[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] 27, 2020 New Economic Challenges and the Fed's Monetary Policy Review Chair Jerome H. Powell At "Navigating the Decade Ahead: Implications for Monetary Policy," an economic policy symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (via webcast)
¤Ç¤â¤Ã¤Æº£²ó¤Ï»×¤¤¤Ã¤¤ê¤½¤Î¥í¥ó¥¬¡¼¥é¥ó¥´¡¼¥ë¤ÎÏä˽ª»Ï¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢ºÇ½é¤Î¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤¬¡ØEvolution of the Fed's Monetary Policy Framework¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢¥Ü¥ë¥«¡¼¤Î»þÂ夫¤é¤ÎÏäò´Êñ¤Ë¹Ô¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤³¤ì¤Ï¤³¤ì¤ÇÎò»Ë³Îǧ¤È¤·¤Æ¤Ï¥¤¥±¥ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤±¤É¡¢º£²ó¤Î¸½À¤Íø±×Ū¤Ë¤Ï¤Þ¤¢¥Ñ¥¹¤·¤ÆÎɤ¤¤È»×¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£¤½¤Î¼¡¤Î¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤«¤é¡£
¡ØMotivation for the Review¡Ù¤Ã¤Æ¤³¤È¤Ç¤³¤Î»þÅÀ¤ÇÀ¸¤¤Æ¤¤¤ë(¤Á¤Ê¤ß¤Ë¥¯¥Ã¥½¤É¤¦¤Ç¤âÎɤ¤¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢FED¤Î¥µ¥¤¥È¤Ë¿·¤·¤¤¥í¥ó¥¬¡¼¥é¥ó±¾¡¹¤È¤³¤Î¹Ö±é¥Æ¥¥¹¥È¤¬¥¢¥Ã¥×¤µ¤ì¤ëÁ°¤Ë¤³¤ÎÉôʬ¤ÏÃý¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤¿È¦)¥í¥ó¥¬¡¼¥é¥ó¥´¡¼¥ë¤¬2012ǯ¶àÀ½¤Îʪ¤Ç¤¹¤¬º£²ó¤Ï¤½¤ì¤ò¸«Ä¾¤·¤Þ¤·¤¿¤Ã¤ÆÏäǤ·¤Æ¡¢¤¸¤ã¤¢²¿¤Ç¥ì¥Ó¥å¡¼¤·¤¿¤«¤È¤¤¤¦¤½¤â¤½¤âÏÀ¤¬¤³¤Á¤é¤Ë¤¢¤ë¡£¤È½ñ¤±¤ÐÂçÂÎÆâÍÆ¤Ï¤ª»¡¤·¤ÎÄ̤ꡣ
¡ØThe completion of the original consensus statement in January 2012 occurred early on in the recovery from the Global Financial Crisis, when notions of what the "new normal" might bring were quite uncertain. Since then, our understanding of the economy has evolved in ways that are central to monetary policy. Of course, the conduct of monetary policy has also evolved. A key purpose of our review has been to take stock of the lessons learned over this period and identify any further changes in our monetary policy framework that could enhance our ability to achieve our maximum-employment and price-stability objectives in the years ahead.9¡Ù
¡ØFirst, assessments of the potential, or longer-run, growth rate of the economy have declined. For example, since January 2012, the median estimate of potential growth from FOMC participants has fallen from 2.5 percent to 1.8 percent (see figure 1). Some slowing in growth relative to earlier decades was to be expected, reflecting slowing population growth and the aging of the population. More troubling has been the decline in productivity growth, which is the primary driver of improving living standards over time.10¡Ù
¡ØSecond, the general level of interest rates has fallen both here in the United States and around the world. Estimates of the neutral federal funds rate, which is the rate consistent with the economy operating at full strength and with stable inflation, have fallen substantially, in large part reflecting a fall in the equilibrium real interest rate, or "r-star." This rate is not affected by monetary policy but instead is driven by fundamental factors in the economy, including demographics and productivity growth-the same factors that drive potential economic growth.11 The median estimate from FOMC participants of the neutral federal funds rate has fallen by nearly half since early 2012, from 4.25 percent to 2.5 percent (see figure 2).¡Ù
¡ØThis decline in assessments of the neutral federal funds rate has profound implications for monetary policy. With interest rates generally running closer to their effective lower bound even in good times, the Fed has less scope to support the economy during an economic downturn by simply cutting the federal funds rate.12 The result can be worse economic outcomes in terms of both employment and price stability, with the costs of such outcomes likely falling hardest on those least able to bear them.¡Ù
¡ØThird, and on a happier note, the record-long expansion that ended earlier this year led to the best labor market we had seen in some time. The unemployment rate hovered near 50-year lows for roughly 2 years, well below most estimates of its sustainable level. And the unemployment rate captures only part of the story. Having declined significantly in the five years following the crisis, the labor force participation rate flattened out and began rising even though the aging of the population suggested that it should keep falling.13 For individuals in their prime working years, the participation rate fully retraced its post-crisis decline, defying earlier assessments that the Global Financial Crisis might cause permanent structural damage to the labor market.¡Ù
3ÈÖÌܤ¬on a happier note¤ÈÍè¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢ºòǯ¤Þ¤Ç³¤¤¤¿²áµîºÇĹ¤Î·Êµ¤³ÈÂç´ü´Ö¤Ë¤ª¤¤¤Æ¡¢Ï«Æ¯»Ô¾ì¤ÏÎò»ËŪ¤Ë¸«¤Æ¤âºÇ¹â¤Î¾õ¶·¤È¤Ê¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¡£¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤Ï¼º¶ÈΨ¤¬À¹Âç¤Ë²¼¤¬¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¤ê¡¢¥³¥¢Ï«Æ¯ÎÏÀ¤Âå¤Ë¤ª¤±¤ëϫƯ»²²ÃΨ¤ò¸«¤ë¤È¥ê¡¼¥Þ¥ó¥·¥ç¥Ã¥¯Á°¤Î¿å½à¤ò´°Á´¤Ë²óÉü¤·¤Æ¤¤¤¿¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢¥ê¡¼¥Þ¥ó¥·¥ç¥Ã¥¯¤¬Ï«Æ¯»Ô¾ì¤Î¹½Â¤¤òÊѤ¨¤ë¤Û¤É¤Î¥À¥á¡¼¥¸¤òÍ¿¤¨¤º¤ËºÑ¤ó¤À¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤¸¤ã¤Ê¤È¤Î¤³¤È¡£
¡ØMoreover, as the long expansion continued, the gains began to be shared more widely across society. The Black and Hispanic unemployment rates reached record lows, and the differentials between these rates and the white unemployment rate narrowed to their lowest levels on record.14 As we heard repeatedly in our Fed Listens events, the robust job market was delivering life-changing gains for many individuals, families, and communities, particularly at the lower end of the income spectrum.15 In addition, many who had been left behind for too long were finding jobs, benefiting their families and communities, and increasing the productive capacity of our economy. Before the pandemic, there was every reason to expect that these gains would continue. It is hard to overstate the benefits of sustaining a strong labor market, a key national goal that will require a range of policies in addition to supportive monetary policy.¡Ù
¤µ¤é¤ËÀèÈ̤ޤǤÎϫƯ»Ô¾ì²þÁ±¤ÇÎɤ«¤Ã¤¿¤Î¤Ï¡¢Ï«Æ¯»Ô¾ì¤Î²þÁ±¤Î²¸·Ã¤¬¤³¤ì¤Þ¤ÇÆÀ¤é¤ì¤Ë¤¯¤«¤Ã¤¿¥Þ¥¤¥Î¥ê¥Æ¥£¤ÎÊý¡¹¤Ê¤É¤Ë¤âÅÁ¤ï¤Ã¤¿¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢·Êµ¤²þÁ±¤Î¥á¥ê¥Ã¥È¤¬µÚ¤Ð¤º¤ËÃÖ¤¤¤Æ¹Ô¤«¤ì¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦¿Í¤¬¶Ë¤á¤Æ¾¯¤Ê¤«¤Ã¤¿¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¤¹(¤Á¤Ê¤ß¤Ë¾åµ¤ÎÃæ¤Çmany who had been left behind for too long were finding jobs¤Ã¤Æ¤Î¤¬¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤¬¡¢³Î¤«¥Î¡¼¥ï¥ó¥ì¥Õ¥È¥Ó¥Ï¥¤¥ó¥É¤Ã¤ÆSDGs¤ÎÃæ¤Ç¤âëð¤ï¤ì¤ëÍýǰ¤À¤Ã¤¿µ¤¤¬)¡£
¡ØFourth, the historically strong labor market did not trigger a significant rise in inflation. Over the years, forecasts from FOMC participants and private-sector analysts routinely showed a return to 2 percent inflation, but these forecasts were never realized on a sustained basis (see figure 3). Inflation forecasts are typically predicated on estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, or "u-star," and of how much upward pressure on inflation arises when the unemployment rate falls relative to u-star.16 As the unemployment rate moved lower and inflation remained muted, estimates of u-star were revised down. For example, the median estimate from FOMC participants declined from 5.5 percent in 2012 to 4.1 percent at present (see figure 4). The muted responsiveness of inflation to labor market tightness, which we refer to as the flattening of the Phillips curve, also contributed to low inflation outcomes.17 In addition, longer-term inflation expectations, which we have long seen as an important driver of actual inflation, and global disinflationary pressures may have been holding down inflation more than was generally anticipated. Other advanced economies have also struggled to achieve their inflation goals in recent decades.¡Ù
¡ØThe persistent undershoot of inflation from our 2 percent longer-run objective is a cause for concern. Many find it counterintuitive that the Fed would want to push up inflation. After all, low and stable inflation is essential for a well-functioning economy. And we are certainly mindful that higher prices for essential items, such as food, gasoline, and shelter, add to the burdens faced by many families, especially those struggling with lost jobs and incomes. However, inflation that is persistently too low can pose serious risks to the economy. Inflation that runs below its desired level can lead to an unwelcome fall in longer-term inflation expectations, which, in turn, can pull actual inflation even lower, resulting in an adverse cycle of ever-lower inflation and inflation expectations.¡Ù
