¹Ö±é¤Î¥Õ¥ë¥Æ¥¥¹¥È¤Ï¤³¤Á¤é¤Ë¤Ê¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤¬¡¢ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] in New York, Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren said that underlying trends suggest "an economy that risks pushing past what is sustainable, raising the probability of higher asset prices, or inflation well above the Federal Reserve's 2 percent target."¡Ù
¤â¤È¤Î·ÐºÑ¤Î´ðÄ´¤Ï¥µ¥¹¥Æ¥¤¥Ê¥Ö¥ë¤Ë2%ʪ²ÁÌÜɸãÀ®¤¹¤ë¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤Ë²Ã¤¨¤Æ¡Öraising the probability of higher asset prices,¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬¤¢¤ëÌõ¤Ç¤¹¤è¤³¤ì¤¬¤Þ¤¿¡£
¡Ø"Steps lowering the probability of such an outcome seem advisable - in other words, seem like insurance worth taking out at this time," he said. "As a result, it is my view that regular and gradual removal of monetary accommodation seems appropriate."¡Ù
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¡ØNoting that the weakness in inflation readings appears to be transitory, Rosengren said "the declines in the unemployment rate below the level most see as sustainable seem likely to be more long-lasting."¡Ù
¡Ø"Discerning the underlying trends in unemployment and inflation - looking through transitory effects - is likely to be quite difficult in coming months," Rosengren said, citing the impact of recent hurricanes on economic data.¡Ù
¡ØIn addition, Rosengren noted that the Federal Reserve's dual mandate indicators - employment and inflation - are sending somewhat conflicting signals of late: labor markets have continued to improve, yet inflation has slipped down a notch this year.¡Ù
¡ØAsking how policymakers might resolve the conflicting signals when "the central bank's dual mandate is 'dueling,'" Rosengren explored the forecasts of both central bankers and private forecasters. Both suggest that by the end of next year, inflation is expected to be close to target, while the unemployment rate will continue to fall - and as a result, will move further below most estimates of a sustainable unemployment rate.¡Ù
¡Ø"This outcome poses risks - specifically that an overheated economy will lead to price or asset-price inflation, risking the sustainability of the recovery," Rosengren said.¡Ù
¡ØRosengren noted that low inflation readings are viewed as transitory by both FOMC participants and private-sector forecasters. In contrast, Rosengren noted that most forecasters see the recent low readings for unemployment as persistent, and they envision additional declines on average.¡Ù
¡Ø"While such forecasts are still of course subject to errors - possibly even significant ones - I believe policymakers should not overreact to low current inflation readings that are widely expected to be temporary," he said.¡Ù
¡Ø"In my view, appropriate risk mitigation would argue for continued gradual removal of monetary accommodation, even though we are currently below the inflation target."¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] 28, 2017 The Independent Bank of England--20 Years On Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer At "20 Years On," a conference sponsored by the Bank of England, London, England
¡ØThe Financial Stability Responsibility of the Central Bank¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦¼Â¼ÁºÇ¸å¤Î¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤«¤é¡£
¡ØThe financial stability responsibility of the central bank is one that has been subject to considerable institutional change over the past two decades. Until 1997, the Bank of England had wide supervisory and regulatory powers. With the reforms of the late 1990s, the Bank had a deputy governor responsible for financial stability, but regulatory powers were largely moved to a different institution, the Financial Services Authority (FSA).¡Ù
¡ØA decade later, the financial crisis demonstrated that financial imbalances can ultimately endanger macroeconomic stability and highlighted the need for enhanced central bank oversight of the financial system. In the post-crisis era, the FSA became two separate regulatory authorities, one of which--the Prudential Regulation Authority, created in 2012--is part of the Bank of England.¡Ù
¡ØIn effect, regulatory powers have largely returned to the Bank. It is fair to say that the Bank was initially glad to cede many of its financial powers, but that it was later even more glad to have those powers restored.¡Ù
¡ØFinancial supervision has also been reformed in the United States in light of the crisis. The Federal Reserve, which always had regulatory powers, received enhanced authority and devoted more resources to financial stability.29 In both countries, it remains the case that not all financial stability responsibilities rest with the central bank--so it is less independent in this area than in monetary policy proper--and that the central bank's tools for achieving financial stability are still being refined.¡Ù
¡ØIndeed, as I have noted previously, a major concern of mine is that the U.S. macroprudential toolkit is not large and not yet battle tested.30¡Ù
¡ØThe Federal Reserve and the Bank of England benefit from each other's experience as they develop and improve arrangements to meet their financial stability responsibilities. One major innovation that deserves mention is that the Bank of England has two policy committees: Alongside the MPC is the Financial Policy Committee (FPC). Although they coordinate and have partially overlapping memberships, the MPC and FPC are distinct committees.¡Ù
