illustration of their finding.¡Ù
¡ØOne possible interpretation is that the high-yield share acts as a summary statistic for a variety of nonprice credit terms and structural features. That is, when agents' risk appetite goes up, they agree to fewer covenants, accept more-implicit subordination, and so forth, and high-yield issuance responds accordingly, hence its predictive power.¡Ù
¡ØA second implication of the institutions view is what one might call the "tip of the iceberg" caveat.¡Ù
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¡ØQuantifying risk-taking in credit markets is difficult in real time, precisely because risks are often taken in opaque ways that escape conventional measurement practices.¡Ù
¡ØFor example, I have mentioned the junk bond market several times, but not because this market is necessarily the most important venue for the sort of risk-taking that is likely to raise systemic concerns. Rather, because it offers a relatively long history on price and nonprice terms, it is arguably a useful barometer.¡Ù
¡ØThus, overheating in the junk bond market might not be a major systemic concern in and of itself, but it might indicate that similar overheating forces were at play in other parts of credit markets, out of our range of vision.¡Ù
¤È¸À¤¦½ê¤Þ¤Ç¤¬Á°ºÂ¤ÎÀâÌÀÉôʬ¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢¤³¤³¤«¤é¡ØRecent Developments in Credit Markets¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¸½ºß¤ÎÊÆ¹ñ¤Î¥¯¥ì¥¸¥Ã¥È»Ô¾ì¤Î²áÇ®¾õ¶·¤¬¤É¤Î¤è¤¦¤Ê½ê¤Ç´Ñ¬¤µ¤ì¤ë¤«¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦ÂçÊѤËÁÇŨ¤ÊÏ䬤ª¤Ã¤Ñ¤¸¤Þ¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤Î¤Ç³¤¤Ï¸åÆü(^^)¡£
¡ØAccording to the primitives view, changes in the pricing of credit over time reflect fluctuations in the preferences and beliefs of end investors such as households, where these beliefs may or may not be entirely rational. Perhaps credit is cheap when household risk tolerance is high--say, because of a recent run-up in wealth.3 Or maybe credit is cheap when households extrapolate current good times into the future and neglect low-probability risks.¡Ù
¡ØThe primitives view is helpful for understanding some aspects of the behavior of the aggregate stock market, with the 1990s Internet bubble being one illustration. It seems clear that the sentiment of retail investors played a prominent role in inflating this bubble. More generally, research using survey evidence has shown that when individual investors are most optimistic about future stock market returns, the market tends to be overvalued, in the sense that statistical forecasts of equity returns are abnormally low. This finding is consistent with the importance of primitive investor beliefs. ¡Ù
¡ØBy contrast, I am skeptical that one can say much about time variation in the pricing of credit--as opposed to equities--without focusing on the roles of institutions and incentives. The premise here is that since credit decisions are almost always delegated to agents inside banks, mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds, and so forth, any effort to analyze the pricing of credit has to take into account not only household preferences and beliefs, but also the incentives facing the agents actually making the decisions. And these incentives are in turn shaped by the rules of the game, which include regulations, accounting standards, and a range of performance-measurement, governance, and compensation structures. ¡Ù
¡ØAt an abstract level, one can think of the agents making credit decisions and the rulemakers who shape their incentives as involved in an ongoing evolutionary process, in which each adapts over time in response to changing conditions. At any point, the agents try to maximize their own compensation, given the rules of the game. Sometimes they discover vulnerabilities in these rules, which they then exploit in a way that is not optimal from the perspective of their own organizations or society.¡Ù
¡ØIf the damage caused is significant enough, the rules themselves adapt, driven either by internal governance or by political and regulatory forces. Still, it is possible that at different times in this process, the rules do a better or worse job of managing the incentives of the agents.¡Ù