¡ØThis dynamic is a problem because expected inflation feeds directly into the general level of interest rates. Well-anchored inflation expectations are critical for giving the Fed the latitude to support employment when necessary without destabilizing inflation.18 But if inflation expectations fall below our 2 percent objective, interest rates would decline in tandem. In turn, we would have less scope to cut interest rates to boost employment during an economic downturn, further diminishing our capacity to stabilize the economy through cutting interest rates. We have seen this adverse dynamic play out in other major economies around the world and have learned that once it sets in, it can be very difficult to overcome. We want to do what we can to prevent such a dynamic from happening here.¡Ù
¼¡¤Î¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤¬¡ØElements of the Review¡Ù¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤³¤³¤Ï¥ì¥Ó¥å¡¼¤ò¤·¤¿·Ð²á¤ÎÀâÌÀ¤Ç¡¢¥Õ¥§¥É¥ê¥Ã¥¹¥ó¥º¤Î¼Â»Ü¤È¤«³Ø¼Ô½¸¤á¤¿¥·¥ó¥Ý¥¸¥¦¥à(ÀµÄ¾¸À¤Ã¤Æ¤¢¤ì¤Ï̵°ÕÌ£¤À¤Ã¤¿µ¤¤¬¤¹¤ë¤±¤É)¤ËFOMC¤Ç¤ÎµÄÏÀ¤Ê¤É¤ò¤·¤Þ¤·¤¿¤¬¡¢¥³¥í¥ÊÂбþ¤È¤«¤·¤Æ¤¿¤Î¤Ç¤Á¤ÈÃæÃǤ·¤Þ¤·¤¿¤ï¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤è¤¦¤ÊÏäò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤À¤±¤Ê¤Î¤Ç³ä°¦¤·¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤½¤Î¼¡¤Î¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤Î¡ØNew Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦Á´ÎϤǥ¥¿¥³¥ì¤Ê¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤Ë»²¤ê¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØThe federated structure of the Federal Reserve, reflected in the FOMC, ensures that we always have a diverse range of perspectives on monetary policy, and that is certainly the case today. Nonetheless, I am pleased to say that the revised consensus statement was adopted today with the unanimous support of Committee participants.¡Ù
¡ØOur new consensus statement, like its predecessor, explains how we interpret the mandate Congress has given us and describes the broad framework that we believe will best promote our maximum-employment and price-stability goals. Before addressing the key changes in our statement, let me highlight some areas of continuity.¡Ù
¡ØWe continue to believe that specifying a numerical goal for employment is unwise, because the maximum level of employment is not directly measurable and changes over time for reasons unrelated to monetary policy. The significant shifts in estimates of the natural rate of unemployment over the past decade reinforce this point. In addition, we have not changed our view that a longer-run inflation rate of 2 percent is most consistent with our mandate to promote both maximum employment and price stability.¡Ù
¡ØFinally, we continue to believe that monetary policy must be forward looking, taking into account the expectations of households and businesses and the lags in monetary policy's effect on the economy. Thus, our policy actions continue to depend on the economic outlook as well as the risks to the outlook, including potential risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of our goals.¡Ù
¡ØOur new statement explicitly acknowledges the challenges posed by the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound. By reducing our scope to support the economy by cutting interest rates, the lower bound increases downward risks to employment and inflation.22 To counter these risks, we are prepared to use our full range of tools to support the economy.¡Ù
¡ØIn addition, our revised statement says that our policy decision will be informed by our "assessments of the shortfalls of employment from its maximum level" rather than by "deviations from its maximum level" as in our previous statement.24¡Ù
¤Á¤Ê¤ß¤Ë¤³¤³¤Ç¸ÀµÚ¤µ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤ë·ï¤Î½¾Íè¤Îʸ¸À¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢½¾Íè¤Î¤È¤³¤í¤Ç¤Ï3¥Ñ¥éÌÜ¤ÎÆ¬¤Ë¡ÖIn setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee¡Çs assessments of its maximum level.¡×(¤³¤ÎÉôʬ¤Ï½¾Íè¤Î¥í¥ó¥¬¡¼¥é¥ó¥´¡¼¥ë¤Î¥¹¥Æ¡¼¥È¥á¥ó¥È¤«¤é°úÍѤ·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹)¤È¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤³¤Î¡Ödeviations¡×¤ÎÉôʬ¤ò¡Öshortfalls¡×¤ËÊѹ¹¤·¤Þ¤·¤¿¤È¤¤¤¦ÏᣤÁ¤Ê¤ß¤Ëʪ²Á¤Ë´Ø¤·¤Æ¤âƱ¤¸¤Ç¤¹¡£¤Ç¤â¤Ã¤Æ¤½¤Î°ÕÌ£¤Ï¡¢
¡ØThis change may appear subtle, but it reflects our view that a robust job market can be sustained without causing an outbreak of inflation.¡Ù
¡ØIn earlier decades when the Phillips curve was steeper, inflation tended to rise noticeably in response to a strengthening labor market. It was sometimes appropriate for the Fed to tighten monetary policy as employment rose toward its estimated maximum level in order to stave off an unwelcome rise in inflation.¡Ù
¡ØThe change to "shortfalls" clarifies that, going forward, employment can run at or above real-time estimates of its maximum level without causing concern, unless accompanied by signs of unwanted increases in inflation or the emergence of other risks that could impede the attainment of our goals.25 Of course, when employment is below its maximum level, as is clearly the case now, we will actively seek to minimize that shortfall by using our tools to support economic growth and job creation.¡Ù
¡ØWe have also made important changes with regard to the price-stability side of our mandate. Our longer-run goal continues to be an inflation rate of 2 percent. Our statement emphasizes that our actions to achieve both sides of our dual mandate will be most effective if longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored at 2 percent. However, if inflation runs below 2 percent following economic downturns but never moves above 2 percent even when the economy is strong, then, over time, inflation will average less than 2 percent. Households and businesses will come to expect this result, meaning that inflation expectations would tend to move below our inflation goal and pull realized inflation down.¡Ù
¡ØTo prevent this outcome and the adverse dynamics that could ensue, our new statement indicates that we will seek to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time.¡Ù
¡Öaverages 2 percent over time¡×¥¥¿¥³¥ì¤È¤¤¤¦¤ªÏäǡ¢
¡ØTherefore, following periods when inflation has been running below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.¡Ù
¤½¤ì¤Ï¤¹¤Ê¤ï¤Á2%¤ò³ä¤ê¹þ¤à´ü´Ö¤Î¸å¤Ï2%¤ò¥â¥Ç¥ì¡¼¥È¤Ëͤ¨¤ë¤è¤¦¤Ê¥¤¥ó¥Õ¥ì¤òÌܻؤ¹¤Î¤¬Å¬ÀÚ¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¤¹¤±¤É¡¢¤Þ¤¢moderately¤À¤Îfor some time¤À¤Î¤È¤¤¤¦Æ¨¤²¸ý¾å¤âÆþ¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤¬¥Á¥ã¡¼¥ß¥ó¥°¡£¤Ä¤Þ¤ê¡¢
¡ØIn seeking to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, we are not tying ourselves to a particular mathematical formula that defines the average.¡Ù
¡ØOf course, if excessive inflationary pressures were to build or inflation expectations were to ratchet above levels consistent with our goal, we would not hesitate to act.¡Ù
¡ØThe revisions to our statement add up to a robust updating of our monetary policy framework. To an extent, these revisions reflect the way we have been conducting policy in recent years. At the same time, however, there are some important new features. Overall, our new Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy conveys our continued strong commitment to achieving our goals, given the difficult challenges presented by the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound.¡Ù
¡ØIn conducting monetary policy, we will remain highly focused on fostering as strong a labor market as possible for the benefit of all Americans. And we will steadfastly seek to achieve a 2 percent inflation rate over time.¡Ù
¤³¤³¤Þ¤ÇÀâÌÀ¤·¤¿»ö¤Î¤Þ¤È¤á¤È¤¤¤¦´¶¤¸¤Ç¡¢¤Þ¤¢¤æ¤¦¤È¤ë¤³¤È¤ÏƱ¤¸¤Ê¤ó¤Ç¤¹¤±¤É¡¢¤³¤ì¤À¤È¥Ø¥Ã¥É¥é¥¤¥óŪ¤Ë¤Ï¸ÛÍѽŻë¤Ã¤Æ½Ð¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Ê¤¢¤È¤Ï»×¤¤¤Þ¤·¤¿¤¬¡¢¥Õ¥£¥ê¥Ã¥×¥¹¥«¡¼¥Ö¤¬¿²¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬Á°Äó¤Ë¤¢¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤½¤ÎÊդϤޤ¢Î±Êݤ·¤Æ¹Í¤¨¤ëɬÍפ¬¤¢¤ë¤Ã¤·¤ç¡¢¤È¤Ï»×¤¤¤Þ¤·¤¿¤Ç¤¹¡£¤Þ¤¢²¿¤À¤«¤ó¤À¸À¤Ã¤Æ¡Östrong commitment to achieving our goals¡×¤È¤Ï¤æ¤¦¤È¤ë¤â¤Î¤Î¡¢ÆÃ¤Ë¿·µ¬¤Î³µÇ°¤¬¤Ö¤Ã¤³¤Þ¤ì¤¿¤È¤¤¤¦Ìõ¤Ç¤Ï¤Ê¤¯¤Æ¡¢½¾Í褫¤é¤¢¤¢¤Ç¤â¤Ê¤¤¤³¤¦¤Ç¤â¤Ê¤¤¤ÈÀâÌÀ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤¿Ïäò¥¹¥Æ¡¼¥È¥á¥ó¥È¤Ë¿¥¤ê¹þ¤ó¤À¤é¤³¤¦¤Ê¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¡¢¤Ã¤Æ´¶¤¸¤¸¤ã¤Í¤¨¤Î¤«¡¢¤È¤Ï»×¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤¬¤Þ¤¢¤½¤³¤Ï¼õ¤±»ß¤á¼¡Âè¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Ê¡£