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¡ØWhy have both the MPC and the FPC? I offer a few possible reasons. First, not all of a central bank's responsibilities typically rest with its monetary committee. This is true not only of the Bank of England, but also of the Federal Reserve: Our financial egulatory authority resides in the Board of Governors, not the FOMC. Second, aggregate monetary policy tools are often blunt weapons against financial imbalances, so deploying them might produce a conflict between financial stability and short-term economic stabilization. Macroprudential tools may be more direct and more appropriate for fostering financial stability.31 Third, financial policy might need less frequent adjustment than monetary policy. Perhaps reflecting this judgment, the FPC meets quarterly, which contrasts with the MPC's eight meetings a year.32 The lower frequency of meetings may also reflect the desirability of a relatively stable regulatory structure; financial tools likely should not be as continuously data dependent as monetary policy tools.¡Ù
¡ØIt is clear that the U.K. institutional framework for the preservation of financial stability has much to be said for it. But it also seems clear that there is no uniquely optimal set-up of the framework for the maintenance of financial stability that is independent of the size and scale of the financial system of the country or of its political and financial history.¡Ù
¡ØIt has been more than 20 years since the Bank of England celebrated its 300th birthday with a conference focused on central bank independence. Since then, central banks' operating frameworks have undergone substantial changes, many in response to the financial crisis. But the case for monetary policy independence set out in the 1990s remains sound, and Bank of England monetary policy independence is now widely accepted in the United Kingdom, as it long has been in the United States. It is also clear that central bank responsibilities other than policy rate decisions--specifically, the lender-of-last-resort function and financial stability--are closely connected with monetary policy and that these responsibilities play a prominent role in macroeconomic stabilization.¡Ù
¡ØLet me conclude by observing that, while the crisis and its aftermath motivated central banks to reappraise and adapt their tools, institutions, and thinking, future challenges will doubtless prompt further reforms.33 Or, if I may be permitted a few final words on my way out the door, the watchwords of the central banker should be "Semper vigilans," because history and financial markets are masters of the art of surprise, and "Never say never," because you will sometimes find yourself having to do things that you never thought you would.¡Ù
¹Ö±é¤Ë´Ø¤·¤Æ¤Î¥µ¥Þ¥ê¡¼¤Ï¤³¤Á¤é [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Recent data indicate that U.S. real GDP growth remains consistent with the low-growth regime of recent years. ¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡o Hurricane effects will add uncertainty to the interpretation of¡¡macroeconomic data in the months ahead.
¡¦ U.S. inflation has surprised to the downside in recent months, and the surprise is unlikely to reverse during 2017.
¡¦ Low unemployment readings are probably not an indicator of meaningfully higher inflation over the forecast horizon.
¡¦ The current level of the policy rate is appropriate given current macroeconomic data.¡Ù
#²¿ÅÙ¤«¥Í¥¿¤Ë¤â¤·¤Þ¤·¤¿¤±¤ì¤É¤âÍ̾¤Ê¤Î¤Ï¤³¤ì¤Ç¤¹ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Faces of ¡ÈThe Peril¡É FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2010 (ÆÉ¤ó¤Ç¤Ê¤¤Êý¤Ï¤Þ¤¢¹Í¤¨Êý¤È¤·¤ÆÌÌÇò¤¤¤Î¤ÇÀ§Èó°ìÆÉ¤µ¤ì¤¿¤¤¡¢¤´Í÷¤Î¤È¤ª¤ê¤Ç2010ǯ¤Îʪ·ï¤Ç¤¹)
¹Ö±é¤Ï¤³¤Á¤é [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] 26, 2017 Inflation, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy Chair Janet L. Yellen At the "Prospects for Growth: Reassessing the Fundamentals" 59th Annual Meeting of the National Association for Business Economics, Cleveland, Ohio
¹Ö±é¤Ï¤³¤Á¤é [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Conditions, Policy, and the Future
Raphael Bostic President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Atlanta Press Club Commerce Club Atlanta, GA September 26, 2017
¤¢¤È¥Ö¥ì¥¤¥Ê¡¼¥ÉÍý»ö¤Î¹Ö±é¤â¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] 26, 2017 Why Persistent Employment Disparities Matter for the Economy's Health Governor Lael Brainard At "Disparities in the Labor Market: What Are We Missing?" a research conference sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.
ʪ·ï¤Ï¤³¤ì¤Ç¤¹¤Ê¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] for the Local Economy and the Importance of Workforce Development September 25, 2017 William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer Remarks at Onondaga Community College, Syracuse, New York
ʪ·ï¤Ï¤³¤Á¤é [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] Updated: 09/25/17 The Puzzle of Low Inflation: Implications for Monetary Policy A speech prepared for the Economic Club of Grand Rapids in Grand Rapids, MI, on September 25, 2017.