¡ØTo be more specific, a fundamental challenge in delegated investment management is that many quantitative rules are vulnerable to agents who act to boost measured returns by selling insurance against unlikely events--that is, by writing deep out-of-the-money puts. An example is that if you hire an agent to manage your equity portfolio, and compensate the agent based on performance relative to the S&P 500, the agent can beat the benchmark simply by holding the S&P 500 and stealthily writing puts against it, since this put-writing both raises the mean and lowers the measured variance of the portfolio.7 Of course, put-writing also introduces low-probability risks that may make you, as the end investor, worse off, but if your measurement system doesn't capture these risks adequately--which is often difficult to do unless one knows what to look for--then the put-writing strategy will create the appearance of outperformance.¡Ù
¡ØSince credit risk by its nature involves an element of put-writing, it is always going to be challenging in an agency context, especially to the extent that the risks associated with the put-writing can be structured to partially evade the relevant measurement scheme.¡Ù
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¡ØThink of the AAA-rated tranche of a subprime collateralized debt obligation (CDO), where the measurement scheme is the credit risk model used by the rating agency.¡Ù
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¡ØTo the extent that this model is behind the curve and does not fully recognize the additional structural leverage and correlational complexities embedded in a second-generation securitization like the CDO, as opposed to a first-generation one, it will be particularly vulnerable to the introduction of a second-generation product.¡Ù
¡ØA more interesting set of questions has to do with time-series dynamics: Why is it that sometimes, things get out of balance, and the existing set of rules is less successful in containing risk-taking? In other words, what does the institutions view tell us about why credit markets sometimes overheat?¡Ù
¡ØLet me suggest three factors that can contribute to overheating.¡Ù
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¡ØThe first is financial innovation.¡Ù
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¡ØWhile financial innovation has provided important benefits to society, the institutions perspective warns of a dark side, which is that innovation can create new ways for agents to write puts that are not captured by existing rules.¡Ù
¡ØPerhaps the best explanation for the existence of second-generation securitizations like subprime CDOs is that they evolved in response to flaws in prevailing models and incentive schemes. Going back further, a similar story can be told about the introduction of payment-in-kind (PIK) interest features in the high-yield bonds used in the leveraged buyouts (LBOs) of the late 1980s. I don't think it was a coincidence that among the buyers of such PIK bonds were savings and loan associations, at a time when many were willing to take risks to boost their accounting incomes.¡Ù
¡ØThe second closely related factor on my list is changes in regulation.¡Ù
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¡ØNew regulation will tend to spur further innovation, as market participants attempt to minimize the private costs created by new rules. And it may also open up new loopholes, some of which may be exploited by variants on already existing instruments.¡Ù
¡ØThe third factor that can lead to overheating is a change in the economic environment that alters the risk-taking incentives of agents making credit decisions.¡Ù
¡ØFor example, a prolonged period of low interest rates, of the sort we are experiencing today, can create incentives for agents to take on greater duration or credit risks, or to employ additional financial leverage, in an effort to "reach for yield."¡Ù
¡ØAn insurance company that has offered guaranteed minimum rates of return on some of its products might find its solvency threatened by a long stretch of low rates and feel compelled to take on added risk. A similar logic applies to a bank whose net interest margins are under pressure because low rates erode the profitability of its deposit-taking franchise. ¡Ù
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¡ØMoreover, these three factors may interact with one another. For example, if low interest rates increase the demand by agents to engage in below-the-radar forms of risk-taking, this demand may prompt innovations that facilitate this sort of risk-taking. ¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] the "Restoring Household Financial Stability after the Great Recession: Why Household Balance Sheets Matter" research symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri February 7, 2013 Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and Policy Responses