¡ØOur review has provided a platform for productive discussion and engagement with the public we serve. The Fed Listens events helped us connect with our core constituency, the American people, and hear directly how their everyday lives are affected by our policies. We believe that conducting a review at regular intervals is a good institutional practice, providing valuable feedback and enhancing transparency and accountability. And with the ever-changing economy, future reviews will allow us to take a step back, reflect on what we have learned, and adapt our practices as we strive to achieve our dual-mandate goals. ¡Ù
¡ØAs our statement indicates, we plan to undertake a thorough public review of our monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices roughly every five years.¡Ù
¤¨¡¼¤Ã¤È¤Ç¤¹¤Ê¡¢¥Ñ¥¦¥¨¥ë¤¬¹Ö±é¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë´Ö¤Ë¤³¤ì¤¬FRB¤Î¥µ¥¤¥È¤ËÅê²¼¤µ¤ì¤Æ¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] 27, 2020 Federal Open Market Committee announces approval of updates to its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy For release at 9:10 a.m. EDT
¤½¤·¤Æº£²ó¤Î¿ÆÀÚÀ߷פϤ³¤Á¤é¡£ [³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] to changes in the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy
¡ØIn the revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy shown below, bold red text shows additions and struck-through text shows deletions relative to the statement the Committee issued on January 29, 2019. Note that the discussion of the employment and inflation goals have been separated into two paragraphs and their order reversed relative to the January 2019 statement. To improve readability, these changes are not marked with bold red text or struck-through text.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] negative: the ECB¡Çs experience Speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Roundtable on Monetary Policy, Low Interest Rates and Risk Taking at the 35th Congress of the European Economic Association
¡ØIn June 2014, the ECB was the first major central bank to lower one of its key interest rates into negative territory.[1] As experience with negative interest rates was scant, the ECB proceeded cautiously over time, lowering the deposit facility rate (DFR) in small increments of 10 basis points, until it reached -0.5% in September 2019.¡Ù
¡ØWhile negative interest rates have, over time, become a standard instrument in the ECB¡Çs toolkit, they remain controversial, both in central banking circles and academia.[2]¡Ù
¡ØIn my remarks today, I will review the ECB¡Çs experience with its negative interest rate policy (NIRP). I will argue that the transmission of negative rates has worked smoothly and that, in combination with other policy measures, they have been effective in stimulating the economy and raising inflation.¡Ù
¡ØOn balance, the positive effects of the NIRP have exceeded their side effects, in particular when taking into account the compensating effects of other policy innovations, such as the two-tier system and our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs).¡Ù
¡ØAt the same time, like with other unconventional policy measures, side effects are likely to increase over time, if the negative interest rate environment were to persist for too long.¡Ù
¡ØAs negative rates are, by and large, a reflection of broader slow-moving adverse macroeconomic trends, the pandemic is a wake-up call for governments to foster innovation and potential growth, and to reap the benefits from further European integration.¡Ù
¡ØOver the past few decades, the global macroeconomic environment has changed in ways that pose significant challenges to the conduct of monetary policy.¡Ù
¡ØSustained demographic shifts, global excess savings and a slowdown in productivity growth have all contributed to a secular decline in the real equilibrium rate of interest over the last 20 years in most advanced economies, though estimates are fraught with a considerable degree of uncertainty (Chart 1).[3]¡Ù
¡ØCentral banks have responded in different ways to the fall in equilibrium rates. As the global financial crisis broke and conventional policy space was exhausted, most central banks resorted to forward guidance as a means to provide additional accommodation. Some started purchasing government bonds and other securities.¡Ù
¡ØThe ECB, for its part, tailored its non-standard measures to the structure of the euro area economy, where banks play a significant role in credit intermediation. In essence, this meant providing ample liquidity for a much longer period than under the ECB¡Çs standard operations.¡Ù
¡ØIn mid-2014, however, when downside risks to the inflation outlook intensified, additional accommodation was required. Negative interest rates were a crucial part of the measures that the Governing Council adopted at the time.¡Ù
¡ØThe idea was, broadly speaking, twofold: to trigger a repricing of the expected future path of short-term interest rates by ¡Èbreaking through¡É the zero lower bound and to encourage banks to provide more credit to the economy.¡Ù
¼¡¤Î¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤¬¡ØTransmission of monetary policy in an environment of negative policy rates¡Ù¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¥Þ¥¤¥Ê¥¹¶âÍø¤Ö¤Ã¤³¤ó¤À¤Î¤Ç»Ô¾ì¶âÍø¤¬À¹Âç¤Ë²¼¤¬¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¤è¤È¤¤¤¦ÏäÎÉôʬ¤Ï¤Ï¤¤¤Ï¤¤¤½¤¦¤Ç¤¹¤Í¤È¤¤¤¦Éôʬ¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤ÃÈô¤Ð¤·¤Þ¤·¤ÆÅÓÃæ¤«¤é¡£
¡ØNegative interest rates reinforced the effects of our asset purchases for the same reasons: when banks¡Ç excess reserves are remunerated at negative rates, there is a strong incentive to reduce them by shifting into riskier assets, such as longer-dated government bonds.[5] This strengthens the portfolio rebalancing channel of asset purchases.¡Ù
¡ØThis ¡Èhot potato effect¡É also extends to bank loans, which was the second objective of lowering rates into negative territory. With the start of negative rates, we have observed a steady increase in the growth rate of loans extended by euro area monetary financial institutions (Chart 4).¡Ù
¥Á¥ã¡¼¥È4¤È¤¢¤ë³ä¤Ë¤Ï3ËçÌܤΥÁ¥ã¡¼¥È¤Î¤è¤¦¤Êµ¤¤â¤¹¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡ØSubstantial positive effects of NIRP on loan growth¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦À¨¤¤Âê̾¤Î¥¹¥é¥¤¥É¤¬¤µ¤Ã¤¤Î¥¹¥é¥¤¥É½¸¤ÎÊý¤Ë¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤½¤³¤Ç¤ÏƲ¡¹¤È¡ØEstimated impact of NIRP on bank loans to firms¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦¿ä·×Ãͤò½Ð¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤À¤¬¡¢¤½¤Îº¹¤ò¸«¤ë¤È¡ÖSubstantial positive effects¡×¤«¤è¤È¸À¤¤¤¿¤¯¤Ê¤ë¡£
¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¡¦¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤â¤¢¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤½¤â¤½¤â¤³¤ÎÀâÌÀ¤¬¥¢¥«¥ó¤Î¤Ï¤½¤ÎÁ°ÃʤǡÖwhen banks¡Ç excess reserves are remunerated at negative rates, there is a strong incentive to reduce them by shifting into riskier assets¡×¤È¸À¤¤¤Ê¤¬¤éÂ߽Ф¬¿¤Ó¤ëÏäò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë·ï¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢¶âÍ»µ¡´Ø¤¬Â߽Фò¿¤Ð¤·¤¿¤«¤é¤È¸À¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¤â¡¢Ê̤ˤ½¤ì¤ÏÅö³ºÄ¶²á½àÈ÷¤ËÂФ·¤Æ²¿¤Î±Æ¶Á¤âÍ¿¤¨¤Ê¤¤¤Ç¤¹¤·¡¢Â߽п¤Ó¤ë¢ª¼Ú¤ê¤¿´ë¶È¤Ï¤ª»Ùʧ¤¤¤Î¤¿¤á¤Ë¾¹Ô¤ËÁ÷¶â¤¹¤ë¡¢¤È¤Ê¤ì¤ÐÅö³º¶ä¹Ô¤Ï¾¹Ô¤¢¤Æ»Å¸þ°ÙÂØ¤¬È¯À¸¤¹¤ë¤«¤é³Î¤«¤ËͲá½àÈ÷¤¬¸º¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤½¤ì¤Ï¾¹Ô¤ÎͲá½àÈ÷¤Î³ÈÂç¤È¤¤¤¦·Á¤ËÂå¤ï¤ë¤À¤±¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¡¢Ä¶²á½àÈ÷¤Î¥Ð¥é¥ó¥¹ÊѤï¤é¤ó¤Î¤Ç¡¢Ä¶²á½àÈ÷±¾¡¹¤Îή¤ì¤ÇÀâÌÀ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë(¤è¤¦¤Ë¸«¤¨¤ë)¤³¤Îή¤ì¤Ï¶Ú°ÀâÌÀ¡£
¡ØAn ECB meta-analysis of various studies corroborates the view that the use of the NIRP had a positive impact on loan growth.[6] The analysis shows that, since the start of the NIRP regime in mid-2014, the growth of loans extended to non-financial corporations (NFCs) would have been lower in the vast majority of counterfactual scenarios of non-negative policy rates (Chart 5). In addition, several empirical studies exploiting bank-level data confirmed the causal link between negative policy rates and loan growth.[7]¡Ù
¡ØTaken together, these findings suggest that the lowering of policy rates into negative territory fostered monetary policy transmission in the euro area, as evidenced by the strong pass-through from policy rates to market rates and higher loan growth.¡Ù
°Ê²¼¡¢ÕûÍý¶þ¤ÎÊý¤Ï¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤ò¸«¤Þ¤¹¤È¡¢ Effect of negative policy rates on bank profitability and bank lending Effect of negative policy rates on bank risk-taking A longer-term perspective Concluding remarks ¤È³¤¤Þ¤¹¡£¤Ç¤â¤Ã¤ÆÎã¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤Æ»þ´Ö¤¬Ìµ¤¯¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¿¤Î¤Ç̵ÍýÌðÍýÅÓÃæ¤ò¤¹¤Ã¤È¤Ð¤·¤Æ¤Þ¤È¤á¤À¤±¥Í¥¿¤Ë¤·¤Þ¤¹(ÅÓÃæ¤ÎÉôʬ¤Ï¥Í¥¿¤Ë¤¹¤ë¤«¤â¤·¤ì¤Ê¤¤¤·¤·¤Ê¤¤¤«¤â¤·¤ì¤Ê¤¤)¤È¡¢