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in July indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been rising moderately so far this year.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØInformation received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been rising moderately so far this year.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
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¡ØJob gains have remained solid in recent months, and the unemployment rate has stayed low. Household spending has been expanding at a moderate rate, and growth in business fixed investment has picked up in recent quarters.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØJob gains have been solid, on average, since the beginning of the year, and the unemployment rate has declined. Household spending and business fixed investment have continued to expand.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØOn a 12-month basis, overall inflation and the measure excluding food and energy prices have declined this year and are running below 2 percent. Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØOn a 12-month basis, overall inflation and the measure excluding food and energy prices have declined and are running below 2 percent. Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØConsistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability.¡Ù(º£²ó) ¡ØConsistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
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¡ØHurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria have devastated many communities, inflicting severe hardship. Storm-related disruptions and rebuilding will affect economic activity in the near term, but past experience suggests that the storms are unlikely to materially alter the course of the national economy over the medium term.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØConsequently, the Committee continues to expect that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace, and labor market conditions will strengthen somewhat further.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØThe Committee continues to expect that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace, and labor market conditions will strengthen somewhat further.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
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¡ØHigher prices for gasoline and some other items in the aftermath of the hurricanes will likely boost inflation temporarily; apart from that effect, inflation on a 12-month basis is expected to remain somewhat below 2 percent in the near term but to stabilize around the Committee's 2 percent objective over the medium term.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØInflation on a 12-month basis is expected to remain somewhat below 2 percent in the near term but to stabilize around the Committee's 2 percent objective over the medium term.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØNear-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced, but the Committee is monitoring inflation developments closely.¡Ù(º£²ó) ¡ØNear-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced, but the Committee is monitoring inflation developments closely.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØIn view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1 to 1-1/4 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2 percent inflation.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØIn view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1 to 1-1/4 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2 percent inflation.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØIn determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØIn determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¡ØIn October, the Committee will initiate the balance sheet normalization program described in the June 2017 Addendum to the Committee's Policy Normalization Principles and Plans.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØFor the time being, the Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The Committee expects to begin implementing its balance sheet normalization program relatively soon, provided that the economy evolves broadly as anticipated; this program is described in the June 2017 Addendum to the Committee's Policy Normalization Principles and Plans.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
¥Ú¡¼¥¹¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤Ï [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] 20, 2017 Implementation Note issued September 20, 2017
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¡ØEffective in October 2017, the Committee directs the Desk to roll over at auction the amount of principal payments from the Federal Reserve's holdings of Treasury securities maturing during each calendar month that exceeds $6 billion, and to reinvest in agency mortgage-backed securities the amount of principal payments from the Federal Reserve's holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities received during each calendar month that exceeds $4 billion. Small deviations from these amounts for operational reasons are acceptable.¡Ù
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¡ØVoting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; Charles L. Evans; Stanley Fischer; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; Neel Kashkari; and Jerome H. Powell.¡Ù(º£²ó)
¡ØVoting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; Charles L. Evans; Stanley Fischer; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; Neel Kashkari; and Jerome H. Powell.¡Ù(Á°²ó)
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] 05, 2017 Understanding the Disconnect between Employment and Inflation with a Low Neutral Rate Governor Lael Brainard At The Economic Club of New York New York, New York