¡ØTwo Views of the Overheating Mechanism¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤ÎËÁƬÉôʬ¤«¤é¡£
¡ØI will start by sketching two views that might be invoked to explain variation in the pricing of credit risk over time: a "primitive preferences and beliefs" view and an "institutions, agency, and incentives" view. While the first view is a natural starting point, I will argue that it must be augmented with the second view if one wants to fully understand the dynamics of overheating episodes in credit markets.¡Ù
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢¥¯¥ì¥¸¥Ã¥È»Ô¾ì¤Î²áÇ®¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ"primitive preferences and beliefs"¤È¤¤¤¦¸½¾Ý¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤ÆÀ¸¤¸¤ë¤â¤Î¤È¡¢"institutions, agency, and incentives"¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤ò»ØÅ¦¤·¤Æ¤ª¤ê¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØParticipants also discussed the economic thresholds in the Committee's forward guidance on the path of the federal funds rate.¡Ù
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¡ØOn the whole, participants judged that financial markets had adapted to the shift from date-based communication to guidance based on economic thresholds without difficulty, although a few participants stated that communications challenges remained.¡Ù
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¡ØFor example, one participant commented that some market participants appeared to have incorrectly interpreted the thresholds as triggers that, when reached, would necessarily lead to an immediate rise in the federal funds rate.¡Ù
¡Öincorrectly interpreted the thresholds as triggers¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤Ï³Î¤«¤Ë¤¢¤ë¤¢¤ë¡£
¡ØA couple of participants noted that this policy tool would be more effective if the Committee were able to communicate a consensus expectation for the path of the federal funds rate after a threshold was crossed.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Views on Current Conditions and the Economic Outlook¡Ù¤ÎºÇ¸å3¥Ñ¥é¥°¥é¥ÕÊդ꤬´ËÏÂÀ¯ºö¤Î·Ñ³¤¬¤É¤¦¤Î¤³¤¦¤Î¤È¤¤¤¦µÄÏÀÉôʬ¤Ç¤¹¡£
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¡ØThe Committee again discussed the possible benefits and costs of additional asset purchases.¡Ù
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¡ØMost participants commented that the Committee's asset purchases had been effective in easing financial conditions and helping stimulate economic activity, and many pointed, in particular, to the support that low longer-term interest rates had provided to housing or consumer durable purchases.¡Ù
¡ØIn addition, the Committee's highly accommodative policy was seen as helping keep inflation over the medium term closer to its longer-run goal of 2 percent than would otherwise have been the case.¡Ù
¡ØPolicy was also aimed at improving the labor market outlook.¡Ù
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¡ØIn this regard, several participants stressed the economic and social costs of high unemployment, as well as the potential for negative effects on the economy's longer-term path of a prolonged period of underutilization of resources.¡Ù
¡ØHowever, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases.¡Ù
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¡ØSeveral participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability.¡Ù
¡ØSeveral participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.¡Ù
¡ØA few also raised concerns about the potential effects of further asset purchases on the functioning of particular financial markets, although a couple of other participants noted that there had been little evidence to date of such effects.¡Ù
¡ØIn light of this discussion, the staff was asked for additional analysis ahead of future meetings to support the Committee's ongoing assessment of the asset purchase program.¡Ù
¡ØSeveral participants emphasized that the Committee should be prepared to vary the pace of asset purchases, either in response to changes in the economic outlook or as its evaluation of the efficacy and costs of such purchases evolved.¡Ù
¡ØFor example, one participant argued that purchases should vary incrementally from meeting to meeting in response to incoming information about the economy. A number of participants stated that an ongoing evaluation of the efficacy, costs, and risks of asset purchases might well lead the Committee to taper or end its purchases before it judged that a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market had occurred.¡Ù