¡ØLet me conclude by emphasising three key points.¡Ù
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¡ØFirst, the ECB¡Çs negative interest rate policy has been successful in turning the zero lower bound into an effective lower bound well below zero and supporting bank lending. This fundamentally improved monetary transmission and helped to stimulate the economy and raise inflation.¡Ù
¡ØSecond, negative rates can have side effects on banks¡Ç profitability and risk-taking behaviour. That said, the experience of the euro area over the past few years suggests that the positive effects dominated, supported by the use of other policy measures that directly mitigate the costs of negative rates.¡Ù
¡ØFinally, side effects are likely to become more relevant over time. Since negative rates largely reflect adverse macroeconomic trends outside the remit of central banks, a forceful policy response by governments to the pandemic is indispensable for raising potential growth, thereby paving the way for positive interest rates in the future.¡Ù
The provision of euro liquidity through the ECB¡Çs swap and repo operations Blog post by Fabio Panetta and Isabel Schnabel, Members of the Executive Board of the ECB 19 August 2020
¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤ÎºÇ½é¤¬¡ØThe basic functioning of swap and repo lines¡Ù¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤³¤³¤Ï¥ï¥·¤é¤Î¸½À¤Íø±×¤Ë¤¢¤ó¤Þ¤ê´Ø·¸¤Ê¤¤¤È»×¤¦¤±¤É¥ª¥â¥í¥¤¤Î¤Ç°úÍѤ·¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØLiquidity arrangements between central banks guarantee access to foreign liquidity through two basic types of operations: currency swaps and repos.¡Ù
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¡ØA currency swap between two central banks is a contractual agreement in which the borrowing central bank obtains foreign currency against its own currency, with the promise to reverse the transaction at a pre-specified date, adding the agreed interest cost to the borrowed currency.¡Ù
¡ØSwap line agreements are generally stipulated among central banks issuing major currencies. They ensure reciprocal access to each central bank¡Çs currency and are considered to be low-risk transactions.[2] Most of these agreements are currently not in use, or are used only in one direction.[3]¡Ù
¡ØRepo lines are arrangements in which the lending central bank provides access to its currency to another central bank, accepting assets denominated in that same currency as collateral to secure the repayment of the funds by the borrowing central bank. To guard against fluctuations in the collateral value, the lending central bank applies a discount to the value of the collateral posted by its counterparties, also known as haircut. This practice mirrors the application of collateral haircuts in regular monetary policy operations.¡Ù
¡ØChart 1 illustrates the basic structures of swap and repo liquidity arrangements, using the example of the ECB.¡Ù
¤È¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¡ØChart 1¡¡Comparison of the ECB¡Çs swap and repo line arrangements.¡Ù¤È¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¿Þɽ¤ÏޤêÉÕ¤±¥¹¥¥ë¤¬Ìµ¤¤¤Î¤Ç¤Þ¤¢URLÀè¤ò¸«¤Æ¤Á¤ç¤È¤¤¤¦ÏäǤ¹¤¬¡¢6Ãæ¶ä¤ÎÁê¸ß¥¹¥ï¥Ã¥×¤È¡¢ECB¤È¤´¶á½êÃæ¶ä¤È¤Î¥¹¥ï¥Ã¥×¥é¥¤¥ó¤¬¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤è¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬Áê´Ø¿Þ¤ß¤¿¤¤¤Ê´¶¤¸¤Ç¼¨¤µ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤½¤Î±¦¤Ërepo line arrangements¤Î¾õ¶·¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢ECB¤¬¥ë¡¼¥Þ¥Ë¥¢¤À¤Î¥Ï¥ó¥¬¥ê¡¼¤À¤Î¤ÎÃæ¶ä¤È¥æ¡¼¥í·ú¤Æ¤ÎôÊݤò´ð¤Ë¥ì¥Ý¥é¥¤¥óÁȤó¤Ç¤Þ¤Ã¤»¤È¤¤¤¦¿Þ¤¬¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¡£
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¡ØFrom the viewpoint of the borrowing central bank, swap agreements are more attractive than repo lines for at least two reasons:¡Ù
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¡ØFirst, they allow access to a currency issued by another central bank without having to provide collateral denominated in that currency. Second, the pricing of swap lines is typically more favourable than for repo arrangements.¡Ù
¡ØBoth types of operations are used as liquidity backstops in times of strained funding conditions in currency markets. That is, the cost of swap or repo arrangements for the borrowing central bank typically renders them more expensive than normal market funding; they only become attractive when market pricing deteriorates due to stressed conditions, which in turn has a stabilising impact on market conditions.¡Ù
¡ØTraditionally, swap arrangements were often used by central banks - as supplements to their foreign reserves - to intervene in foreign exchange markets.[4] Based on lessons from the Global Financial Crisis, they, together with repo agreements, have increasingly been used to address monetary policy and financial stability concerns.[5] Today, major central banks provide swap and repo agreements mostly to alleviate funding strains in their own currency experienced by financial institutions in the jurisdiction of the borrowing central bank.¡Ù
¼¡¤Î¡ØThe role of US dollar and euro liquidity facilities¡Ù¤ÎºÇ½é¤ÎÊý¤Ïº£¼¡¥³¥í¥Ê´íµ¡¤Ë¤ª¤¤¤Æ6Ãæ¶ä¥¹¥ï¥Ã¥×¥é¥¤¥ó¤ÎÃæ¤Ç¤Î¼è°ú¶¯²½(²ó¿ôÁý¤ä¤·¤¿¤ê3¤«·îʪ¤òÆþ¤ì¤¿¤ê)¤ò¤·¤¿¤ê¤·¤ÆÂбþ¤·¤¿¤é°ì½ÖÂçÇúȯ¤·¤«¤«¤Ã¤¿¥É¥ë¥Õ¥¡¥ó¥Ç¥£¥ó¥°»Ô¾ì¤ÏÍî¤ÁÃ夤ޤ·¤¿¤Ã¤ÆÏäȿÞɽ¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤½¤ÎÊÕÈô¤Ð¤·¤Æ¡¢
¡ØThe actual use of liquidity facilities differed widely across central banks, depending on prevailing market conditions. Chart 3 illustrates the evolution of the outstanding amount of US dollar liquidity taken up by several central banks under the standing swap line agreement with the Federal Reserve since the peak of the COVID-19 crisis.¡Ù
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢¡ØChart 3¡¡Outstanding amounts in US dollar operations for selected central banks (USD bn).¡Ù¤È¤¤¤¦¥°¥é¥Õ¤¬¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¡¢¤Þ¤¿¤Þ¤¿Îã¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤Æ¿Þɽâù·º¥¹¥¥ë¤¬Ìµ¤¤¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢8·î¤Î»Ä¹â¤Ï14Æü¥Ù¡¼¥¹¤ß¤¿¤¤¤Ç¤¹¤±¤ì¤É¤â¡¢ECB¡¢BOJ¡¢BOE¡¢SNB¤Î¿ôÃͤ¬¤¢¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤¹¤±¤É¡¢Æü¶ä¤À¤±À¹Âç¤Ë»Ä¹â¤¬»Ä¤ê³¤±¤Æ¤¤¤Æ¡¢¤³¤³¤Ç¼¨¤µ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤ë¾¤Î3Ãæ¶ä¤Ï»Ä¹â¤¬¤«¤Ê¤ê¸º¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦¿Þɽ¤¬¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ³ä¤È¥ï¥í¥¨¥ë¡£
¤Ç¤â¤Ã¤ÆºÇ¸å¤Î¾®¸«½Ð¤·¡ØThe ECB¡Çs motivation for setting up liquidity arrangements¡Ù¤Ç¤¹¤±¤ì¤É¤â¡¢
¡ØBy providing a backstop, the euro liquidity facilities alleviate strained funding conditions and reduce funding costs for banks in the receiving central bank¡Çs jurisdiction.[11] This at the same time generates advantages for the ECB: it helps to prevent forced asset sales by receiving central banks, mitigates spillover effects and further strengthens the role of the euro in international financial markets. By addressing risks of market dysfunction and liquidity shortages, the liquidity facilities support the smooth transmission of monetary policy in the euro area.¡Ù
¡ØIn periods of heightened financial market stress, such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the global financial crisis[12], funding conditions in foreign currency may deteriorate rapidly due to rising risk aversion. As a consequence, market participants may find it difficult to obtain sufficient liquidity in foreign currency to fulfil their payment obligations.¡Ù
¡ØChart 5 shows that a substantial proportion of the foreign reserve holdings of non-euro area central banks is denominated in euro, including sovereign bonds issued by euro area countries. This reflects the important role of the euro in global financial transactions.¡Ù
¤Æ¤ÊÌõ¤Ç¡ØChart 5¡¡Developments in the shares of selected currencies in global official holdings of foreign exchange reserves.¡Ù¤Ã¤Æ¤Î¤¬¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¡¢¥°¥í¡¼¥Ð¥ë¤Ë¸«¤¿³°²ß½àÈ÷ÊÝͤ˴ؤ·¤Æ¡¢¥æ¡¼¥í¤¬Áý¤¨¤Æ¤¤Æ¤¤¤ë(¤Á¤Ê¤ß¤Ë¥°¥é¥Õ¤Î¥¹¥±¡¼¥ë¤¬¥É¥ë¤È¥É¥ë°Ê³°¤ÏÊ̤ˤ·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ëµ¤¤¬ÉÕ¤«¤Ê¤¤¤È¥æ¡¼¥í¤¬¥É¥ë¤òµÕž¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤è¤¦¤Ë¸«¤¨¤ë¤Î¤Ï¤ªÃãÌÜ)¤Î´¬¤È¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦´ÑÅÀ¤«¤é¤Î¡¢
¡ØIn the absence of a liquidity arrangement with the Eurosystem, tensions in euro funding markets may force a non-euro area central bank to sell part of its euro-denominated foreign reserve holdings to provide euro liquidity to its domestic counterparties.¡Ù