¡ØThere is no single highly reliable measure of that underlying trend or the closely associated notion of longer-run inflation expectations. Nonetheless, a variety of measures suggest underlying trend inflation may currently be lower than it was before the crisis, contributing to the ongoing shortfall of inflation from our objective.¡Ù
¡ØThat conclusion is suggested by estimates based on time-series models, longer-run expectations from the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers and Survey of Professional Forecasters, and market-based measures of inflation compensation.¡Ù
¡ØWhy might underlying inflation expectations have moved down since the financial crisis? One simple explanation may be the experience of persistently low inflation: Households and firms have experienced a prolonged period of inflation below our objective, and that may be affecting their perception of underlying inflation.¡Ù
¥¤¥ó¥Õ¥ì´üÂÔ¤¬²¼¤¬¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë·ï¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¡¢°ì¤Ä¤Î¥·¥ó¥×¥ë¤ÊÀâÌÀ¤È¤·¤Æ¡Öthe experience of persistently low inflation¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¡ÖŬ¹çŪ´üÂÔ·ÁÀ®¡×¤ÎÏ䬻פ¤¤Ã¤¤ê½Ð¤Æ¤¤¤ë½ê¤¬Ã桹̣¤ï¤¤¤¬¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØA related explanation may be the greater proximity of the federal funds rate to its effective lower bound due to a lower neutral rate of interest.6 By constraining the amount of policy space available to offset adverse developments using our more effective conventional tools, the low neutral rate could increase the likely frequency of periods of below-trend inflation. In short, frequent or extended periods of low inflation run the risk of pulling down private-sector inflation expectations.7¡Ù
¡ØGiven today's circumstances, with the economy near full employment and inflation below target, how should the FOMC achieve its dual-mandate goals?¡Ù
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¡ØSome might determine that preemptive tightening is appropriate on the grounds that monetary policy operates with long lags, and inflation will inevitably accelerate as the labor market continues to tighten because of the Phillips curve. However, in today's economy, there are reasons to worry that the Phillips curve will not prove very reliable in boosting inflation as resource utilization tightens. Since 2012, inflation has tended to change relatively little as the unemployment rate has fallen considerably, from 8.2 percent to 4.4 percent.8 In short, the Phillips curve appears to be flatter today than it was previously.9 This is also apparent in a number of advanced foreign economies, where declines in their unemployment rates to relatively low levels have failed to generate significant upward pressures on inflation.10¡Ù
¡ØGiven the flatness of the Phillips curve, it could take a considerable undershooting of the natural rate of unemployment to achieve our inflation objective if we were to rely on resource utilization alone.¡Ù
¡ØFor all these reasons, achieving our inflation target on a sustainable basis is likely to require a firming in longer-run inflation expectations--that is, the underlying trend. The key question in my mind is how to achieve an improvement in longer-run inflation expectations to a level that will allow us to achieve our inflation objective. The persistent failure to meet our inflation objective should push us to think broadly about diagnoses and solutions.¡Ù
¡ØThe academic literature on monetary policy suggests a variety of prescriptions for preventing a lower neutral rate of interest from eroding longer-run inflation expectations.11 One feature that is common to many proposals is that the persistence of the shortfall in inflation from our objective should be one of the considerations in setting monetary policy. Most immediately, we should assess inflation developments closely before making a determination on further adjustments to the federal funds rate.¡Ù
¡ØThe Bank of England¡Çs Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) sets monetary policy to meet the 2% inflation target, and in a way that helps to sustain growth and employment. At its meeting ending on 13 September 2017, the MPC voted by a majority of 7-2 to maintain Bank Rate at 0.25%. The Committee voted unanimously to maintain the stock of sterling non-financial investment-grade corporate bond purchases, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, at ¡ò10 billion. The Committee voted unanimously to maintain the stock of UK government bond purchases, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, at ¡ò435 billion.¡Ù
¡ØThe MPC set out its most recent assessment of the outlook for inflation and activity in the August Inflation Report. That assessment depended importantly on three main judgments: that the lower level of sterling continues to boost consumer prices broadly as projected, and without adverse consequences for inflation expectations further ahead; that regular pay growth remains modest in the near term but picks up over the forecast period; and that subdued household spending growth is largely balanced by a pickup in other components of demand.¡Ù
¡ØSince the August Report, the relatively limited news on activity points, if anything, to a slightly stronger picture than anticipated. GDP rose by 0.3% in the second quarter, as expected in the MPC¡Çs August projections, although initial estimates of private final demand were softer than anticipated.¡Ù
¡ØThe unemployment rate has continued to decline, to 4.3%, its lowest in over 40 years and a little lower than forecast in August. Survey indicators are consistent with continued strength in employment growth. Evidence continues to accumulate that the rate of potential supply growth has slowed in recent years. Overall, the latest indicators are consistent with UK demand growing a little in excess of this diminished rate of potential supply growth, and the continued erosion of what is now a fairly limited degree of spare capacity. Underlying pay growth has shown some signs of recovery, albeit remaining modest.¡Ù