¤Ç¤Þ¤¢¤³¤ÎÉôʬ¤Ç¤Û¤Û¤¦¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤Ï2ʸÌܤǤ·¤ç¤¦¤Ê¤¢¤È¤¤¤¦½ê¤Ç¡¢¥×¥í¥³¥óÈæ³Ó¤·¤Æ¥Ç¥á¥ê¥Ã¥È¤¬Â¿¤¯¤Ê¤ë¤è¤¦¤Ç¤¢¤ì¤Ð¡Öa substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market¡×¤È¤Ê¤ëÁ°¤Ç¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¤â»ñ»ºÇãÆþ¥×¥í¥°¥é¥à¤Î¥Ú¡¼¥¹¸º¾¯¤äÄä»ß¤âɬÍפǤ¢¤í¤¦¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬¡ÖA number of¡×¤È¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£
¤Ä¤Þ¤ê¤Ç¤¹¤Í¡¢¤Þ¤¢¤³¤ÎÊÕ¤ê¤Î¥¬¥¤¥À¥ó¥¹¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤¦¤Î¤Ï(ÀèÈ̥ͥ¿¤Ë¤·¤¿¥«¥Ê¥ÀÃæ¶ä¥«¡¼¥Ë¡¼ÁíºÛ¤Î¥¬¥¤¥À¥ó¥¹¤Ë´Ø¤¹¤ë¹Ö±é¤Ç¤â¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¤è¤¦¤Ë)¡Ö¥¬¥¤¥À¥ó¥¹¤ÏÌó«¤Ç¤Ï̵¤¤¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬½ÅÍפʥݥ¤¥ó¥È¤Ç¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¡¢¤½¤â¤½¤âÈóÅÁÅýŪÀ¯ºö¤Ç¸ú²Ì¤È¥³¥¹¥È¤¬Í½¤áȽ¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ëÌõ¤Ç¤Ï̵¤¤À¯ºö¤ò¼Â»Ü¤¹¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¢¤ë¤«¤é¤·¤Æ¡¢Î㤨¤Ðº£²ó¤Î¤è¤¦¤Ë¡Öa substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market¡×¤È¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤â´ËÏÂÀ¯ºö¤ò·Ñ³¤¹¤ë¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦Ïäò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Æ¤â¤½¤ì¤Ï¤¢¤¯¤Þ¤Ç¤â¥¬¥¤¥À¥ó¥¹¤Ç¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¡¢¼ÂºÝ¤ËÀ¯ºö¤ä¤Ã¤Æ¤ß¤Æ¥Ç¥á¥ê¥Ã¥È¤ÎÊý¤¬Â礤¯¤Ê¤Ã¤¿¤ÈȽÃǤµ¤ì¤¿¤é¥×¥é¥¯¥Æ¥£¥«¥ë¤ËÂбþ¤·¤Þ¤·¤ç¤¦¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬(¤¢¤ë°ÕÌ£¤´ÅÔ¹ç¼çµÁ¤Ç¤Ï¤¢¤ë¤¬)ÈóÅÁÅýŪÀ¯ºö¤Î±¿±Ä¤Ë¤ª¤±¤ë½ÅÍפʥݥ¤¥ó¥È¤Ç¤¢¤ë¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤è¤¦¤Ê¹Í¤¨Êý¤¬¼Â¤ÏÀ¤³¦Åª¤ËÈóÅÁÅýŪÀ¯ºö¤ò¼Â»Ü¤¹¤ë¾ì¹ç¤Î¥Ý¥¤¥ó¥È¤È¤¤¤¦Ç§¼±¤¬ÃÊ¡¹¹¤Þ¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Ê¤¢¤È¤«»×¤¦¤Î¤Ç¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØSeveral others argued that the potential costs of reducing or ending asset purchases too soon were also significant, or that asset purchases should continue until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook had occurred.¡Ù
°ìÊý¤ÇSeveral others¤Ï»ñ»ºÇãÆþ¤òÁá¤á¤Ë¸º³Û¤Þ¤¿¤Ï½ª¤ï¤é¤»¤ëÀøºßŪ¥³¥¹¥È¤ÏÂ礤¤¤Î¤Ç¡¢¤ä¤Ï¤ê¡Öa substantial improvement in the labor market outlook¡×¤È¤Ê¤ë¤Þ¤Ç¤Ï»ñ»ºÇãÆþ¤ò·Ñ³¤¹¤Ù¤¤Ç¤Ï¤Ê¤¤¤«¤È¤¤¤¦¸«²ò¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤³¤ì¤É¤¦¸«¤Æ¤â¤³¤Ã¤Á¤ÎÊý¤¬¾¯¿ôÇɤȤ¤¤¦¤Î¤¬¤Û¤Û¤¦¤È¤¤¤¦½ê¤Ç¤Ï¤´¤¶¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØA few participants noted examples of past instances in which policymakers had prematurely removed accommodation, with adverse effects on economic growth, employment, and price stability; they also stressed the importance of communicating the Committee's commitment to maintaining a highly accommodative stance of policy as long as warranted by economic conditions.¡Ù
A few¤ÏÁ᤹¤®¤ë´Ëϲò½ü¤¬·ÐºÑ¤Ê¤É¤ËÍ¿¤¨¤ë°±Æ¶Á¤¬¤¢¤Ã¤¿²áµî¤ÎÎã(¤Ã¤Æ²¿¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Í¤¨^^)¤òµó¤²¤Æ¡¢¥³¥ß¥Ã¥È¥á¥ó¥È¤ÎÄ̤ê¤Ë´ËϤòĹ´ü²½¤µ¤»¤ë¤³¤È¤Ï½ÅÍפǤ¢¤ë¤È»ØÅ¦¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤Þ¤¢¸åȾ¤Î¿Í¤¿¤Á¤ÎÊý¤¬¡Ö¶âÍ»À¯ºö¤Î¥³¥ß¥Ã¥È¥á¥ó¥È¡×¤È¤¤¤¦°ÕÌ£¤Ç¤ÏÂç»ö¤Ê¥Ý¥¤¥ó¥È¤Ç¡¢¤¢¤Þ¤ê¥¬¥¤¥À¥ó¥¹¤ò¥×¥é¥¯¥£¥«¥ë¤Ë±¿ÍѤ·¤Á¤ã¤¦¤ÈºÇ½é¤Î»þ¤ÏÎɤ¤¤±¤ì¤É¤â2ÅÙÌÜ¤ËÆ±¤¸»ö¤ò¼Â»Ü¤·¤è¤¦¤È¤·¤¿»þ¤Ë¥¬¥¤¥À¥ó¥¹¤¬¿®ÍѤµ¤ì¤Ê¤¯¤Ê¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦ÊÀ³²¤â¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹æ«¡¢¤È¤Þ¤¢¤½¤¦¤¤¤¦É÷¤Ë¤â»×¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤Ç¤¹¡£
¡ØIn this regard, a number of participants discussed the possibility of providing monetary accommodation by holding securities for a longer period than envisioned in the Committee's exit principles, either as a supplement to, or a replacement for, asset purchases.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Jeremy C. Stein At the "Restoring Household Financial Stability after the Great Recession: Why Household Balance Sheets Matter" research symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri February 7, 2013 Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and Policy Responses
¡ØThank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. The question I'd like to address today is this: What factors lead to overheating episodes in credit markets?¡Ù