¡ØIf many counterparties rush for euro liquidity at once, several non-euro area central banks may have to simultaneously engage in broad-based asset sales, which may have a negative price impact on euro area bond markets. Liquidating holdings at a discount could result in self-reinforcing ¡Èfire sale¡É dynamics that would lead to abrupt movements in the prices and yields of euro area sovereign bonds.¡Ù
¤Ç¤Þ¤¢¤½¤ÎÅꤲÇä¤êÀãÊø¤Ç¥½¥Ö¥ê¥óÍø²ó¤ê¤¬¾å¤¬¤Ã¤Æ¤·¤Þ¤¦¤È¥¤¥¯¥Ê¥¤¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦Ïäǰʲ¼¥½¥Ö¥ê¥ó¾å¤¬¤ë¤ÈÂ߽жâÍø¤È¤«¤â¾å¤¬¤Ã¤Æ¤·¤Þ¤¦¤«¤é¥¢¥«¥óŪ¤ÊÏäò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤¬¤½¤ÎÊդϥѥ¹¤·¤Þ¤¹¡£°Ê²¼¤Î¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤Ï¡Ø2. Mitigating spillover effects¡Ù¡¢¡Ø3. Strengthening the role of the euro¡Ù¤ÈÍè¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤¬¡¢2È֤Ϥޤ¢¤ª»¡¤·¤ÎÆâÍÆ¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢3È֤˴ؤ·¤Æ¤Ïº£°úÍѤ·¤¿Éôʬ¤ÈÏä¬Ãϳ¤¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤±¤É¡¢¤½¤ÎºÇ½é¤Ë¡¢
¡ØThe smooth functioning of liquidity arrangements can enhance the euro¡Çs international role, consistent with the objective set by euro area leaders.[14] The case and conditions for strengthening the euro¡Çs role in international financial markets were outlined by Fabio Panetta in a recent ECB blog.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] in frequency of 7-day US dollar liquidity-providing operations as of 1 September 2020 20 August 2020
¡Ø¡¦ECB and other major central banks to reduce frequency of 7-day US dollar operations from three times per week to once per week, while 84-day operations continue to be offered weekly
¡¦New frequency effective as of 1 September 2020, to remain in place for as long as appropriate to support smooth functioning of US dollar funding markets
¡¦ECB and other major central banks standing ready to re-adjust provision of US dollar liquidity as warranted by market conditions¡Ù
¤ä¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤³¤È¤Ï6Ãæ¶ä¶¦Ä̤ʤΤÇÏÃ¤ÏÆ±¤¸¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢Èù̯¤ËÌ£¤ï¤¤¤¬¤¢¤ë¤Î¤Ï¡ÖECB and other major central banks standing ready to re-adjust provision¡×¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤Ï¤Æ¤µ¤Æ¤³¤ÎÏääÆÃ¯¤¬¤É¤¦¼çƳ¤¹¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤·¤ç¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬¤Þ¤¢±ü¤Î±¡¤ÎÏäÀ¤«¤é¤è¡¼Ê¬¤«¤ê¤Þ¤»¤ó¤¬¡¢¤Þ¤¢¥ê¡¼¥Þ¥ó¥·¥ç¥Ã¥¯¤Î»þ¤ÈÈæ¤Ù¤ÆÊªÀ¨¤¤Àª¤¤¤Ç¤Ö¤Ã¤³¤Þ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¿(¥ê¡¼¥Þ¥ó¤Ï½é²ó¤À¤«¤é¤·¤ã¡¼¤Ê¤«¤Ã¤¿)ÊÕ¤ê¤Ï¡¢³¤³°Åê»ñ²È¤Î¥Õ¥¡¥¤¥ä¡¼¥»¡¼¥ë¤òÂ¥¤¹¤ÈÊÆ¹ñ¶âÍ»µ¡´Ø¥¦¥Þ¡¼¤È¤Ï¤Ê¤é¤º¡¢°ì½ï¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¥Õ¥¡¥¤¥ä¡¼¥»¡¼¥ë¤Î¥Õ¥¡¥¤¥ä¡¼¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤ÆÃϹö¤Î²Ð¤ÎÃæ¤ËÅꤲ¹þ¤Þ¤ì¤ë¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤ÏÄË´¶¤·¤¿¤È»×¤ï¤ì¤ëÊÆ¹ñÅö¶É¤¬ÀѶËŪ¤Ëư¤¤¤¿¤ó¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Ê¤¢¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦ÊÕ¤ê¤Þ¤Ç¤Ï²¿¤È¤Ê¤¯ÁÛÁü¤ÏÉÕ¤¯¡£
¡ØIn view of continuing improvements in US dollar funding conditions and the low demand at recent 7-day maturity US dollar liquidity-providing operations, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank, in consultation with the Federal Reserve, have jointly decided to further reduce the frequency of their 7-day operations from three times per week to once per week.¡Ù
¤ä¤ë¤È¤¤Ï6Ãæ¶äƱ»þ¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¡¢Êƹñ¤Î¾õ¶·¥ª¥ê¥¨¥ó¥Æ¥Ã¥É¤Ç·è¤á¤Æ¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Í¡£¤Ç¤â¤Ã¤ÆÍýͳ¤Ï¡Öcontinuing improvements in US dollar funding conditions and the low demand at recent 7-day maturity US dollar liquidity-providing operations¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç»Ô¾ì¤Î²þÁ±¤È7Æü¤â¤Î¥É¥ë»ñ¶â¶¡µë¤Î¼è¤ê°·¤¤¸º¾¯¤Ç¤¹¡£
¡ØThis operational change will be effective as of 1 September 2020. At the same time, these central banks will continue to hold weekly operations with an 84-day maturity.¡Ù
¡ØThese central banks stand ready to re-adjust the provision of US dollar liquidity as warranted by market conditions. The swap lines among these central banks are available standing facilities and serve as an important liquidity backstop to ease strains in global funding markets, thereby helping to mitigate the effects of such strains on the supply of credit to households and businesses, both domestically and abroad.¡Ù
The provision of euro liquidity through the ECB¡Çs swap and repo operations Blog post by Fabio Panetta and Isabel Schnabel, Members of the Executive Board of the ECB 19 August 2020
¡ØSwap and repo lines are well-established instruments in central banks¡Ç toolkits. Since the global financial crisis they have increasingly been employed as stabilising tools in times of stress in global financial markets. The coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis has once again underscored their importance.¡Ù
¡ØThis blog post explains the motivation for the Eurosystem granting non-euro area central banks access to euro liquidity through swap and repo facilities. It argues that liquidity arrangements are essential monetary policy instruments for central banks, and for the Eurosystem in particular.¡Ù
¡ØBy ensuring that euro funding is available to counterparties outside the euro area, the Eurosystem¡Çs swap and repo agreements help the ECB to fulfil its price stability objective, prevent euro liquidity shortages from morphing into financial stability risks, and support the use of the euro in global financial and commercial transactions.¡Ù
¡ØTaken together, this contributes to the smooth transmission of monetary policy in the euro area by preventing a possible undesirable tightening of credit provision in all, or part, of the euro area due to financial turmoil, which benefits the entire European economy and all European citizens.¡Ù
¡ØImportantly, swap and repo lines serve as a backstop that should not compete with, or replace, private funding markets in the provision of euro liquidity to non-euro area residents. The mere existence of precautionary liquidity arrangements has a calming effect on investors, and may help to maintain orderly market conditions.¡Ù
¡ØIn fact, the signalling effect of the ECB being willing and able to provide liquidity in case of need has helped to calm market tensions so that the euro liquidity lines granted as a response to the crisis have not been used so far.¡Ù
The basic functioning of swap and repo lines The role of US dollar and euro liquidity facilities The ECB¡Çs motivation for setting up liquidity arrangements ¡¡1. Preventing forced asset sales ¡¡2. Mitigating spillover effects ¡¡3. Strengthening the role of the euro Conclusion
2020: Navigating the Decade Ahead: Implications for Monetary Policy 2019: Challenges for Monetary Policy 2018: Changing Market Structure and Implications for Monetary Policy 2017: Fostering a Dynamic Global Economy 2016: Designing Resilient Monetary Policy Frameworks for the Future
°ìÈֺǸå¤Ë¡ØNote: The Committee did not reaffirm this statement in January 2020 in light of its ongoing review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communications practices. This statement is a reprint of the statement affirmed in January 2019.¡Ù¤È¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤è¤¦¤Ë¡¢ºÇ½é¤Ïǯ¼¡¸«Ä¾¤·¤À¤Ã¤¿¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬º£Ç¯¤Ï¤Þ¤À¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¤¹¤Î¤Ç¡¢¤Þ¤¢¥¸¥ã¥¯·ê¤Î¹Ö±é¤â¤¢¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¤¹¤«¤é¤³¤ê¤ã9·î¤Ë¤³¤Î¼êľ¤·¤Ç¤Þ¤¹¤ï¤Ê¡£
¡ØThe Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decisionmaking by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society¡Ù
¡ØInflation, employment, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Moreover, monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity and prices with a lag. Therefore, the Committee¡Çs policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee¡Çs goals. ¡Ù
¡ØThe inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation.¡Ù
¡ØThe Committee reaffirms its judgment that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve¡Çs statutory mandate.¡Ù
¡ØThe Committee would be concerned if inflation were running persistently above or below this objective. Communicating this symmetric inflation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term inflation expectations firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee¡Çs ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.¡Ù