¡ØThe sterling exchange rate has been volatile and the price of oil has increased. Headline and core CPI inflation in August were slightly higher than anticipated. Twelve-month CPI inflation rose to 2.9% and is now expected to rise to above 3% in October. ¡Ù
¡ØThe circumstances since the referendum on EU membership, and the accompanying depreciation of sterling, have been exceptional. Monetary policy cannot prevent either the necessary real adjustment as the United Kingdom moves towards its new international trading arrangements-or the weaker real income growth that is likely to accompany that adjustment over the next few years.¡Ù
¡ØThe MPC¡Çs remit specifies that, in such exceptional circumstances, the Committee must balance any trade-off between the speed at which it intends to return inflation sustainably to the target and the support that monetary policy provides to jobs and activity.¡Ù
¡ØRecent developments suggest that remaining spare capacity in the economy is being absorbed a little more rapidly than expected at the time of the August Report, and that inflation remains likely to overshoot the 2% target over the next three years.¡Ù
¡ØAll MPC members continue to judge that, if the economy follows a path broadly consistent with the August Inflation Report central projection, then monetary policy could need to be tightened by a somewhat greater extent over the forecast period than current market expectations.¡Ù
¡ØA majority of MPC members judge that, if the economy continues to follow a path consistent with the prospect of a continued erosion of slack and a gradual rise in underlying inflationary pressure then, with the further lessening in the trade-off that this would imply, some withdrawal of monetary stimulus is likely to be appropriate over the coming months in order to return inflation sustainably to target.¡Ù
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¡ØAll members agree that any prospective increases in Bank Rate would be expected to be at a gradual pace and to a limited extent. ¡Ù
¡ØAt this month¡Çs meeting, seven members thought that the current policy stance remained appropriate to balance the demands of the MPC¡Çs remit. Two members considered it appropriate to increase Bank Rate by 25 basis points. The Committee will undertake a full assessment of recent developments in the context of its November Inflation Report and accompanying economic projections.¡Ù
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¡ØThere remain considerable risks to the outlook, which include the response of households, businesses and financial markets to developments related to the process of EU withdrawal. The MPC will respond to these developments as they occur insofar as they affect the behaviour of households and businesses, and the outlook for inflation. The Committee will continue to monitor closely the incoming evidence on these and other developments, and stands ready to respond to changes in the economic outlook as they unfold to ensure a sustainable return of inflation to the 2% target.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] 05, 2017 Understanding the Disconnect between Employment and Inflation with a Low Neutral Rate Governor Lael Brainard At The Economic Club of New York New York, New York
¡ØTo what extent does it make sense to look through the recent low inflation readings on the grounds they are transitory? It appears that temporary factors, such as discounted cell phone plans, are pushing down inflation to some extent this year. By the same token, it is likely that other temporary factors--for example, prescription drug prices--boosted inflation last year. Going forward, we should see a temporary boost to headline inflation due to Hurricane Harvey's effect on gasoline prices that I mentioned earlier. Temporary factors, by their nature, have little implication for the underlying trend in inflation.¡Ù
¡ØIn contrast, what is troubling is five straight years in which inflation fell short of our target despite a sharp improvement in resource utilization.¡Ù
¡ØIt is instructive to put the shortfall in inflation in recent years in perspective by comparing inflation in the past few years with the last time the economy was in the neighborhood of full employment--namely, just before the financial crisis. In particular, over the past three years, unemployment has averaged roughly 5 percent. Similarly, over the three years ending in early 2007--before the unemployment rate started rising--the unemployment rate also averaged 5 percent. Despite a similar degree of resource utilization, core inflation averaged 2.2 percent from 2004 to 2007, notably higher than the comparable three-year average inflation rate today of 1.5 percent.¡Ù
¡ØWhy is inflation so much lower now than it was previously? The fact that the period from 2004 to 2007 had inflation around target with similar unemployment rates casts some doubt on the likelihood that resource utilization is the primary explanation.3 Similarly, a 12-quarter average is typically long enough that temporary factors should not be the dominant concern.¡Ù
¡ØOne key factor that may have played a role in the past three years is the decline in import prices, reflecting the dollar's surge, especially in 2015. By contrast, in the 2004?07 period, non-oil import prices increased at roughly a 2 percent annual rate and had a more neutral effect on inflation. Nonetheless, while the decline in non-oil import prices likely accounts for some of the weakness in inflation over the past few years, these prices have begun rising again in the past year at a time when inflation remains relatively low.¡Ù
¡ØSo if import prices, resource utilization, and transitory factors together do not provide a complete account, why has inflation been so much lower in the past few years than it was previously?¡Ù
¤Û¤¦¤Û¤¦¤½¤ì¤Ç¤½¤ì¤Ç?