¡ØIn other words, why do we periodically observe credit booms, times during which lending standards appear to become lax and which tend to be followed by low returns on credit instruments relative to other asset classes?¡Ù
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¡ØWe have seen how such episodes can sometimes have adverse effects on the financial system and the broader economy, and the hope would be that a better understanding of the causes can be helpful both in identifying emerging problems on a timely basis and in thinking about appropriate policy responses. ¡Ù
>identifying emerging problems on a timely basis and in thinking about appropriate policy responses >identifying emerging problems on a timely basis and in thinking about appropriate policy responses >identifying emerging problems on a timely basis and in thinking about appropriate policy responses
¤Ç¤Ç¤¹¤Í¡¢¤½¤³¤Þ¤ÇÆÉ¤à¤ÈËÜʸ8¥Ú¡¼¥¸Ê¬¤Ë¤Ê¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢3ʬ¤Î1¤Û¤ÉÆÉ¤ó¤À¤¼¡¼¤È»×¤¦¤È¤½¤Î¼¡¤Î¡ØRecent Developments in Credit Markets¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦¥¥¿¥³¥ì¤Ê¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤¬¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤½¤³¤ÎËÁƬ¤Ë¡¢ ¡ØWith these remarks as a prelude, what I'd like to do next is take you on a brief tour of recent developments in a few selected areas of credit markets.¡Ù
¤È¤´¤¶¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¡Öthese remarks as a prelude¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤ò¸«¤¿½Ö´Ö¤Ë¤½¤³¤Þ¤Ç¥Ò¡¼¥Ò¡¼¸À¤¤¤Ê¤¬¤é(¤È¤¤¤¦ÄøÆñ²ò¤Ç¤Ï̵¤¯Ê¸¾Ï¼«ÂΤÏÊ¿°×¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤½¤ó¤Ê¤Ë¶ìÏ«¤·¤Ê¤¤¤È»×¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤¬)ÆÉ¤ó¤À¤¢¤¿¤·¤ã¡¼À¹Âç¤Ë¤³¤±¤Þ¤·¤¿¤Î¤Ç¡¢¼êÈ´¤¤·¤ÆÆÉ¤ß¤¿¤±¤ì¤Ð¡ØRecent Developments in Credit Markets¡Ù¤«¤éÆÉ¤à¤Î¤â°ì¤Ä¤Î¼êÃʤǤϤ´¤¶¤¤¤Þ¤¹(¤¿¤À·ë¶ÉÁ°¤ÎÊý¤âÆÉ¤ó¤ÀÊý¤¬ÏäηҤ¬¤ê¤¬È½¤ê¤ä¤¹¤¤¤È»×¤¤¤Þ¤¹)¡£
¡Øsubstantial improvement in the labor market. is that clear to you?¡Ù¤È¼ÁÌ䤵¤ì¤Æ¤«¤é¤Î¥¨¥Ð¥ó¥¹ÁíºÛ¤ÎÀâÌÀ(°Ê²¼transcript¤Î¤Þ¤Þ¤Ç°úÍѤ·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹)¡£
¡Øit's qualitative. i tend to favor quantitative markets. i think that's sufficient. we're out for a run, we're not going to run a marathon. it's about a half marathon. and we're going to see how it feels when we're done. so we're going to keep policy low until the unemployment rate is 6.5%. if we still feel good, you know, with the run, we might go a little bit longer. we'd like to get off to a good start. we're loading with carbs, taking the energy bars we're goingo get this off so the first couple of miles is at a good pace that continues like that.¡Ù
¡Øso the quantitative easing is to we're going to do that until we're clear that the labor market outlook has improved. might be happier, might be a whole year, could be longer. i'm hospital mystic that momentum is going to pick up this year.¡Ù
¡Ølet's talk about what substantial improvement looks like. the last time we met back in october you talked about job growth of 200,000 per month over a six-month period. is that your metric for substantial improvement?¡Ù
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¡Øi think that's a good bench mark.¡Ù
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¡Øi think that's completely achievable. the last three months have averaged 200,000 on payrolls. we need month after month of 200,000. i'd say, for six months, that would be good. but we also need growth above potential that reinforces that labor market improvement. and we need to really see the unemployment rate turn in its direction. it picked up a little bit to 7.9%. we ought to see it moving down. this is really the key, the unemployment rate. there's different things that are effecting the unemployment rate. you have the participation rate. the percentage of those in the workforce who are actually -- population and part of the workforce, that seems to be going down. part of that is because of aging. part of it -- ¡Ù
¡Øhow do you think about the unemployment rate? could you imagine 200 or 300,000 jobs a month but increasing unemployment rate and would that cause you to dial back on stimulus? ¡Ù
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¡Øi think the unemployment rate came down a little more quickly in the last year than we had thought. i think once we start getting growth above trend, clearly above trend, quarter after quarter, the unemployment rate is going to move down, people will be coming back into the labor force but they'll be finding jobs and things will be picking up. so once we get momentum, and we achieve escape velocity either later this year or 2014, i think unemployment will move down with momentum.¡Ù