º£²ó¤Î¸«Ä¾¤·¤Ç¤¤¤¸¤Ã¤ÆÍè¤ë¤È¤·¤¿¤é¤³¤Á¤é¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¡£¤³¤ÎÃæ¤Ë¡Öthis symmetric inflation goal¡×¤È¤¢¤ê¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤µ¤é¤Ë¤½¤ÎÁ°¤Î½ê¤Ç¡ÖFOMC¤Ï»ý³Ū¤Ëʪ²Á¤¬ÌÜɸÃͤ«¤é¾å²¼¤ÎÊÒÊý¤ËЪΥ¤·¤¿¾õÂ֤Ȥʤ뤳¤È¤ò·üǰ¤¹¤ë¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤¬¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¡Ö¥·¥ó¥á¥È¥ê¥Ã¥¯¡×¤È¤¤¤¦Ïäò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£¤Ê¤ª¡¢¤³¤ì1ʸ¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤«¤éʬ¤±¤é¤ì¤Þ¤»¤ó¤Ç¤·¤¿¤±¤É¡¢¥·¥ó¥á¥È¥ê¥Ã¥¯¥´¡¼¥ë¤Ç±¿±Ä¤¹¤ë¤³¤È¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤Æ´ë¶È¤ä²È·×¤Îʪ²Á¤Ë´Ø¤¹¤ë¾Íè¤Î¸«Êý¤ò°ÂÄꤵ¤»¤Æ¡¢³§ÍÍ¤Î·ÐºÑ¹ÔÆ°¤Ø¤ÎÉԳμÂÀ¤ò¸º¤é¤·¡¢Ä¹´ü¶âÍø¤Î°ÂÄê¤â¤·¤Þ¤Ã¤»¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤è¤¦¤Ê¸úÍѤÎÏäˤʤäƤ¤¤Þ¤¹¤Î¤Ç¡¢¤Þ¤¢¸åȾ¤ÎÊý¤Ï¤µ¤Æ¤ª¤¤Þ¤·¤Æ¡¢¤¿¤Ö¤ó¤³¤ÎºÇ½é¤Î¡ÖThe Committee would be concerned if inflation were running persistently above or below this objective. ¡×¤È¤¤¤¦°ìʸ¤ò¤â¤¦¾¯¤·¡ÖÊ¿¶Ñ¤·¤¿¥µ¥¤¥¯¥ë¤Ç2%¤òÌܻؤ¹¤Î¤Ç¡¢¥á¥¤¥¯¥¢¥Ã¥×¥¹¥È¥é¥Æ¥¸¡¼±¾¡¹¡¢¤¿¤À¤·¥¤¥ó¥Õ¥ì¤¬¥ª¡¼¥Ð¡¼¥·¥å¡¼¥È¤·¤Ê¤¤»þ¤Ë¸Â¤ë¡×¤È¤«¤½¤ó¤Ê¸À¤¤Êý¤Ë¤¹¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Ê¡£¤¢¤ë¤¤¤Ï¡ÖCommunicating this symmetric inflation goal¡×¤Î¥·¥ó¥á¥È¥ê¥Ã¥¯¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤â¤Á¤ç¤Ã¤È¤³¤¦ÍѸì¤È¤·¤Æ·ø¤¤µ¤¤¬¤¹¤ë(¸Ä¿Í¤Î´¶ÁۤǤ¹)¤Î¤Ç¡¢¤³¤³¤ò¤â¤¦¤¹¤³¤í¡Ö·Êµ¤¤Î¥µ¥¤¥¯¥ë¤ÎÃæ¤ÇÊ¿¶ÑŪ¤Ë2%¡×¤È¤¤¤¦Ïäò¤¹¤ë¤Î¤«¤Ê¡¢¤È»×¤¤¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØThe maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable.¡Ù
¡ØConsequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee¡Çs policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision.¡Ù
¡ØThe Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments. Information about Committee participants¡Ç estimates of the longer-run normal rates of output growth and unemployment is published four times per year in the FOMC¡Çs Summary of Economic Projections. For example, in the most recent projections, the median of FOMC participants¡Ç estimates of the longerrun normal rate of unemployment was 4.4 percent. ¡Ù
¡ØIn setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee¡Çs assessments of its maximum level.¡Ù
¡ØThese objectives are generally complementary. However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants noted that the coronavirus pandemic was causing tremendous human and economic hardship across the United States and around the world. Following sharp declines, economic activity and employment had picked up somewhat in recent months but remained well below levels at the beginning of the year. Weaker demand and significantly lower oil prices were holding down consumer price inflation. Overall financial conditions had improved in recent months, in part reflecting policy measures to support the economy and the flow of credit to U.S. households and businesses. Participants agreed that the path of the economy would depend on the course of the virus, which was seen as highly uncertain.¡Ù
ºÇ½é¤Î¥Ñ¥é¥°¥é¥Õ¤Ç¼¨¤µ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤ëÏääÆÂçÂÎÀ¼ÌÀʸ¤ÎÂè1¥Ñ¥é¥°¥é¥Õ(ºÇ¶á¤ÎÀ¼ÌÀʸ¤ÏºÇ½é¤Ë¡ÖThe Federal Reserve is committed to using its full range of tools to support the U.S. economy in this challenging time, thereby promoting its maximum employment and price stability goals.¡×¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤¦´èÄ¥¤ê¤Þ¤¹Ê¸¸À¤¬Æþ¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç2¥Ñ¥éÌܤˤʤê¤Þ¤¹¤¬)¤Î¸½¾õȽÃÇʸ¸ÀÉôʬ¤ÈÂçÂÎÆ±¤¸¤â¤Î¤¬½Ð¤Æ¤¯¤ë¤È¤¤¤¦»ÅÍͤˤʤäƤ¤¤Þ¤·¤Æº£²ó¤â³µ¤Í¤³¤ì¤Ï¸«¤¿¤³¤È¤¢¤ëÏäǥ³¥í¥Ê¤Ç¥¨¥é¥¤¥³¥Ã¥Á¥ã¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤ª¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿¤¬¡¢è¤µö¼ã´³»ý¤Áľ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤±¤É¿å½à¤Ï¤¢¤Ð¤Ð¤Ð¤Ð¡¼¤À¤·Àè¹Ô¤¤Ï¥³¥í¥Ê³ÈÂ缡Âè¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤µ¤Ã¤Ñ¤ê¥ï¥«¥é¥ó¥Á²ñĹ¤È¡£
¡ØParticipants noted that the rebound in consumer spending from its trough in April had been particularly strong. Resumption in economic activity, as well as payments to households under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, had supported household income and consumer expenditures.¡Ù
¡ØConsumers' purchases of goods-including motor vehicles, other durables, and especially goods sold online-had bounced back much more than their purchases of services, such as air travel, hotel accommodations, and restaurant meals, which were disrupted significantly by social distancing and other effects of the virus.¡Ù
¡ØWith regard to the behavior of household spending in recent weeks, participants pointed to information from District contacts and high-frequency indicators (such as credit and debit card transactions and mobility indicators based on cellphone location tracking) as suggesting that increases in some consumer expenditures had likely slowed in reaction to the further spread of the virus.¡Ù
½Ð¤¿¤Ê¡Öhigh-frequency indicators¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¡¢Æü¶ä¤â¤·¤Ã¤«¤ê¤³¤ÎÊդθ¦ïÓ¤ò¤·¤Æ¤ª¤¤¤ÆÂçÀµ²ò¤Ç¤´¤¶¤¤¤Þ¤·¤¿¤Ê¤È¤¤¤¦´¶¤¸¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¥¯¥ì¥¸¥Ã¥È¥«¡¼¥ÉÈÎÇä¾õ¶·¤ä¤é¿Í´Ö¤Î°Üư¾õ¶·¤Ê¤É¤«¤é´ª°Æ¤¹¤ë¤Ë¡¢ºÇ¶á¿ô½µ´Ö¤Ë´Ø¤·¤Æ¸À¤¦¤È¡¢´¶À÷¾ÉºÆ³ÈÂç¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤Æ¾ÃÈñ¼Ô¤Îư¤¤¬Æß²½¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë·¹¸þ¤¬¤ß¤é¤ì¤ë¤³¤È¤¬¸«¼õ¤±¤é¤ì¤Þ¤¹¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦ÏäǤ¹¤¬¡¢¤½¤ÎÁ°ÃʤˤÁ¤ã¤ó¤È¡Öinformation from District contacts¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤âÆþ¤ì¤Æ¡¢½¾ÍèÄ̤ê¤Î¥¢¥Í¥¯¥É¡¼¥¿¥ë¤Ê¾ðÊó¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤â¸ÀµÚ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤¬¥¤¥¤¥Í!¤Ã¤Æ´¶¤¸¤Ç¤·¤Æ¡¢¥Ó¥Ã¥¯¥Ç¡¼¥¿³èÍѱ¾¡¹¤Ã¤Æ¡¢µï¤Ê¤¬¤é¤Ë¤·¤Æ¥Ç¡¼¥¿¼è¤ì¤Æ¤·¤Þ¤¤¤Þ¤¹¤Î¤ÇÊØÍø¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¤Þ¤¢¤½¤¦¤Ï¤æ¤¦¤Æ¤â¥¢¥¿¥¯¥·¤Î¤è¤¦¤Ê¥¢¥Ê¥í¥°¿Í´Ö¤«¤éÃפ·¤Þ¤¹¤È¡¢ÃϾåÀï¤Î¾õ¶·¤Ï¾å¤«¤é¸«¤ë¤À¤±¤Ç¤Ï¤Ê¤¯¸½ÃϤˤò±¿¤ó¤À¤êÁ°Àþ¤ÎÊý¤«¤éľÀÜʹ¤¯¤Ê¤É¡¢Íפϥե£¡¼¥ë¥É¥ï¡¼¥¯¤È¤«¥¢¥Í¥¯¤Ã¤ÆÂç»ö¤À¤è¤Í¡¢¤È»×¤¦¤Î¤Ç¤³¤Îɽ¸½¤Ï¹¥´¶¤ò»ý¤Ä¤ï¡£
¡ØParticipants noted that households' spending on discretionary services-such as leisure, travel, and hospitality-would likely be subdued for some time and thus would be a factor restraining the pace of recovery.¡Ù
¡ØIn contrast to the sizable rebound in consumer spending, participants saw less improvement in the business sector in recent months, and they noted that their District business contacts continued to report extraordinarily high levels of uncertainty and risks.¡Ù
¡ØSeveral participants relayed examples of some operational difficulties their business contacts were reportedly facing in the current environment. These difficulties included managing disruptions in supply chains, challenges associated with closure and reopening, and elevated employee absenteeism in some cases. Furthermore, some participants noted that small businesses were under significant strain.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants noted that, in light of conditions in the business sector, business investment spending continued to be subdued. Participants generally agreed that actions of consumers and businesses in taking steps to slow the spread of the virus, along with developments in public health, would be critical in ensuring a durable reopening of businesses.¡Ù
¡ØSeveral participants also commented on ongoing challenges facing the energy or farm sector despite recent improvements. In the energy sector, these challenges included still-low oil demand, excess inventories, and low oil prices, while in the farm sector they included low prices of some farm commodities, pandemic-related disruptions in some food processing plants, and a significant decline in demand for ethanol.¡Ù
¡ØRegarding the labor market, many participants commented that the pace of employment gains, which was quite strong in May and June, had likely slowed. The increasing number of virus cases in many parts of the country had led to delays in some business reopenings and to some reclosures as well.¡Ù
¡ØThe pace of declines in initial unemployment insurance claims had slowed in recent weeks, and claims remained at an elevated level. In addition, participants emphasized that the labor market was a long way from a full recovery even after the positive May and June employment reports; these reports indicated that, through June, only about one-third of the roughly 22 million loss in jobs that occurred over March and April had been offset by subsequent gains.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants generally agreed that prospects for further substantial improvement in the labor market would depend on a broad and sustained reopening of businesses. In turn, such a reopening would depend in large part on the efficacy of health measures taken to limit the spread of the virus.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants also discussed the nature of the current situation in the labor market.¡Ù
the nature of the current situation¤È¤Ï²¿¤¾??