¡ØIn many of the models economists use to analyze inflation, a key feature is "underlying," or trend, inflation, which is believed to anchor the rate of inflation over a fairly long horizon. Underlying inflation can be thought of as the slow-moving trend that exerts a strong pull on wage and price setting and is often viewed as related to some notion of longer-run inflation expectations.¡Ù
¡ØThere is no single highly reliable measure of that underlying trend or the closely associated notion of longer-run inflation expectations. Nonetheless, a variety of measures suggest underlying trend inflation may currently be lower than it was before the crisis, contributing to the ongoing shortfall of inflation from our objective.¡Ù
¡ØThat conclusion is suggested by estimates based on time-series models, longer-run expectations from the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers and Survey of Professional Forecasters, and market-based measures of inflation compensation.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] U.S. Economic Outlook and the Implications for Monetary Policy September 07, 2017 William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer Remarks at Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City
¡ØIn thinking about the decision to reduce the size of the Fed¡Çs balance sheet, I see two important, opposing factors.¡Ù
¡ØOne is that a large balance sheet could conceivably make further asset purchases less attractive. This factor suggests that we should use the opportunity to shrink the balance sheet during good economic times so that this tool will be fully available to us in the future if necessary. However, on the other side, reducing the size of the balance sheet is another form of monetary tightening, one with which we have little experience. This suggests we should proceed with caution. The FOMC has judged that a gradual, predictable approach to normalization is the best way to appropriately balance these two factors.¡Ù
¡ØAnother question is how long the normalization process will take. Assuming that this process begins later this year and continues uninterrupted, the balance sheet size would likely normalize in the early part of the next decade.4¡Ù
¡ØThere is uncertainty about the exact timing for several reasons. We don¡Çt know how fast our agency MBS holdings will pre-pay, how quickly currency outstanding will grow, how many bank reserves will be required for the efficient execution of monetary policy, or the evolution of other liability items on the Fed¡Çs balance sheet that affect the amount of bank reserves.¡Ù
¡ØAgainst that backdrop, one major issue that remains outstanding is whether the Fed will continue to operate with a ¡Èfloor¡É system, in which the Fed maintains a relatively abundant supply of reserves and the effective federal funds rate is managed by periodic adjustments to the interest rate the Fed pays on bank reserves.¡Ù
¡ØOr, whether the Fed will move back to a ¡Ècorridor¡É system, in which reserves are relatively scarce and the effective federal funds rate is managed by frequently adjusting the supply of reserves to meet demand at the desired federal funds rate level.¡Ù
¡ØIn this type of regime, it is the quantity of reserves, rather than the interest rate the Fed pays on reserves, that is the primary driver of the federal funds rate.5¡Ù
¡ØHaving managed the System Open Market Account during the financial crisis-a period during which the demand for reserves was very volatile-I very much favor a floor-type system.¡Ù
¡ØIt is much easier to manage on a day-to-day basis. It also eliminates the need for a lot of interbank trading activity to move reserves to banks that would otherwise find themselves short of reserves on a particular day. In my view, this type of intermediation activity does not have much social value.¡Ù
¡ØWhile the FOMC has discussed these issues, it has made no decision about its choice of long-term monetary policy operating framework. This seems appropriate to me because over the next few years we will gain considerable further experience about operating with a floor-type system.¡Ù
¡ØNevertheless, my expectation is that the FOMC will ultimately favor maintaining a floor-type system similar to what is in place today. As support, I would point to the minutes of the November 2016 FOMC meeting, in which participants observed that the current framework had been working well.¡Ù
¡ØThis leads us to the next question: Assuming that a floor system is retained, what amount of reserves will be needed in the banking system so that day-to-day open market operations are not necessary to keep the federal funds rate within its target range? In other words, how small can the amount of excess reserves be before banks begin to compete and bid for such reserves, introducing unwanted volatility to the federal funds rate?¡Ù
¡ØFirst, there will need to be sufficient excess reserves to accommodate day-to-day fluctuations in the ¡Èautonomous factors¡É that influence the amount of reserves in the banking system. These include shifts in the Treasury¡Çs cash balance, the foreign repo pool, and overnight reverse repo facility usage. Second, there will have to be an additional buffer to meet banks¡Ç underlying demand for reserves. We expect that the demand for reserves will be considerably higher than it was prior to the financial crisis because reserves can be used to satisfy the more stringent liquidity requirements that are in place today, and because the opportunity cost of holding reserves is much lower now since the Fed pays interest on reserves.¡Ù
¡ØTogether, as a rough starting point, we have suggested that the necessary amount of excess reserves could be in a range of $400 billion to $1 trillion.6 Coupled with uncertainty about the likely growth in other factors, such as currency outstanding, this implies a normalized balance sheet size of, perhaps, $2.4 trillion to $3.5 trillion in the early 2020s.¡Ù