¡Ødo you have a time period where you think we get to, say 7% unemployment? ¡Ù
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¡Øwell, i've got an outlook, and you know, that outlook has the unemployment rate in the range that you talk about by the end of 2014. in the 7% vicinity. i kind of currently think that 6.5% unemployment isn't going to be achieved until about the middle of 2015. but if things pick up more quickly, you know, that data will appear sooner. we have to talk about the difference between when the fed starts raising interest rates, and when it stops quantitative easing.¡Ù
¡Øthe st. louis fed president says it's about 7%. do you have a point in your mind when the unemployment rate should trigger the end of quantiive easing? ¡Ù
¡Øi've said 200,000 on payroll. that's what i'm looking at. i'd love to see 7% unemployment sooner, rather than later. and moving down. to 7%. i tend to think it might be possible to turn off the quantitative easing. we build moment up and then we're just going to keep going. it's self-sustaining. we wouldn't have to continue to carve up along the run and so that's why we might be able to stop before 7%. bu'm open-minded, and i think that these policies have done a lot of good, auto sales are up. housing is turning the quarter. i think our policies are improving things.¡Ù
¡Øhow much -- running out of time. how much fiscal restraint do you expect to see? ¡Ù
¡Øgo well, that's marked down our forecast. i'm looking for 2.5% growth this year. that's against 1% drag under the current law for fiscal policy, if we had more of a drag this year, that's more of a headwind that might mean that we have to do a little bit more. but i think we've got the appropriate policies in place to respond flexibly to what we're facing. you're going to sit right there.¡Ù
¡ØToronto, Ontario - While transparency is critical to well-functioning capital markets and effective monetary policy, forward policy guidance is best used sparingly by central banks in normal times, Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney said today. In a speech to the Toronto CFA Society, the Governor discussed where policy guidance can be most effective and when it may be warranted.¡Ù
¡Ø¡ÈCentral banks pursue transparency to be accountable in democratic societies,¡É Governor Carney said. Clear, open communications also enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy. Success in this regard requires transparency around what policy-makers are trying to achieve and how they go about achieving it, he added.¡Ù
¡ØOver time, the Bank of Canada has become significantly more transparent in discussing the forces affecting the Canadian economy, in order to help households, firms and financial market participants understand how monetary policy will respond over time. This communication not only promotes the appropriate formation of policy expectations, but allows those expectations to evolve efficiently as new information is received.¡Ù
¡ØThe Bank of Canada occasionally provides guidance in normal times to give a sense of the imminence and degree of prospective policy action, and the important economic and financial factors influencing policy, the Governor said. ¡ÈThis guidance is never a promise, however. Actual policy will always respond to the economic and financial outlook as it evolves. Expectations of policy should do the same.¡É¡Ù
>This guidance is never a promise >This guidance is never a promise >This guidance is never a promise
¡ØMore explicit policy guidance may be most useful in extraordinary times, Governor Carney noted. For instance, in April 2009, when conventional monetary policy had been exhausted, the Bank of Canada provided additional stimulus by committing to hold the policy rate at its lowest possible level, conditional on the outlook for inflation. ¡ÈOur conditional commitment worked because it was exceptional, explicit and anchored in a highly credible inflation-targeting framework,¡É he said.¡Ù
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¡ØCentral banks needing to go further could also publicly announce precise numerical thresholds for inflation and unemployment. If additional stimulus were required, a framework change, such as adopting a nominal GDP-level target, may be worthy of consideration, Governor Carney said. He cautioned, however, that ¡Èthe benefits of such a regime change would have to be weighed carefully against the effectiveness of other unconventional monetary policy measures under the proven, flexible inflation-targeting framework.¡É¡Ù