¡ØThey noted that the downturn in employment was concentrated among lower-wage and service-sector workers, many of whom were employed in industries most adversely affected by social-distancing measures. And with lower-wage and service-sector jobs disproportionately held by African Americans, Hispanics, and women, these portions of the population were bearing a disproportionate share of the economic hardship caused by the pandemic.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants noted that the fiscal support initiated in the spring through the CARES Act had been very important in granting some financial relief to millions of families. A number of participants observed that, with some provisions of the CARES Act set to expire shortly against the backdrop of a still-weak labor market, additional fiscal aid would likely be important for supporting vulnerable families, and thus the economy more broadly, in the period ahead.¡Ù
¡ØIn their comments about inflation, participants generally judged that the negative effect of the pandemic on aggregate demand was more than offsetting upward pressures on some prices stemming from supply constraints or from higher demand for certain products, so that the overall effect of the pandemic on prices was seen as disinflationary.¡Ù
¡ØRecent low monthly readings of PCE prices suggested that the 12-month change measure of PCE price inflation would likely continue to run well below the Committee's 2 percent objective for some time.¡Ù
¡ØAgainst this backdrop, a few participants noted a risk that longer-term inflation expectations might move below levels consistent with the Committee's symmetric 2 percent objective. Participants also noted that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy would likely be needed for some time to support aggregate demand and achieve 2 percent inflation over the longer run.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants observed that many measures of financial market functioning were indicating that improvements achieved since the extreme turbulence in March had been sustained.¡Ù
¡ØActions by the Federal Reserve, including emergency lending facilities established with approval of (and, in many cases, financial support from) the Treasury, had helped ease the strains in some financial markets seen earlier in the year and were supporting the flow of credit to households, businesses, and communities.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants observed that the volume of borrowing in recent months at many of the Federal Reserve's liquidity facilities had stayed low, reflecting improved availability of funding from market sources. And participants agreed that the Federal Reserve's ongoing provision of backstop credit in various forms continued to be important to sustain the market improvements already achieved.¡Ù
¤Þ¤¢¤³¤ÎÊÕ¤ÎÏäϤۤܽçÅö¤Ç¡¢¥ï¥·¤é¡¢¤È¸À¤¤¤Ä¤Ä¤³¤Á¤é¤Ç¤â¡Öwith approval of (and, in many cases, financial support from) the Treasury¡×¤ÈºâÀ¯ÍÍ¥¢¥ê¥¬¥¿¥ä¥¢¥ê¥¬¥¿¥ä¤ÈºâÀ¯¤Ë²Ö¤ò»ý¤¿¤»¤ë¥¹¥¿¥ó¥¹¥¥¿¥³¥ì¤Ç¤¹¤Ê¡£º£¸å¤â¥Ð¥Ã¥¯¥¹¥È¥Ã¥×¤È¤·¤Æ¤Î¥µ¥Ý¡¼¥È¤ÏɬÍס¢¤È¤¤¤¦¸À¤¤Êý¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¥µ¡¼¥Ó¥¹¥ì¡¼¥È¤Ç¥¬¥·¥¬¥·¤È¤¤¤¦ÏäǤϤʤ¤¡£
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¡ØParticipants observed that uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook remained very elevated, with the path of the economy highly dependent on the course of the virus and the public sector's response to it.¡Ù
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¡ØSeveral risks to the outlook were noted, including the possibility that additional waves of virus outbreaks could result in extended economic disruptions and a protracted period of reduced economic activity. In such scenarios, banks and other lenders could tighten conditions in credit markets appreciably and restrain the availability of credit to households and businesses.¡Ù
¡ØOther risks cited included the possibility that fiscal support for households, businesses, and state and local governments might not provide sufficient relief of financial strains in these sectors and that some foreign economies could come under greater pressure than anticipated as a result of the spread of the pandemic abroad.¡Ù
¡ØSeveral participants noted potential longer-run effects of the pandemic associated with possible restructuring in some sectors of the economy that could slow the growth of the economy's productive capacity for some time.¡Ù
¡ØBanks and other financial institutions could come under significant stress, particularly if one of the more adverse scenarios regarding the spread of the virus and its effects on economic activity was realized. Nonfinancial corporations had carried high levels of indebtedness into the pandemic, increasing their risk of insolvency.¡Ù
¡ØThere were also concerns that the anticipated increase in Treasury debt over the next few years could have implications for market functioning.¡Ù
ºâÀ¯ÀÖ»ú¤¬À¹Âç¤Ë³ÈÂ礷¤Æ¤¤¤¯¸«Ä̤·¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤ÏÊÆ¹ñºÄ»Ô¾ì¤ËÂФ¹¤ë¡Öimplications for market functioning¡×¤¬¤¢¤ë¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Ã¤Æ¤³¤È¤Ç¤Þ¤¢¼ûµë¤È¤¤¤¦¤«Àè¹Ô¤ºâÀ¯·üǰ¤Ç¶âÍø¤¬¾å¤¬¤ëÏäǤ¹¤«¤Í¡£
¡ØThere was general agreement that these institutions, activities, and markets should be monitored closely, and a few participants noted that improved data would be helpful for doing so.¡Ù
¡ØSeveral participants observed that the Federal Reserve had recently taken steps to help ensure that banks remain resilient through the pandemic, including by conducting additional sensitivity analysis in conjunction with the most recent bank stress tests and imposing temporary restrictions on shareholder payouts to preserve banks' capital. A couple of participants noted that they believed that restrictions on shareholder payouts should be extended, while another judged that such a step would be premature.¡Ù
[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] of the Federal Open Market Committee July 28-29, 2020
A joint meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee and the Board of Governors was held by videoconference on Tuesday, July 28, 2020, at 10:00 a.m. and continued on Wednesday, July 29, 2020, at 9:00 a.m.1
ºÇ½é¤Î¾®¸«½Ð¤·¤¬¡ØReview of Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communication Practices¡Ù¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¤³¤ì¤Ï¤É¤¦¸«¤Æ¤âÄà¤é¤ì¤Ê¤±¤ì¤Ð¹Ô¤±¤Þ¤»¤ó¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¤¹¤¬²¿¤«Ã»¤¤¤Ê¥ª¥¤¡£
¡ØParticipants continued their discussion related to the ongoing review of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices.¡Ù
¡ØAt this meeting, they discussed potential changes to the Committee's Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy.¡Ù
¥í¥ó¥¬¡¼¥é¥ó¥´¡¼¥ë¥º±¾¡¹¤ÏºÇ½é¤Ö¤Ã¤³¤Þ¤ì¤Æ¤«¤éËèǯ1·î¤ÎFOMC¤Ç¥ì¥Ó¥å¡¼¤·¤Æ¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢º£Ç¯¤Ï(Ê̤˥³¥í¥Ê¤È¤Ï´Ø·¸¤Ê¤¯)¸«Ä¾¤·¤·¤Þ¤·¤ç¤Ã¤Æ¤ä¤Ã¤Æ¤¿¤Î¤Çºòǯ1·îÈǤΤޤޤˤʤäƤª¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤ë¡£¤Á¤Ê¥Ö¥Ä¤Ï¢ª[³°Éô¥ê¥ó¥¯] agreed that, in light of fundamental changes in the economy over the past decade-including generally lower levels of interest rates and persistent disinflationary pressures in the United States and abroad-and given what has been learned during the monetary policy framework review, refining the statement could be helpful in increasing the transparency and accountability of monetary policy.¡Ù
¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤ÇÍè¤Þ¤·¤¿¤Ã¤Æ½ê¤Ç¤¹¤¬¡¢¡Örefining the statement¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¤¢¤¯¤Þ¤Ç¤â¡Ö¥ê¥Õ¥¡¥¤¥ó¡×¤Ç¤¢¤Ã¤Æ¡Ö¥Á¥§¥ó¥¸¡×¤È¤«¤Ç¤Ï¤Ê¤¤¤Ç¤¹¤«¤é¡¢´ðËÜŪ¤Ë¸½¾õ¤Ç¼¨º¶¤µ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤ëÀ¯ºöÊý¸þÀ¤Ë±è¤Ã¤¿ÌÀ³Î²½¤È¤¤¤¦¤è¤¦¤ÊÊý¸þ¤Ë¤Ê¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Ê¤¢¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦ÏäǤ¹¤¬¡¢¡ÖParticipants agreed that¡×¤Ê¤Î¤Ç¼¡²ó¤ÎFOMC¤Ç²¿¤«¤Î¼êľ¤·¤¬Æþ¤ë²ÄǽÀ¤Ï¹â¤½¤¦¤Ë»×¤¨¤Þ¤¹¤Ê¡£
¤Ç¤â¤Ã¤Æ¤É¤¦¤¤¤¦Êѹ¹¤ò¤¹¤ë¤«¤È¤¤¤¦¤È¡¢¡Öin light of fundamental changes in the economy¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¾õ¶·¤Ç¡¢¶ñÂÎŪ¤Ë¤Ï¡Ögenerally lower levels of interest rates and persistent disinflationary pressures in the United States and abroad¡×¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ç¤¹¤«¤é¡¢¤Þ¤¢°ÊÁ°¤è¤êÏäΤ¢¤ë¡Ö¥á¥¤¥¯¥¢¥Ã¥×¥¹¥È¥é¥Æ¥¸¡¼¡×¤Î¹Í¤¨¤òÆþ¤ì¤Æ¤¯¤ë¡¢¤È¤¤¤¦¤³¤È¤Ë¤Ê¤ë¤ó¤Ç¤·¤ç¤¦¤Í¡¢¤È¹Í¤¨¤ë¤Î¤¬²ºÅö¤ÊÀþ¤«¤Ê(¸Ä¿Í¤Î´¶ÁۤǤ¹)¤«¤È¡£
¡ØSuch refinements could also facilitate well-informed decisionmaking by households and businesses, and, as a result, better position the Committee to meet its maximum-employment and price-stability objectives.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants noted that the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy serves as the foundation for the Committee's policy actions and that it would be important to finalize all changes to the statement in the near future.¡Ù
¡Öin the near future¡×¤Ë¤Ï¤½¤Î¥ê¥Õ¥¡¥¤¥ó¤Î¡Öfinalize¡×¤ò¤¹¤ë¤è¤¦¤Ç¤¹¤Ê¡£¤Ê¤ª¤³¤³¤ÎÉôʬ¤Ç¤Ï¥ê¥Õ¥¡¥¤¥ó¤¸¤ã̵¤¯¤Æ¥Á¥§¥ó¥¸¤Ã¤Æ¸À¤Ã¤Æ¤ë¤±¤É¡¢¤³¤ì¤Ï¥¹¥Æ¡¼¥È¥á¥ó¥Èʸ¸À¤Î¥Á¥§¥ó¥¸¤È¤¤¤¦°ÕÌ£¤Ç¡¢¼ñ»Ý¤Ï¥ê¥Õ¥¡¥¤¥ó¤Ê¤ó¤Ç¥Í¡¼¥Î¤È¤«»×¤¤¤Þ¤·¤¿¡£
ËèÅ٤Υ¤¥ó¥¹¥¿¥ó¥ÈÆÉ¤ßµ»Ë¡(?)¤Ç¡ØParticipants' Views on Current Conditions and the Economic Outlook¡Ù¤Î¥±¥Ä¤«¤é¥Ñ¥é¥°¥é¥Õ¤´¤ÈµÕ½ç¤ÇÆÉ¤ó¤Ç¤Þ¤¤¤ê¤Þ¤¹¤È¡¢ºÇ¸å¤Î2¥Ñ¥é¤¬º£¸å¤Î¶âÍ»À¯ºö¡¢¤È¤¤¤Ã¤Æ¤â¤µ¤Ã¤¤Î¥¹¥È¥é¥Æ¥¸¡¼±¾¡¹¤è¤ê¤âÀï½Ñ¤ÎÏäǡ¢¥¬¥¤¥À¥ó¥¹Ê¸¸À¤É¤¦¤¹¤ë¤Î¤«¤È¤¤¤¦¤Î¤È¡¢YCC¤È¤«¤½¤Î¼ê¤ÎÏäϤɤ¦¤è¤È¤¤¤¦ÆâÍÆ¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤Î¤Ç¸½À¤Íø±×¥Á¥Ã¥¯¡£µÕ½ç¤ÇÆÉ¤à¤Î¤ÇºÇ½ª¥Ñ¥é¤«¤é»²¤ê¤Þ¤¹¡£
¡ØA majority of participants commented on yield caps and targets-approaches that cap or target interest rates along the yield curve-as a monetary policy tool.¡Ù
¡ØOf those participants who discussed this option, most judged that yield caps and targets would likely provide only modest benefits in the current environment, as the Committee's forward guidance regarding the path of the federal funds rate already appeared highly credible and longer-term interest rates were already low.¡Ù
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¡ØAmong these costs, participants noted the possibility of an excessively rapid expansion of the balance sheet and difficulties in the design and communication of the conditions under which such a policy would be terminated, especially in conjunction with forward guidance regarding the policy rate.¡Ù
¡ØIn light of these concerns, many participants judged that yield caps and targets were not warranted in the current environment but should remain an option that the Committee could reassess in the future if circumstances changed markedly. ¡Ù