¡ØAfter reaching that level, one should anticipate that the Fed would resume purchases of Treasury securities. These purchases would allow the balance sheet to expand to accommodate the growth in currency outstanding and in banks¡Ç demand for reserves as the economy grows. They also would make up for ongoing paydowns of the agency MBS that remain in our portfolio. ¡Ù
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¡ØAlthough there is considerable uncertainty about the long-run size of the Fed¡Çs balance sheet, I would stress that the balance sheet is likely to shrink by much less than it grew between 2007 and 2014. Based on New York Fed staff projections, I would expect the Fed¡Çs balance sheet, which currently stands at $4.5 trillion, to shrink by roughly $1 trillion to $2 trillion. This compares to an increase of about $3.7 trillion in the wake of the financial crisis. This is another reason why I anticipate that the impact of balance sheet normalization on financial markets is likely to be quite mild. This view is supported by empirical research carried out within the Fed7 and is consistent with the results of surveys of private sector economists, including the Survey of Primary Dealers and the Survey of Market Participants conducted by the New York Fed¡Çs Markets Group.8¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] transmission of the ECB¡Çs monetary policy in standard and non-standard times
Speech by Benoit Coure, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the workshop ¡ÈMonetary policy in non-standard times¡É, Frankfurt am Main, 11 September 2017
ºÇ½é¤Î¥¹¥é¥¤¥É¤Î¤Þ¤¨¤Ë¡ØA state-dependent exchange rate pass-through¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤¬¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢ËÜʸ¤â¡ØLet me start with the exchange rate channel - a channel that has been heavily debated in recent months in the light of the large movements that we have observed in the foreign exchange market.¡Ù¤È¤«¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¡¢¤¤¤¤Ê¤ê¶âÍ»À¯ºö¤Î°ÙÂØ»Ô¾ì·Ðͳ¤Ç¤ÎÇȵڸú²Ì¤È¤«¸À¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ëÊդ꤬¤ªÞ¯Íî¡£
¡ØSlide 5 illustrates the implications of this shock decomposition for the assessment of the exchange rate pass-through. The black line, which is the net effect, suggests relatively mild downward pressure on core inflation, much below what the rule of thumb would tend to suggest, despite the sizeable appreciation.¡Ù
¡ØThe reason is simple. The current solid economic expansion in the euro area allows firms that export to the euro area to increase prices in their currency without losing market share, thereby mitigating, once again, the pass-through.¡Ù
¤Ç¤â¤Ã¤Æ2ÈÖÌܤξ®¸«½Ð¤·¤¬¡ØThe New Keynesian IS curve in the euro area¡Ù¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤¤Ê¤ê¥Ë¥å¡¼¥±¥¤¥ó¥¸¥¢¥ó¤È¤Ê¤È¤¤¤¦½ê¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¡ØThis brings me to the second channel I would like to discuss this morning: the effects of monetary policy on real economic activity.¡Ù¤È¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¥¹¥é¥¤¥É7¤ÇʬÀÏ·ë²Ì¤¬½Ð¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤³¤ì¤ÏËÜʸ¤ò¤Á¤ã¤ó¤ÈÆÉ¤Þ¤Ê¤¤¤È¥¤¥Þ¥¤¥ÁÎɤ¯Ê¬¤«¤é¤ó¤Î¤Ç¥Ñ¥¹¡£
With this¤Ã¤Æ¸À¤Ã¤Æ¤âÅÓÃæ¤òÁ´Éô¤È¤Ð¤·¤Á¤ã¤¤¤Þ¤·¤¿¤¹¤¤¤Þ¤»¤ó¤¹¤¤¤Þ¤»¤ó¡£
¡ØThe negative relationship between the real interest rate gap and economic activity as posited by Wicksell back in 1898 is a mainstay of modern central banking. This relationship has not been lost with the advent of unconventional monetary policy measures. By easing market-based financial conditions, and by putting downward pressure on the real interest rate that banks charge to borrowers, central banks can stimulate aggregate demand, even when short-term interest rates approach the effective lower bound.¡Ù
¡ØThe validity of this relationship is also crucial for assessing the price effects of monetary policy-induced movements of the exchange rate. With policy being effective in boosting growth, any disinflationary effect of a stronger currency arising from expectations of a tighter future monetary policy stance might be mitigated, or offset, by the ensuing improvement in the economic outlook.¡Ù
¡ØHowever, exogenous shocks to the exchange rate, if persistent, can lead to an unwarranted tightening of financial conditions with undesirable consequences for the inflation outlook.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] U.S. Economic Outlook and the Implications for Monetary Policy September 07, 2017 William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer Remarks at Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City
¡ØAs I see it, a few questions about this program remain and are worth addressing. The first question is why do this at all. After all, the Fed has had a large balance sheet for many years now. In my view, the balance sheet expansion was undertaken in response to an extraordinary set of circumstances-a deep recession, short-term interest rates at the zero lower bound, and the economy far away from our dual mandate objectives.¡Ù
¡ØNow that these circumstances no longer hold, it seems appropriate to begin to reduce the size of the Fed¡Çs balance sheet.¡Ù
¡ØIn thinking about the decision to reduce the size of the Fed¡Çs balance sheet, I see two important, opposing factors. One is that a large balance sheet could conceivably make further asset purchases less attractive.¡Ù
¡ØThis factor suggests that we should use the opportunity to shrink the balance sheet during good economic times so that this tool will be fully available to us in the future if necessary.¡Ù
¡ØHowever, on the other side, reducing the size of the balance sheet is another form of monetary tightening, one with which we have little experience.¡Ù