¡ØIt continued to be difficult to get a sense of the underlying strength of growth in the United Kingdom. Employment growth had remained firm and revisions to official statistics had suggested that growth in manufacturing and services sector output, abstracting from the impact of one-off events, had been relatively stable at around 0.3% per quarter during the first three quarters of 2012. But recent information from both monthly official data and business surveys had been conflicting. Moreover, the unwind from the Olympic Games was expected to depress headline GDP growth significantly in the fourth quarter.¡Ù
¡ØThere had been some evidence that credit conditions were easing as lower bank funding costs began to pass through to lower loan rates.¡Ù
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¡ØThese developments were broadly in line with expectations of how the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) would operate in its early stages.¡Ù
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¡ØAnd the Bank¡Çs Credit Conditions Survey had pointed to expectations of a further easing that could help support lending and demand over the course of the year. There had been evidence of a slight improvement in investment intentions that might herald a more broad-based pickup in business investment.¡Ù
¡ØNevertheless, substantial headwinds to recovery remained, including the drag to activity from fiscal consolidation, a further squeeze in household real incomes, and the deterioration in UK competitiveness over the past couple of years. Indeed, the existence of a significant current account deficit at a time of subdued activity and spare capacity suggested that the sterling real exchange rate might be above the level compatible with the necessary rebalancing of the economy.¡Ù
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¡ØAs with activity, there had been little news to cause the Committee to revise its view of the outlook for inflation.¡Ù
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¡ØInflation was a little above the 2% target, and was likely to remain so in the near term. Wage growth had remained subdued and, while productivity growth was also weak, the Committee¡Çs central view remained that productivity growth would pick up as the economy expanded.¡Ù
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¡ØBut there remained a question as to whether this would put sufficient downward pressure on unit labour costs and market price inflation to offset the effect of rising regulated and administered prices. Intelligence concerning the business services sector from the Bank¡Çs Agents had found some grounds for expecting productivity growth to pick up as the economy recovered. But there was a risk that any recovery in productivity would result in higher wage demands, rather than lowering firms¡Ç costs, and so would not deliver the necessary downward pressure on market price inflation.¡Ù
¡ØThe Committee discussed how further monetary stimulus could be delivered, should it be warranted, and the effectiveness of additional asset purchases.¡Ù
¡ØWhile it was too soon to assess the full impact of the FLS in supporting lending and wider economic activity, the early signs within the banking sector were encouraging. There was also considerable further scope for asset purchases to lower long-term yields on government and corporate debt and support other asset prices.¡Ù
¡ØBut there remained uncertainty about their impact on nominal demand, and they might prove less effective in boosting real output when resources needed to be shifted between sectors and while the banking system was constrained.¡Ù
¡ØDevelopments on the month had been modestly positive, increasing the confidence of most members that the outlook was broadly as described in the November Inflation Report. While these developments had not substantially altered the balance of risks associated with maintaining and increasing the size of the monetary stimulus, they had strengthened the belief of some of these members that no further asset purchases were required at the current juncture.¡Ù
¡ØInflation remained above target at 2.7% and some of the factors currently contributing to higher inflation, resulting from administered or controlled sources, were likely to persist through the current year and beyond.¡Ù