>yield caps and targets were not warranted in the current environment >yield caps and targets were not warranted in the current environment >yield caps and targets were not warranted in the current environment
¡ØA couple of participants remarked on the value of yield caps and targets as a means of reinforcing forward guidance on asset purchases, thereby providing insurance against adverse movements in market expectations regarding the path of monetary policy, and as a tool that could help limit the amount of asset purchases that the Committee would need to make in pursuing its dual-mandate goals.¡Ù
¡ØWith regard to the outlook for monetary policy beyond this meeting, a number of participants noted that providing greater clarity regarding the likely path of the target range for the federal funds rate would be appropriate at some point.¡Ù
¡ØConcerning the possible form that revised policy communications might take, these participants commented on outcome-based forward guidance-under which the Committee would undertake to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate at least until one or more specified economic outcomes was achieved-and also touched on calendar-based forward guidance-under which the current target range would be maintained at least until a particular calendar date.¡Ù
¡ØIn the context of outcome-based forward guidance, various participants mentioned using thresholds calibrated to inflation outcomes, unemployment rate outcomes, or combinations of the two, as well as combinations with calendar-based guidance.¡Ù
¡ØIn addition, many participants commented that it might become appropriate to frame communications regarding the Committee's ongoing asset purchases more in terms of their role in fostering accommodative financial conditions and supporting economic recovery.¡Ù
¡ØMore broadly, in discussing the policy outlook, a number of participants observed that completing a revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy would be very helpful in providing an overarching framework that would help guide the Committee's future policy actions and communications.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants discussed the current stance of monetary policy and the circumstances under which they might increase monetary policy accommodation or clarify their intentions regarding policy.¡Ù
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¡ØParticipants generally judged that the Committee's policy actions over the past several months had provided substantial accommodation; several of them observed that the Committee's asset purchases, which were designed to support financial market functioning and the smooth flow of credit, were likely also providing a degree of policy accommodation.¡Ù
¡ØNoting the increase in uncertainty about the economic outlook over the intermeeting period, several participants suggested that additional accommodation could be required to promote economic recovery and return inflation to the Committee's 2 percent objective.¡Ù
¿ô̾(several)¤Î»²²Ã¼Ô¤Ï¤«¤é¡¢Á°²ó¤ÎFOMC²ñ¹ç°Ê¹ß¤ËÉԳμÂÀ¤¬¹â¤Þ¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤«¤é¡Öadditional accommodation could be required¡×ˤ¤¬¤¬Èô¤ó¤Ç¤Þ¤¤¤ê¤Þ¤·¤¿!!!!
¡ØSome participants observed that, due to the nature of the shock that the U.S. economy was experiencing, strong fiscal policy support would be necessary to encourage expeditious improvements in labor market conditions.¡Ù
¡ØParticipants also judged that, in order to continue to support the flow of credit to households and businesses, it would be appropriate over coming months for the Federal Reserve to increase its holdings of Treasury securities and agency residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and CMBS at least at the current pace. These actions would be helpful in sustaining smooth market functioning, thereby fostering the effective transmission of monetary policy to broader financial conditions. In addition, participants noted that it was appropriate that the Desk would continue to offer large-scale overnight and term repo operations. Participants observed that it would be important to continue to monitor developments closely and that the Committee would be prepared to adjust its plans as appropriate.¡Ù
¡ØIn their consideration of monetary policy at this meeting, participants reaffirmed their commitment to using the Federal Reserve's full range of tools to support the U.S. economy during this challenging time, thereby promoting its maximum employment and price stability goals.¡Ù
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¡ØThey noted that the path of the economy would depend significantly on the course of the virus and that the ongoing public health crisis would weigh heavily on economic activity, employment, and inflation in the near term and posed considerable risks to the economic outlook over the medium term.¡Ù
¡ØIn light of this assessment, all participants considered it appropriate to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent. Furthermore, participants continued to judge that it would be appropriate to maintain this target range until they were confident that the economy had weathered recent events and was on track to achieve the Committee's maximum employment and price stability goals.¡Ù
¡ØCATARINA SARAIVA. Hi, Chair. Thanks for taking our questions. You mentioned earlier that the labor market we had in February was the best we¡Çve had in 50 years, yet at that point the Black unemployment rate was still double that of whites. So I wanted to ask you, you know, we¡Çve seen some economists and even the Biden campaign call for the Fed to more specifically target the gap between minority unemployment rates. Even if you don¡Çt get a mandate on this from Congress, is it something you would consider more explicitly going forward? And how would you do that?¡Ù
¡ØAnd then I also wanted to ask you about former economist Claudia Sahm¡Çs writings from last night. She gave a pretty harrowing account of her time at the Fed-described harassment and professional gaslighting that others have also spoken to. Is this your Federal Reserve?¡Ù
¡ØSo we have started, though, in recent years to focus considerable time and attention on disparate levels of unemployment-for example, among-among different racial groups and demographic groups. We regularly discuss those differences in our FOMC discussions. We call them out in testimony and in speeches and in our Monetary Policy Report to Congress. You¡Çll see it everywhere, in all the things that we do.¡Ù
¡ØI would say, though, that we-you know, we have made it a very high priority to have as diverse and inclusive an organization as we can. And I think we¡Çve made a lot of progress on that. I think we want a place where it¡Çs free to speak, where views are welcome, where people can disagree but must do so respectfully. I think a lot of organizations are coming around to understanding the importance of that. And I-my experience has been, you know, from my career in business too, is that organizations-the really successful organizations in our society get this. They do. They-mostly, they get it that if you want to attract the best people, this iswhat you-you¡Çre going to attract the best people by having a diverse and inclusive workforce,so-and workplace. So we¡Çve made diversity a priority.¡Ù
¡ØJEAN YUNG. Hi, Chair Powell. Thank you very much. I wanted to ask about forward guidance. Do you see merits to tying your asset purchases to economic outcomes? And would you consider both inflation and labor market conditions as part of those outcomes? And specifically, for the labor market, what conditions would you want to see before you think about pulling back stimulus? Thank you.¡Ù
¡ØCHAIR POWELL. So that¡Çs a great discussion that we-we¡Çve talked about that at past meetings, and I imagine we will at future meetings and haven¡Çt made any decisions yet on that.¡Ù
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¡ØBut, you know, you¡Çve got a couple ways to go. You can tie?you can tie them to dates. You can say we will-for a specific period of time, we will keep rates at X level. Or you can say we¡Çll keep them there until you achieve a certain macroeconomic goal. And it can either be inflation or it could be an employment goal, as you pointed out.¡Ù
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¡ØAnd I think that, you know, there¡Çs attraction in all of those depending on the situation, I think, for obvious reasons. You can imagine situations where, you know, where you¡Çd really want to be targeting macroeconomic outcomes. It¡Çs also the case, though, that sometimes? sometimes date-based guidance works too. I think it really is very fact specific, and it¡Çs not something we¡Çve-you know, we haven¡Çt made any decisions on that, so I wouldn¡Çt be standing here telling you we¡Çre going to go this way or that way, you know, should the time come for us to-to change our forward guidance.¡Ù
¡ØBRIAN CHEUNG. Hi, Chairman Powell. Thanks so much. Brian Cheung with Yahoo Finance. I wanted to ask just how the framework review is working in tandem with your discussion on explicit forward guidance. So is the idea that you¡Çre trying to have some order to that, that you would announce the findings of the Fed review before then committing to some sort of explicit forward guidance or even yield curve control policy? Thanks¡Ù
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¡ØCHAIR POWELL. You know, so I do think that completion of the review would-first of all, it¡Çs something that was a very high priority for-we were really looking forward to completing it, probably, at the June meeting, but it might have been the meeting before that. We were right on track, and then we got distracted. I-and we weren¡Çt expecting the pandemic, of course. Nobody was. So the pandemic came in. I think it is important to go back and finish that, and I do think that will inform, you know, everything we do going forward.¡Ù
¡ØI would also tell you, though, that, to-to a very large extent, the-the changes we¡Çll make to the Statement of [on] Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy are really codifying the way we¡Çre already acting with our policies. To a large extent, we¡Çre already doing the things that are-that are in there. This is just a way of-of acknowledging that and putting them in the document. I can¡Çt tell you what the exact timing of that will be, but I do think that¡Çs a-that¡Çs a sensible way to think about it. Thanks very much.¡Ù
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