¡ØThis suggests we should proceed with caution. The FOMC has judged that a gradual, predictable approach to normalization is the best way to appropriately balance these two factors.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] U.S. Economic Outlook and the Implications for Monetary Policy September 07, 2017 William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer Remarks at Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City
¡ØWith that background, I would like to comment on some of the criticism of Fed policy decisions.¡Ù
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¡ØSome of the commentary surrounding the FOMC¡Çs June decision to raise the federal funds rate target by 25 basis points illustrates the current tension between ¡Ètoo low¡É inflation and ¡Ètoo buoyant¡É financial conditions. On one hand, some observers question the decision to reduce policy accommodation given that inflation has fallen somewhat further below our objective. I would respond to these concerns by noting that monetary policy is still accommodative and that financial conditions have eased.¡Ù
¡ØIn addition, the long and variable lags between monetary policy adjustments and their impact on the economy imply that the FOMC may need to remove accommodation even when inflation is below its goal. In particular, if the unemployment rate were already below its longer-run natural rate, as may be the case currently, the impact on wage growth and price inflation would still likely take some time to become evident. This would be particularly true if inflation expectations were well-anchored at or slightly below our 2 percent objective, as is the case currently. ¡Ù
¡ØOn the other hand, some Fed watchers have argued that we are helping to create financial asset bubbles by not removing accommodation more quickly. My view is that asset valuations are not particularly troublesome given the economic environment in which we¡Çve been-that is, a long period of moderate growth, low inflation, low interest rates, and low recession risks.¡Ù
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¡ØI would be much more concerned about asset valuations if financial market performance were disconnected from the economy¡Çs performance-for example, if market volatility were very low and asset valuations elevated at a time when the economy was performing poorly and the outlook was highly uncertain. Stretched valuations would also be of greater concern if credit growth were unusually strong and financial institutions were becoming more leveraged and dependent on wholesale funding.¡Ù
¡Öfinancial market performance were disconnected from the economy¡Çs performance¡×¤Ã¤Æ¤Î¤òȽÃǤ¹¤ë¤Î¤Ë°ì±þ¤½¤Î¸å¤Ë¿§¡¹¤È»ØÅ¦¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤±¤É¡¢¤Þ¤¢¤³¤ÎȽÃǤϸ½¾ì¿¦¿Í¤Î´ª¤È¤·¤«¸À¤¤¤è¤¦¤¬Ìµ¤¤¤Î¤Ç¤³¤¦¤¤¤¦ÀâÌÀ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤è¤¦¤À¤ÈÃæ¡¹È½ÃǤǤ¤Ê¤¤¤È»×¤¦¡£
¡ØThe good news is that the substantially higher capital and liquidity requirements enacted in response to the financial crisis have helped to reduce the risks to financial stability.¡Ù
¡ØRelatedly, some critics have argued that our asset purchases have unduly distorted financial asset prices. My response to this critique is that monetary policy-including large-scale asset purchase programs-works through its influence on financial conditions.¡Ù
¡ØWe turned to asset purchases to provide additional monetary policy stimulus when the federal funds rate was constrained by the effective zero lower bound. In buying longer-maturity Treasuries and agency MBS, we sought to reduce risk premia to provide additional support to economic growth at a time when the economy was operating far from full employment. The argument that monetary policy should avoid affecting asset prices-that it be somehow ¡Èneutral¡É-is not one that I find compelling. Such an argument essentially implies that monetary policy should not be utilized to achieve the Fed¡Çs dual mandate objectives. ¡Ù
¡ØAnother recent critique is that the Fed has contributed to the low volatility of financial markets by making monetary policy too predictable. Some argue that we should surprise market participants in order to manufacture greater uncertainty and generate more market volatility. The notion is that if the Fed were more unpredictable, market participants would be less complacent. And, if markets were perceived as riskier, this might hinder the development of financial asset bubbles.¡Ù
¡ØI am not supportive of such a strategy for several reasons. First, I don¡Çt think it is necessary to be unpredictable to keep financial market participants ¡Èon their toes.¡É There are plenty of potential surprises from the economic environment without the Fed seeking to deliberately generate its own. Changes in the economic outlook affect financial asset prices and market participants¡Ç expectations for future monetary policy actions. I don¡Çt see a significant benefit to artificially adding ¡Ènoise¡É to this process. Developments in early 2016 provide a good example. As the economic environment changed and financial conditions tightened, we responded by raising short-term interest rates much more slowly than had been anticipated.¡Ù
¡ØSecond, deliberately degrading the signal of how we are likely to react to changes in economic circumstances would likely lead to higher risk premia. This would represent a real cost that would have to be borne by households and businesses.¡Ù
¡ØThird, a less reliable Fed would also presumably loosen the linkage between the stance of monetary policy and financial conditions. Because the monetary policy impulse works through its impact on financial market conditions, I don¡Çt see why the Fed would want to act in a way that deliberately made this linkage less predictable. In actuality, I have been pushing in the opposite direction. By explaining the importance of financial conditions as part of our monetary policy decisions, I am trying to tighten the linkage.¡Ù