¡ØThere was a risk that the prospect of continued above-target inflation could result in an erosion of credibility in the monetary policy framework which could affect wage and price setting behaviour.¡Ù
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¡ØAgainst that, growth remained subdued and the economy continued to face a number of headwinds that would squeeze real incomes. Moreover, there was likely to be some excess capacity and some members put weight on the possibility that output could be expanded without generating much additional inflationary pressure. On balance, most members judged that it was not necessary at this meeting to change either Bank Rate or the size of the asset purchase programme in order to meet the inflation target in the medium term.¡Ù
ËÜÆü¤â½ôÈ̤λö¾ð¤ÇÃî´³¤·´ë²è¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç1·îµÄ»öÍ׻ݡ£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] contribution of net trade to UK economic growth since the large depreciation of sterling in 2007 and 2008 had continued to be disappointing.¡Ù
¡ØWhile it had contributed 0.5 percentage points to GDP growth in the third quarter, net trade had made a small negative contribution over the preceding year as a whole. The lack of a more significant improvement in the trade performance of the UK economy could partly be explained by slow growth overseas, although there was little evidence that UK exporters were disproportionately reliant on more slowly growing markets.¡Ù
¡ØIt was also the case that measures of the real exchange rate had appreciated since the end of 2008 as UK costs and prices had risen by more than in other countries and the nominal exchange rate had appreciated somewhat.¡Ù
¡ØReceipts of net property income from abroad had weakened and the latest estimates suggested that the current account deficit had been 3.3% of nominal GDP in 2012 Q3.¡Ù
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¡ØThe existence of a significant current account deficit at a time of depressed activity and considerable spare capacity could imply that the sterling real exchange rate was higher than the level compatible with external balance.¡Ù
¡ØTwelve-month food and non-alcoholic beverage inflation had been 3.9% in November, somewhat higher than its long run average, driven largely by higher agricultural commodity prices. There was a concern that recent poor weather was likely to affect future harvests and push up further on food prices. But the effect of higher agricultural commodity prices on food price inflation was likely to be relatively muted so long as the costs of food processing and distribution remained stable. Agricultural commodity prices had fallen a little in recent months, although they remained high and vulnerable to further shocks.¡Ù
¡ØEmployment had continued to grow, rising by 40,000 in the three months to October, compared with the three months to July, despite only a modest increase in underlying activity. There remained a considerable shortfall in productivity relative to the level implied by a continuation of its pre-crisis trend. Understanding the factors behind that shortfall, which had built up to around 15% of the level of productivity since the onset of the crisis, and was outside past experience, remained a key challenge.¡Ù
¡ØThe international evidence suggested that the shortfall was larger in the United Kingdom than most other developed countries. A central policy issue was whether productivity would pick up, and the shortfall get smaller, as aggregate demand expanded. Intelligence concerning the business services sector from the Bank¡Çs Agents had indicated that some of the productivity weakness might indeed dissipate if demand picked up.¡Ù
¡ØContacts had suggested that one of the reasons that employment had remained buoyant was that companies found winning and delivering work was more resource intensive in an environment of persistently weak demand. Some companies had retained staff in the light of persistent expectations of a return to more normal demand growth. Both of these factors were likely to dampen the amount by which employment would need to increase when demand eventually picked up, suggesting that some of the productivity shortfall was likely to be temporary.¡Ù
¡ØNevertheless, contacts had identified other factors, such as client expectations of higher service levels and more frequent tendering for work, that were likely to persist, so that not all of the productivity shortfall was expected to be recouped when demand eventually recovered.¡Ù